# Macau-in-Coimbra

Highlights from the EACS '14 Conference

Macau in Coimbra

Ming Chan, Jorge Rangel, Carmen Mendes, et al.

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Edited by Eilo Yu & Rufino Ramos

Macau in Coimbra:

Highlights From
The EACS '14 Conference

INSTITUTO
INTERNACIONAL
MACAU
澳門國際研究所

A NOTE FROM THE COMPILERS

*This book purports to publish some of the papers and ideas presented on Macau at the **European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) 20th Biennial Conference** held at University of Coimbra, Portugal, 25-26 July 2014. Regrettably, the compilers were not able to collect all the papers that matter, mostly on the authors' own choice. We hope to give out an idea on the efforts held to publicize Macau during that event and in Coimbra, namely with a photo exhibition and book display held on its campus premises.*

*The compilers acknowledge **the great** efforts of Prof. Carmen Mendes – University of Coimbra, as the EACS '14-Coimbra organizer with a series of sessions feataring Macau studies panels, and of Dr. Jorge Rangel-IIM President who, besides making 2 panel presentations (1st in his Macanese Panel & 2nd in the Offshore Chinese Soft Power Roundtable), assumed crucial leadership in actualizing the <Macau-in-Coimbra '14> multi-facet program at EACS '14-Coimbra, to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Macau SAR, as originally proposed by Prof. Ming Chan-Stanford University, the conference keynote speaker.*

The compilers deeply appreciate the intellectual inputs from the panelists-authors of included panel papers/abstracts as well as the contribution of photos from other conference participants and University of Coimbra staffers.

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IIM in Coimbra
Jorge A. H. Rangel
President, International Institute of Macau

Two prestigious Portuguese universities – Coimbra and Minho – jointly hosted the 20th biennial conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS), held in July 2014. Almost five hundred scholars from many countries attended this important academic gathering where Macau had a very significant presence, through the International Institute of Macau (IIM) and other institutions of higher education and research centres, namely the University of Macau, the Macau Polytechnic Institute, the Institute for Tourism Studies, the University of Saint Joseph, the Macau Ricci Institute and the Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association. The conference had the Macau Foundation as one of its main sponsors.

This volume, published by IIM, contains a selection of the papers presented in more than 130 panels. As President of IIM, I take this opportunity to thank all the contributors, as well as Professors Ming K. Chan, Carmen Amado Mendes, Eilo Yu and my colleague Rufino Ramos for their efforts, guidance and effective coordination. This book will certainly stimulate further research on most of the subjects covered.

We also believe that the representatives of so many institutions and independent researchers from Macau will strengthen our relations and future cooperation with Portuguese and other European academic entities. Networking was undoubtedly reinforced, with new exchanges to be developed for the benefit of all.

Some panels were entirely organised by those institutes, while others had a very active involvement of scholars from Macau, both as chairmen or moderators and as speakers or discussants. The first group included the following themes: "The Transformation of the Casino and Tourism Industries in Macau and their Socio-Political Impacts on the Mode of Governance", which was sponsored by keynote speaker Ming K. Chan, "The Teaching of Chinese-Portuguese Translation and Interpretation

in Macau Polytechnic Institute", "Reinventing and preserving Macau Cultural Heritage in the New Millennium" (promoted by the Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association), "Macanese Identities, Heritages and Global Networks" (sponsored by IIM), "Jesuit Studies in Today's Macau" (sponsored by the Macau Ricci Institute) and "History and Impressions of Macau in the 1960's: Perspectives from the Macau Polytechnic Institute".

Other panels, such as "Evolution of Macau's Identity in its External Relations", "Macau and its Present Connections in the Region", "Insights into the Evolution of Modern Chinese Society: Education, Nationalism, Migration, Civil Society and Environmental Policy", "Youth Movements in Chinese Speaking Societies: what makes the Youth Movements and Activism in those Societies unique and different from those in the West?", "Macau in its Regional Context", "China's Courts, Judiciary and Lawyers in the 21st Century – Challenges and Prospects", "China's new Diplomacy under Xi Jinping" and "Sociological and Anthropological Challenges in Modern-day China" had speakers from Macau.

Besides chairing one of the sessions and taking part in a few others, I was also engaged in an "Expert Roundtable on the External Dimensions of Off-shore Chinese Soft Power: Endeavours of NGOs in Hong Kong and Macau", which was included in the general programme and had the sponsorship of keynote speaker Ming K. Chan. It was organised by Global Vision Media, Hong Kong. The topic of my presentation was "The International Institute of Macau and Macau's strategic role in the Sino-Lusophone socio-cultural interface in the global stage".

In accordance with the traditional division of areas of studies, the panels and themes were integrated into 16 sections: Art and Archaeology; Cinema, Media and Performing Arts; Culture; East – West Contact; Economics; Gender Studies; History; Law; Linguistics; Literature; Macau Studies; Philosophy and Religion; Politics and International Relations; Sociology and Anthropology; Teaching Chinese as Foreign Language; and Translation Studies. The inclusion of Macau Studies as a separate section is very meaningful to all of us, indeed. This decision represents a most relevant recognition of Macau Studies as a specific area of research and learning that some universities are now calling "Macaology" or "Macaulogia".

Abstracts identified by EACS as directly related to Macau Studies were formally submitted by Alexandra Sofia Rangel, International Institute of Macau ("The Macanese Community: Yesterday and Today"); António Graça de Abreu, University of Aveiro, Portugal ("In search of Quangzhou, or Zaitan, the Portuguese Chincheo in 16th century China"); Artur K. Wardega, SJ, Macau Ricci Institute ("The Jesuit Contribution to Macau and Greater China Today: Its Recent Foundation and Future Development"); Bill Chou, University of Macau ("Where the ruling party goes underground: China's united front policy in Macao"); Carmen Amado Mendes, University of Coimbra, Portugal ("Macau and the European Perceptions of China"); Celina Veiga de Oliveira, International Institute of Macau ("Women in Macanese Literature"); César Guillen-Nuñez, Macau Ricci Institute ("Rising From the Ashes: The Architecture of the New Society of Jesus in China and Macau"); Chan Wai Lan, Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association ("Constructing Indicators of Effectiveness Evaluation for Revitalization Planning of Stilt Houses in Coloane, Macao"); Alex Choi Hang-Keung, University of Macau ("Labour Politics in Macau's Casino Economy: State Regulation and Labour Control Regime"); Jiang Chun, Macau Polytechnic Institute ("The Traditional Festivals of Macao in 1960s: From an Oral History Perspective"); Jorge A. F. Godinho, University of Macau ("Casino Gaming in Macau: Evolution, Regulation and Challenges"); Jorge Rangel, International Institute of Macau, ("Macanese Diaspora Today"); José Carlos Matias dos Santos, Chinese University of Hong Kong and University of Saint Joseph, Macau ("Macau and Hong Kong: a tale of two external autonomies"); José Guimarães, University of Minho, Portugal ("Portuguese interests vs Chinese pragmatism in the forging of Macau's historical and political identity"); Kong Ka Ian, University of Hong Kong and Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association ("Portuguese Influence on Macao's Cultural Context: Past, Present and Future"); Tang Shi-yeong, Academia Sinica, Taiwan ("Portugal – Macau Relations with China and Japan: A Case of the Tatsu Maru Incident of 1908"); U Kelvin Costa, University of Hong Kong and Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association ("Sino-Luso Intersubjective Dialogue: Macanese Identity in Global Arena"); Victor Zheng, the Chinese University of Hong Kong ("Hong Kong and Macau's Investment in Mainland China in Early Economic Reformation Period: The Cases of Beijing Air Catering and Xingzhou Woolen Mill"); Victor Zheng, Linda Wong and Chris Leung, the Chinese University of Hong Kong ("The Hong Kong – Macau Conne-

ction: Looking through the Lens ofEstablishment and Development of Tung Wah Group of Hospitals and Kiang Wu Hospital"); Victor Zheng and Wan Po San, the Chinese University of Hong Kong ("Exploring the Course and Evolution of Integration between Macau and the Mainland: through a Decade Review of the Individual Visit Scheme"); Wan Hok Kun, Macau Polytechnic Institute ("Memories of the City: Macao in the 1960s"); Wan Penny Yim-king, Institute for Tourism Studies, Macau ("Transformation of Macau's Tourism Industry in the Rise of Casino Capitalism"); Eilo Yu Wing-yat, University of Macau ("Social Mobilization in the Macao Special Administrative Region: From Labour Collective Action to Heritage Conservation Movement"); Yves Camus, SJ, Macau Ricci Institute ("Macao and the Jesuits: A Reading through the Prism of History"); Zheng Yun Jie, Macau Polytechnic Institute ("Market and Economic Diversification in Macau"); and Zhu Feng, University of Peking, China ("A public-private partnership between colonial government and gaming enterprise: the case of Macau ZAPE farmland repossession, 1962-1985"). However, not all the speakers were able to be in Portugal for the conference and some never made the final versions of their papers available for publication.

At the invitation of the organisers and with the support of Professor Ming K. Chan, IIM also hosted a Macau photo exhibition ("A Look at the New Face of Macau") at Coimbra's Casa da Lusofonia, together with a Macau book fair, with inputs from the Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association. Rector João Gabriel Silva and other university authorities and officials presided over the ceremony. The books, published by IIM, the Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association and the Cultural Institute of Macau, were later donated to the main library of the University of Coimbra.

This was the first time that Macau had such a meaningful presence in a major international academic event. Our positive contribution to the success of this conference was well received and will have a decisive impact on our future involvement in activities of a similar nature worldwide.

The University of Coimbra and the 2014 Conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies
Carmen Amado Mendes

In the summer of 2008 I replaced Professor Sun Lam, Director of the Confucius Institute of the University of Minho in Braga, as the Portuguese representative at the board of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS), and challenged her for a joint organisation of an EACS conference in Portugal. The idea of combining the sinological tradition of the University of Coimbra with the excellence and dynamism of the University of Minho in Chinese Studies, sounded irresistible. Two years later, at the General Assembly in Riga, we presented the bid under the slogan: "EACS Conference 2014 in Portugal: The country where Europe ends and Sinology began". And we won.

The news were received with great enthusiasm by the first Portuguese participant in the EACS conferences, Ambassador João de Deus Ramos, the diplomat who opened the Portuguese embassy in Beijing in 1979 after we established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and one of the main negotiators of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration for the resolution of the 'Macau question'. He gave us all the encouragement to bring such an event to Portugal and was the perfect choice to present the keynote speech at the opening ceremony in Braga, dedicated to the evolution of Sino-Portuguese relations.

Organising an EACS conference in two different locations was unprecedented in the history of the Association and a big challenge, but also a good incentive for 'academic tourism' in two beautiful cities. Apart from all academic knowledge acquired during the conference, participants were given the opportunity of returning home and carrying a bit of our culture and traditions with them. In Coimbra, guided tours allowed them to discover the city and its University, UNESCO World Heritage, as well as our students' musical performances with their 'Tunas', dressed in their typical black costumes, at the emblematic *Casa da Escrita* (House of Writing). The gastronomical and handcraft fairs, organised by our sponsors at the Law Faculty, and the banquet at the

University's beautiful S. Marcos Palace, invited our participants to immerse themselves in the local culture. Their feedback suggested that it was a unique and unforgettable experience!

The conference inspired the organisation of an exhibition in the Science Museum on the long tradition of Sino-Portuguese contacts through the Jesuits who studied in the University of Coimbra, highlighting its role not only in history and tradition but also as a bridge between Europe and China since the XVI century. Matteo Ricci was in Coimbra in 1577 where he studied Mathematics and Theology, as many other missionaries bound for the East who sent back letters and other documents now part of the University's archives. These include the first maps of China printed in Europe, first hand descriptions of the Forbidden City and many material traces of the fascination with the East through the centuries. A very interesting photo and book exhibition on Macau was also inaugurated during the EACS conference by the International Institute of Macau, after the opening ceremony.

The quality standards of the presentations, selected through a strict peer review process, met our (legitimate) expectations. The academic programme was extremely rich, with over 500 communications on China in several fields of study: art and archaeology; cinema, media and performing arts; culture; east-west contact; economics; gender studies, history; linguistics; literature; law; politics and international relations; philosophy and religion; sociology; teaching Chinese as a foreign language; translation studies; and... Macau studies! This was also the first time, in the long history of EACS conferences, that Macaulogy was included as a field of study. To me, it would not make sense otherwise, not only due of the University of Coimbra's historical link to Macau, but also because it is my research area. From the start, my greatest motivation to organise this conference was to bring the University of Coimbra back on the map of Sinology after decades of estrangement; and Macau would have to play a key role in this. Professor Ming K. Chan, from Stanford University, keynote speaker in Coimbra, was of great help regarding this Macau connection.

Over 40 abstracts on Macaulogy were submitted, not only from Macau-based scholars, but also from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Portugal,

organised in ten panels: History and impressions of Macau in the 1960s; Macau and its past connection in the region; Macau in its regional context; Macanese identities, heritages and global networks; Jesuit studies in today's Macau; Reinventing and preserving Macau cultural heritage in new millennium; Evolution of Macau's identity in its external relations; The transformation of the casino and tourism industries in Macau and their socio-political impacts on the mode of governance. All presenters were invited to contribute to this book with their papers, although some of them could not meet the deadline. Nevertheless, the present publication gathers a comprehensive amount of excellent presentations featuring both established and junior promising academics.

This book is another step towards a broader recognition of Macaulogy as an important research field in Chinese studies and will hopefully inspire future EACS conference organisers to renew this commitment. The next conference will take place in St. Petersburg during the summer of 2016.

Carmen Amado Mendes, PhD.
Organiser of the 2014 EACS Conference
Professor of International Relations at the University of Coimbra
Author of Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, Hong Kong University Press,
2013 and other publications available at: www.uc.pt/feuc/carmen

Established in 1290, University of Coimbra is the oldest and most prestigious university in the Portuguese speaking world. As the only university in Portugal until the 20th century (except for University of Évora, 1559–1759) Coimbra monopolized Luso higher education for centuries in the nurturing of elite and highly skilled-cultured manpower with talents, advanced scientific-technological training and professional qualifications for the Lusophone Bloc. For nearly five centuries, its graduates have contributed both to Macau's historical evolution with its Luso legacies and the current MSAR development (as legal personnel, medical practitioners, engineers, architects, priests, academics, interpreters, teachers, other key professionals and civil servants).

As the 2014 EACS 20th Biennial Conference Welcome Session Keynote Speaker at the University of Coimbra in Portugal, Professor **Ming K. CHAN— Center of East Asian Studies, Stanford University** *-- will like to sponsor at least four Panels on Macau (2 each on 25 & 26 July '14) as key components at Coimbra of his proposed <***Macau-in-Coimbra '14***> Program:*

-- (A) Panel on Macau development and contemporary transformation by Macau-based scholars.

-- (B) Panel on Macanese identities, heritages and global networks.

-- (C) Panel on Macau studies by experts at public institutions and NGOs, such as the Macau Museum, Macau Historical Archive and Macau Heritage Ambassadors Association, etc.

-- (D) Panel on the visions and missions for China's Macau by Macau/Macanese students studying in and alumni of Portuguese universities, especially Coimbra.

As 2014 will be the the Macau SAR 15th anniversary, it is hoped that there will be several related major undertakings by Macau organizations at this EACS 20th Biennial Conference in Coimbra to highlight Macau for the benefit of European scholars of China, University of Coimbra teachers and students, residents of Coimbra and the people of Portugal.

(1) A major Exhibition on the Macau SAR's 15-year record of achievement and progress at this Conference. This could be linked with the following proposed events:

(2) A Book Fair to display Macau books, journals and related publications in Chinese, English and Portuguese at this Conference (in which almost all participants are China-focused/Chinese proficient). On display will be volumes on Macau published by Macau's research centers and public bodies.

(3) It will be an ideal occasion on 25 July '14 for Macau entities/ and representatives to host a Macau Reception featuring Macanese delicacies for the EACS attendees and University of Coimbra members as well as the Coimbra community at large. It shall be of great importance to celebrate the launching of this special Macau-focused Program in Coimbra that include a Macau Exhibition, Macau Panels and Macau Book Fair.

This item was first drafted by Ming K. Chan in April 2013 and went through further refinement after his academic visits to Lisbon in May 2013 and to Coimbra in October 2013. The present final version has also benefited from his conference trips to Macau in February, June, September and November 2013 when he held extensive consultations with Macau officials, scholars, media think tanks and Macau Foundations Leaders.

歐洲漢學學會2014雙年大會
澳門特別項目活動
<Macau-in-Coimbra '14>

在葡萄牙科英布拉市(Coimbra)的科英布拉大學(University of Coimbra)，成立于1290年，是葡語世界最古老和最負盛名的大學。它的畢業生對近五百年澳門的歷史演變、文化遺產和澳門特別行政區目前的發展做出巨大貢獻（例如法律人員，醫生，工程師，建築師，牧師，學者，譯員，教師，其他專業人士和公務員）。

歐洲漢學學會 (European Association of Chinese Studies) 第二十屆雙年大會將於2014年7月25日至26日在科英布拉大學舉行。作為這一次歐洲漢學學會雙年大會在科英布拉歡迎儀式的主講嘉賓，史丹福大學東亞研究中心的陳明銶教授支持在科英布拉大學舉辦四項關於澳門的特別研討小組：

(A) 澳門學者對澳門的歷史發展及現代轉型的研討小組。

(B) 關於澳門土生葡人(Macanese)的身份，文化傳統及全球化網絡的研討小組。

(C) 在公共機構，如澳門博物館，澳門歷史檔案館，和澳門文物大使協會等單位專家對於澳門研究的研討小組。

(D) 在葡萄牙大學（尤其科英布拉大學）就讀的澳門學生及畢業生對於中國之澳門特別行政區的願景和使命的研討小組。

由於2014年是澳門特別行政區成立15周年，屆時希望澳門的組織能夠承擔起本次在科英布拉的會議的多個主要任務，以突顯澳門與歐洲研究中國的學者、科英布拉大學的教師和學生、科英布拉拉的居民以葡萄牙人民的聯繫交流。

(1) 本次會議期間將有一個關於澳門特別行政區成立15周年的展覽。這展覽將與以下活動相關。

(2) 本次會議中一個關於澳門的書籍、刊物及其他中文、英文及葡文的相關出版物的大型書展（大部分與會者為熟練中文

的中國研究專家及學者）。展覽中將展示出澳門的研究中心及相關公共機構的出版物。

（3）對於澳門機構或代表來說，在7月25日舉辦以澳門美食為特色的澳門招待會，將是一個很好歡迎與會學者、科英布拉大學人員及科英布拉市民及展示澳門的機會，並慶賀在科英布拉成功舉辦關於澳門的展覽、論壇及書展。

＊＊本文件之中文版本為陳明銶之英文原稿再經香港教育學院的羅源昆先生(Luo Yuankon)精心翻譯為中文，謹此申謝。＊＊

Part IV

Evolution of Macau's identity in its external relations

9

Macau, Hong Kong and the European Perceptions of China[1]

Carmen Amado Mendes

Introduction

This paper will analyse the evolution of the European perceptions of China and the contribution of Macau and Hong Kong as bridges between East and West since the 16th century (Macau) and 19th century (Hong Kong). The two regions were the main laboratories for the emergence of the European perceptions of China through Portugal and the United Kingdom and they still play a role in current Sino-European relations.

Conceptually, this study is framed by the key terms 'perceptions', 'images', or 'norms'. Interpretation varies from author to author and their disciplinary background. Most of the literature deals with the concept of perception from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, which gives a very useful background in understanding various interpretations of the term. As Rose and Jones said,
> "*perceptual theorists distinguish among three components of perception:*
> *values, beliefs, and cognitions. A value is a preference for one state of reality over another ...*
> *A belief is a conviction that a description of reality is true, proven, or known. ...*
> *A cognition is data or information received from the environment".* 1

A seminal work is Robert Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Jervis's contribution makes three important points. First, perceptions matter because they are one of the immediate causes of an actor's behaviour. [2] Second, the analysis of perceptions is also important to avoid misperceptions. Third, perception is directly related to image because "when states perceive, in part they try to determine what the other side intended. When states try to project a desired image, they must estimate how the other side will see them and interpret what they are doing."[3] Jervis' concepts have been adopted by a great number of scholars. This is the case of Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan

who see perception and cognition as related concepts that influence the decision-making process.[4] In the same line of argument, Richard Hermann distinguishes perceptions of threat and perceptions of opportunity and says,

> *"perceptions are concepts and must be operationalized with theoretically deduced indicators. [They] must be inferred by examining symptoms that are carefully deduced from a theory about the observable consequences of the hypothesized condition."*[5]

Allen Whiting argues, "image and perception are powerful organizing concepts in the minds of decision-makers". He distinguishes the two concepts by saying that "image provides the lenses through which the external world is seen or perceived":

> *"Image is the preconceived stereotype of a nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience and self-image. [...] Perception refers to the selective cognition of statements, actions or events attributed to the opposite party as framed and defined by the preexisting image."*[6]

David Shambaugh follows Jervis' approach and Whiting's distinction by saying that images "describe *categories* of specific articulated perceptions. The image is a mental construct that categorizes and orders disparate pieces of information and helps to shape an articulated response (perception)."[7] Shambaugh uses cognitive psychology literature by saying that "there is a strong tendency for people to recognise what they expect to see, and to assimilate incoming information into preexisting image structures." He argues that "the belief system of the individual decision maker is conceptualised as the intervening variable between the independent variable of external stimuli (information) and the dependent variable of the decisional output (policy)."[8]

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane adopt a different approach. They say "cognitive psychology ... investigates beliefs of individuals about social reality that identify possibilities for action, reflect moral principles, and specify causal relationships. ... We do not seek to explain the sources of these ideas; we focus on their effects."[9] In spite of perceptions, they use the concept 'ideas', as "beliefs held by individuals". They recognise three types of beliefs. First, beliefs as world views: conceptions of possibility of action "are embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse." Second, principled beliefs: "normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust." Third, causal beliefs: "beliefs about cause-effects relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites ...[and] provide guides for individuals in how to achieve their objectives."[10] Hedley Bull

develops Goldstein and Keohane's idea of beliefs as world views. His idea of 'international society' assumes the world order as "patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole."[11] Gerrit Gong expands this concept of international society by using the term 'standard of civilization': "an expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to a particular society from those that do not."[12]

Martha Finnemore adopts a different approach through a distinction between ideas and norms. She criticises Goldstein and Keohane's definition of ideas because it "obscures the social nature and attendant consequences of a great many ideas".[13] Finnemore argues that ideas may or may not have behavioural implications; norms by definition concern behaviour." Norms are "shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors."[14] In what concerns states' perceptions of the world, Finnemore says that they are shaped by international and social relations and that "states interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms."[15] Similarly, Peter Katzenstein says that the contributors for *The Culture of National Security*, in which Finnemore is included, "use the concept of *norm* to describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having 'constitutive effects' that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such circumstances norms have 'regulative' effects that specify standards of proper behaviour. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, or they do both."[16]

The term perception will be used in this study as the way the European Union(EU) and its Member States view China (political, social and economic levels, positive and negative images of China). The problem of empirical proof must be considered, as discussed by Whiting in three main questions:

> *First, "[h]ow can images and perceptions in the minds of national leaders be reliably determined if the only evidence is published sources and private interviews? ...how do we know that policy makers 'really mean what they say?'". Second, how can we "differentiate the images and perceptions of decisions makers from the information they are given by the various competing organizational components in complex bureaucracies?" Third "[h]ow can the relative weight of image versus interest be empirically determined?"*[17]

Despite these limitations, this paper argues that ideas have impact on foreign policy, as argued by Jervis, Goldstein and Keohane.[18] It does not assume that "image and perception are the sole determinants of decisions in foreign policy" but that they are "powerful organizing concepts in the minds of decision-makers".[19]

The next section will analyse in detail these key concepts in International Relations theories and the way China was portrayed in the European literature from the period of early contacts in Macau, providing the framework for understanding the evolution of Western perceptions of China. The paper will then focus on the British and Portuguese decolonization processes concluding that the handovers of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999 were rather cases of retrocession. It begins by examining the existent literature on withdrawal from Empire, particularly in the cases of Britain and Portugal, providing the background to the Hong Kong-Macau question, which shaped the relationship of the British and the Portuguese governments with the Chinese government. Empirically, the handover of Hong Kong and Macau constitute the more crucial part of the relations of Britain and Portugal with China.

The subject of decolonisation has been largely covered by historians (including John Darwin, Muriel Chamberlain, John Gallagher, Robert Holland and Nicholas White) and International Relations theorists (Robert Jackson, Audie Klotz, Alice Conklin, Chris Brown and Martha Finnemore offer interesting normative insights). There is also a vast literature on Hong Kong and Macau. For Hong Kong, the works of James Tang, Lau Siu-Kai, Steve Tsang, John Keay, Gerald Segal, N.J. Miners, Nigel Cameron, Peter Harris, Michael Yahuda, and Wesley-Smith, among others, are particularly relevant. For Macau, the contributions of António V. de Saldanha, Moisés Fernandes, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Wu Zhiliang, Francisco Gonçalves Pereira, Charles Boxer, José Calvet de Magalhães, Fernando Lima and Richard Edmonds are of unquestionable value.

Perceptions in International Relations

Using cognitive consistency theory, Robert Jervis assumes that decision-makers have a strong tendency "to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images." This consistency may be rational (the interpretation of evidence is conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences) or irrational (related to the actor's beliefs about the others' interests and intentions). Irrational consistency cannot be explained by rational procedures and poses several problems. First, the decision-maker "will act on the basis of one value in one context and another value in another context". Second, "Decision-makers are purchasing psychological harmony at the price of neglecting conflicts among their own values..., sacrificing some values to reach others." Third, "it contributes to the tendency for people to maintain policies when they are no longer appropriate." Fourth, it "often leads to a policy that fails to reach any goals because it attempts to reach too many." Fifth, it can lead to serious consequences when "the decision-maker fails to recognize the trade-offs between advancing his interests and harming those of others."[20]

Expectations thus "represent standing estimates of what the world is like" and "create predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to neglect others". They can be influenced by familiarity, by explicit instructions about what the person is about to see, the person's background and culture and the context in which the stimulus is placed. Jervis argues that "this way of perceiving is rational. Intelligent decision-making in any sphere is impossible unless significant amounts of information are assimilated to pre-existing beliefs."[21]

Perceptions are also influenced by theories, by "the way incoming information is categorised and filed in the individual's or organisation's memory." This also poses some problems. First, "the label placed on an invent or idea influences the way it is seen." Second, the availability of a bit of information depends on whether it has been filed under the categories for which it is later seen as relevant." New ideas are thus hard to develop and test. Why? Jervis argues that it is difficult to reverse cognitive processes: "the initial organisation of the stimuli strongly structures later perceptions." This has three implications for decision-making: First, "the stability of policy is increased because perceptions are slow to change"; Second, decision-makers do not chose the best image, "they adopt the first one that provides a decent fit"; Third, "two kinds of people are apt to have a relatively high proportion of accurate perceptions: those whose perceptual predispositions match the stimulus presented to them and those who avoid forming initial estimates until a lot of data are available." In conclusion, the tendency to assimilate information to pre-existing images "is greater the more ambiguous is the information, the more confident the actor is of validity of this image, and the greater his commitment to the established view." [22]

These insights provided by Jervis suggest an analysis through the weight

of the different images of China among the EU Member States. Different images of China were formed in these states long ago and new information is immediately assimilated in their pre-existing beliefs. To make them converge into a common image may be a slow (if not impossible) process. Each of them thinks their perception of China is accurate, so they may not see a reason to cooperate to achieve consensus. As Rosen and Jones argued, we may "influence perceptions by introducing new information" but "deeply held values and beliefs are highly resistant to change through new cognitions."[23]

To the initial question of the impact of perceptions in decision making, Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod follow Jervis by stating that "decision making in ambiguous settings is heavily influenced by the ways in which the actors think about their problem" and that "those acting on behalf of a state often do not appreciate how their own actions will affect others and how they will be interpreted by others."[24] Later on, with Judith Goldstein, Keohane develops a complementary approach: Both ideas and interests have causal weight in explanations of human action. Ideas

"influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actor's clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions."

Goldstein and Keohane argue that we need to go beyond the pure rationalist analysis and that ideas should be taken into account: "ideas matter for policy, even when human beings behave rationally to achieve their ends." "Like reflectivists, we explore the impact of ideas, or beliefs, on policy. But this ... should be examined empirically with the tools of social science."[25]

In *After Hegemony*, Keohane argues that the states' rational choice is shaped by the international system: interest change due to perceptual change. "Perceptions of self-interest depend both on actors' expectations of the likely consequences that will follow from particular actions and on their fundamental values. Regimes can certainly affect expectations and may affect values as well."[26] Keohane uses a collective definition of *international regimes* from Krasner's book (1983, p.2):

"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of International Relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice".[27]

Keohane developed this argument of the impact of the international with Stanley Hoffman in 1993. They

"support the institutionalist argument that international institutions – both organizations and regimes – are significant not because they exercise control over states (with few exceptions they do not) but because they are useful to states. They do not substitute for common or complementary interests: they depend on such interests, but they may also amplify them."[28] "Most of the roles (functions) played by international institutions are instrumentalist, ... they reflect the calculating use of institutions by governments to achieve their own purposes."

The first role, is to serve as arenas for the *exercise of influence*; The second is to constrain *bargaining strategies* (facilitating agreement); The third is to balance against or replace other institutions; The fourth is to *signal governments' intentions*, providing others with information and making policies more predictable; The fifth is to *specify obligations* that guide state action; The sixth is to affect the interests of states, by affecting constraints and opportunities (thus incentives), but also their more fundamental *preferences*. Only this function goes beyond instrumentalism.[29]

In what concerns the role of international institutions in shaping states' preferences, structure-oriented literature provides a useful insight. Martha Finnemore classifies structure-oriented literature as approaches that treat social structures as causal variables and derive actors and interests from them. Finnemore concentrates in the social-structural type approaches: "Socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behaviour, and shared beliefs may provide states, individuals and other actors with understandings of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued goods." Three schools fit into this model: constructivism, the English school and sociological institutionalism.[30]

Constructivists are interested "in social construction processes and their effects" and "are concerned with the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values on political life and reject the notion that these can be derived from calculations of interests."[31] Alexander Wendt, one of the best-known constructivists, says that there are many forms of constructivism: "The version of constructivism that I defend is a moderate one that draws especially on structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology".[32] Wendt is interested in "the structure and effects of states (or 'international') systems". [33]

Contributors to Katzenstein's *The Culture of National Security* "investigate the role of norms, identities, and social realities in weapons acquisition

patterns, weapons, taboos, humanitarian intervention, the dynamics of specific alliances, and military postures in specific countries. Each of these authors identifies a different socially constructed variable as causal and describes the causal process in a slightly different way, but all share a willingness to make social structures causal as well as a belief that these structures mold preferences in important ways."[34]

Finnemore, herself a constructivist, emphasises the construction of social structures by agents and the way these structures influence and reconstruct agents. She argues that international organizations socialize states "to accept new norms, values and perceptions of interest."[35] This argument may be applied to EU, through an analysis of "the way in which norms worked their effects inside the many states of the system (EU Member States) and the way in which the norms were eventually affected by those individual state experiences."[36]

Finnemore says the core of English school is "how social structure – the shared moral and philosophical environment in which states exist – shapes and tempers state preferences and actions." Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Martin Wight and Gerrit Gong "make historical arguments that the content of international society comes from the liberal principles of Western European democracies and became internationalised with the expansion of the West." These scholars have a "kinship with Grotius and an interest in natural law". "From the notion that order is a relational concept (in that things must be ordered to some particular end) Bull "derives three common ends of all societies, including the international society: security against violence, ensuring that promises will be kept, ensuring that property will be secure."[37]

Hedley Bull argues that the maintenance of order in world politics depends on contingent facts and also common interests in the elementary goals of social life; rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals and institutions that help to make these rules effective. Rules "provide precise guidance as to what behaviour is consistent with these goals." Institution does "not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals. These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society", they rather sustain the collaboration among states.[38]

Bull considers states as the principal institutions of the society of states, or international society. An international society only exists "when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave... as parts of a whole." China was

"part of the European-dominated international system before" being "part of the European-dominated international society. That is to say, they were in contact with European powers, and interacted significantly with them in war and commerce, before they and the European powers came to recognise common interests or values, to regard each other as subject to the same set of rules as co-operating in the work of common institutions."[39]

Bull argues China's perceptions of *unequal treaties*, "consistent element in China's formal relations with the West from 1842 to 1943", "evolved as China gradually became a sovereign and 'civilized' member of international society"[40] and "its protests against them reflected the extent to which it had accepted the European standard of 'civilization'." Gerrit Gong concludes that by 1911 "China could employ the European standard to enter international society as a 'civilized' state".[41]

Gerrit Gong argues the European standard

"initially served to guarantee European life, liberty, and property in non-European countries; later, it specified the requirements necessary for non-European countries to enter the international society of 'civilized' countries. From the non-European perspective, the standard was both a guide-line and a stimulus to reform."[42]

But there was a big "gap between the possibly justifiable Western ideal of establishing equal relations through equal treaties with China, and the reality of increasing Western dominance of Chinese affairs through 'unequal treaties'".[43]

China in the European Literature

For an historical framework of the European perceptions of China, Jonathan Spence in his book *The Chan's Great Continent* looks at a variety of commentators and their observations on China between the years 1253-1985, concluding that China has a permanent "capacity to stimulate and to focus creative energies at specific moments in time".[44] He shows how the view of China has developed, providing a framework for the evolution of the Western perceptions of China. His sources are diverse in that he uses historical documents recording observations of China, the Chinese and their society, and at the same time records literary comments on China. Spence focuses on observers from diverse backgrounds who wrote about China in different circumstances and with various aims. The result is, thus, assorted perceptions of China, which Spence organizes by chronological and thematic order in twelve different chapters. Each of these observations has political, economic, social

and religious concerns.

In the early period, the main concern of the commentators seemed to be generalized descriptions of Chinese society. China was a focus of curiosity; no commentary had been made before. Spence provides two main sources for the 13th century: William of Rubruck, who did not go to China at all, and Marco Polo, a controversial visitor. In the 16th and 17th century, the commentators were those who had travelled to China and observed it closely. These include priests, friars and Jesuits. Their concerns were mainly religious: China was seen as a harbour from which to spread the Christian faith. But with the regression of the Catholic powers and the arrival of the Protestant states to China, the focus of interest in China is more pragmatic and moves from the Church to the diplomatic and political stage. China is seen as a trade partner in an expansionist framework. The contemporary writers of these observers often had never been there and sought to often their own views. This was reinforced with the 18th century interest in Chinoiserie. In English analysis of Chinese society through comparisons between Chinese and Western cultures issues such as morality, religion, costumes and language and the state are important in the perception of China.

Interestingly, Spence focuses on women observers, mainly associated with diplomats and missionaries. He starts with Jane Austen who was more noted for her social commentary on British society in the 19th century. Spence then looks at Western perceptions of Chinese outside China, in Western society. He looks at stories such as the return of Fu-Manchu, where the Chinese are depicted as evil individuals working against Western societal values. At the same time he points to the novel of Jack London who sought to portray the Chinese in a more positive light. Finally, he refers to the development of the exotic perceptions of the Chinese from a French and American point of view.

In the 20th century there is a deeper analytical evaluation of China. Jonathan Spence mentions several threads. One is philosophical, from the point of view of the revolution: in the context of the Russian revolution and of the World War, some writers looked towards the East for answers and were sympathetic with the revolutionary tendencies of China. Another thread is the historical conception of China, the idea of authoritarian history. Finally, a review of perceptions of China, i.e., how the West perceives China from its own stance: the West perceives what it wants to perceive about China, probably not what China really is.

Another approach in the historical background of the European perceptions of China is Donald Lach's book *China in the Eyes of Europe*: "Europe's conception of China in the pre-discovery era derived primarily from the testimony of the land travellers and from Mandeville's romantic peregrinations." A more accurate image of China would only emerge in the end of the 16th century. China itself, and the Portuguese 'policy of secrecy', contributed to Europe's ignorance:

> "Information in China before 1550 was circulating in Europe only when official sources in Lisbon allowed to be disclosed, or as agents of Spain and other European states managed to acquire maps and rutters, as well as texts and oral information from participants in the trade with China."

China in the Eyes of Europe makes a very good synthesis of the picture of China that was "possible for a learned European to obtain after the publication of Mendoza's work in 1585". He acknowledges three points: most of the data relates to South China and was learned second hand through informants or books, and "the better educated observers were inclined to relate what they saw or heard to the corpus of European knowledge and convention about Asia which was part of their own intellectual heritage."[45]

Regarding the political organisation and administration, Lach acknowledges that: writers "were neither uncritical admirers nor detractors of the mandarinate"; the emperor is not well known; the system of prisons and punishments is cruel but China is the best ruled country Mendoza knows. In terms of economic resources and crafts, all European writers comment on "the extent, fertility and productivity of agricultural China"; "the density of population in the countryside"; they did not try to explain poverty; they were interested in the techniques used in agricultural production and listed agricultural products in detail, excellence in architecture and ships. Mendonza noted the existence of silk, musk and fine porcelain in great abundance. Rada talks about mines of all kind of metals and Cruz also mentions the fine Porcelain. As for customs, social practices and learning, all writers are unanimous that: the Chinese eat well and welcome people with tea; feast days with all its decorations, processions, and theatrical entertainments were impressive (plays, puppet shows); foot-binding is used to keep women at home; there is no poverty and begging in the streets – there are hospitals for poor and blind and the family has some responsibility for maintaining their poor. Only Rada seems to have seen poor people and blind begging in the street and Mendoza describes a Chinese system of state charity, which did not happen in 16th century Europe. They also noticed the peculiar nature of the Chinese language and "Mendoza clearly understood that in China existed a system of secular, state-controlled and state-supported education whose

main objective was the training of students for official posts in the imperial bureaucracy." Apparently, the writers had no conscious knowledge of the Confucian system in any of its aspects." Amongst them, it also prevailed the opinion that "China was militarily very weak" since it had a "non-aggressive policy toward her neighbours."[46]

The Europeans criticised the Chinese tributary system: "missions might come to China only in terms prescribed by Peking."[47] "The kowtow in China was a potential symbol of power. It was the ritual means by which the Middle Kingdom regulated its entire political, cultural, and social system, both domestically and throughout East Asia. As Macartney discovered, to refuse to kowtow to the Chinese emperor was to challenge the whole system of influence."[48]

> [T]he tributary system with its implicit Chinese standard of 'civilization' was historically accepted by peoples in the East and in parts of South-east Asia as part of an integral, universal, historically proven, and thereby acceptably prescriptive world order. ... One could not refuse to kowtow without challenging the whole of the extensive Chinese world order, domestic and international.

It was "symbolic of a self-consciously superior Chinese standard of 'civilization'." "Within the context of its own political culture, each non-European country defined, distributed, and regulated political power according to its own standard of 'civilization'".[49] As Lach concludes, "the European image of the 'mightie kingdome' was largely shaped by the books... And the impressions derived from them were reinforced by the maps and firsthand accounts published in the chronicles, travel collections, and Jesuits letters and histories." The Jesuit writings "were particularly important in bringing to Europe confirmatory evidence which helped to round out the other sources of information".

> "Greater clarity was given to the image by the regular appearance in Europe of the products of China's arts and crafts, and by the Chinese who managed to reach there. From such sources an overwhelming impression of China's wealth and greatness was clearly conveyed to the European public. The fact that the sources disagree on certain points or contradict each other on detail should not be too surprising. The observers at first hand were forced to generalize on the basis of limited experiences and in spite of their inability to cope with the language."[50]

Hong Kong, Macau and the European Norms of Late Decolonisation

International Relations theorists have presented different sorts of arguments to clarify twentieth century decolonisation. Normative theories and theoretical debates about international norms provide valuable explanations to the development of the anti-colonial idea, being therefore an important methodological tool to understand decolonisation. English school theories analyse how the norms dictated by the international society influence the decisions taken by the members of that society, i.e., states. They examine in which way the decolonisation process changed the rules established by the international society, leading the members of that society to adopt a new behaviour – to withdraw from their empires. Constructivist approaches complement those theories by arguing that the shared beliefs actually shape state's interests and decisions. The new norms in international society persuaded its members that it was their duty and their interest to decolonise.

English school emphasises the social structure in opposition to agent-oriented approaches. States are taken as the primary actors and its preferences and actions are shaped by the shared moral and philosophical environment in which states exist – the social structure. The concept of international society, as a society of states, is particularly relevant. In it "lie some principled rules, institutions and values that govern both who is member of the society and how those members behave."[51] James Mayall argues that there are no practical alternatives to this society of sovereigns. "The nation-state (or the would be nation-state) remains the basic political unit."[52] International cooperation always depends on the prior recognition of the sovereignty of the individual state.

Hedley Bull, the most known English school scholar, says that at the turn of the nineteenth century there was a worldwide dominance of the European powers – especially Britain and France - "expressed not only in their superior economic and military power and in their commanding intellectual and cultural authority but also in the rules and institutions of international society."[53] These rules were made by and for the European powers. They used international law to facilitate the maintenance of their status[54] and adopted normative justifications to support the idea of colonialism. In the same line of argument, Robert Jackson says that the colonial powers fitted their military and economic interests in their dependencies into an international legal and moral framework: "Nineteenth century colonialism was not only a system of

power for the pursuit of Western national or commercial interests; it was also a regime of justification expressed by domestic and international law." [55]

Jackson gives as example the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, which established in Britain the rules for the acquisition and governance of the dependencies; the General Act on the partition of Africa in 1885, which set up the international rules for the acquisition and administration of the African territories; and the treaties with China in the 1840s that legalized the encroachment process. Obviously these treaties were shaped to defend the Western interests overseas. But still they functioned as law in the international society. [56] After the First World War, the Article 22 of the League Covenant recognised that the colonial territories were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world", and the system of mandates was established. The United Nations Charter confirmed this doctrine in 1945, refusing the right to self-determination to those peoples that were not familiar with the western idea of self-government. [57] The laws created by the European powers were not necessarily normative frameworks – as argued by Jackson – but their existence suggests that colonialism was often linked to moral justifications.

After the First World War the US started playing a relevant role in international politics, but colonialism the international society remained a predominantly European affair until the Second World War. The revolt of the non-Western states against the European empires defied this logic. [58] At the conference of Bandung in 1955 – which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 – 29 African and Asian nations came together for the first time to oppose colonialism.

> Through the Afro-Asian Movement, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, the Group of 77, and other bodies, and making use of the UN, in which they could now command easy majorities, the non-European states set about changing the international order that had been created by the Europeans so as to remove the elements of discrimination and special privilege which they held to be so conspicuous within it.

Bull and Watson argue that these new legal and moral ideas, such as the universal right to self-determination, to sovereignty, and racial equality, are rooted in the liberal political tradition of the Western countries. [60] According to Jackson, the extension of membership in the society of states to non-Western countries or peoples is a new normative idea related to the extension of domestic citizenship across racial lines in Western countries. "Both the civil rights movement and the decolonisation movement are rooted in the same core values of western political culture." [61]

Bull sees decolonisation as one of the stages of 'the revolt against the West' that ended with the old, Western-dominated international order, and places it in a broader process of five different phases: The struggle of the independent states with inferior status for equal sovereignty; The anti-colonial revolution of the European colonies fighting for independence (decolonisation); The struggle of non-white states and peoples for racial equality; The struggle of the Third World for economic justice; And the struggle for cultural liberation against the intellectual ascendancy of the West. Bull says that five causes contributed to this process: The Western-educated elites of the European colonies became aware of the possibility of fighting against the colonial system; The two World Wars left the European powers weakened – the use of force to maintain their positions of dominance became more costly and they started to question whether it was in their economic interests to maintain the colonies; The rise of the Soviet Union and its alliance with the Third World against the West; The consequent existence of a more general equilibrium of power; The legal and moral change in international relations due to the pressure exercised by the Third World in the UN and other institutions about a wide range of normative issues. Mayall adds that American liberalism gave even more support to anti-colonial nationalism than Soviet Marxism: After the Second World War the American government saw in the British Empire an obstacle for a non-discriminatory world order and campaigned at the UN to speed up the process of decolonisation. [64]

Bull argues that the Western powers offered strong resistance to the dismantling of the old order and that decolonisation was not an act of policy of the colonial powers, even if the British government claimed that the purpose of the Empire was preparation for self-government. He says that evidence can be found in the reverses suffered in some colonies - for Britain Suez was the main one - and in the debates that preceded the historic UN resolutions on the colonial issues. [65] Robert Jackson also points out different factors that contributed to the abolition of colonialism. It is associated with the declining military power and economic disinterest of the European powers after the two World Wars and with the rise of the superpowers supporting the colonial leaders. The European powers foreign policy was also influenced by a strong public opinion – in Britain and abroad – calling since the late 1940s for more development towards the colonies. [66] But underlying all the multiple causes that can be pointed out was a shift of normative ideas. Colonialism became an injury to the dignity and autonomy of the colonial peoples and regarded as a tool for their economic exploitation and political oppression. [67]

Jackson sees the decolonisation process as an institutional change; it was

not a revolution of power but a revolution of ideas, a normative victory: "it was carried out by referenda and elections and not by the threat or use of force or as a result of sudden change in the economic utilities of the colonies for the imperial power." Traditionally, colonies could only become independent either by force either by achieving the preparation required by the European powers. As both of these options could take too long to attain, they chose a third way: to discredit the old norms. The leaders of the colonies legitimated their claims with new political and moral ideas. "Decolonisation was above all an international change of ideas about legitimate and illegitimate rule and not a change in the balance of power or the economic utilities of imperialism." [68]

Along with the English school literature there is a constructivist contribution to the theoretical debate on decolonisation. In the International Relations theory the term 'constructivism' was generated by Nicholas Onuf and was developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.[69] Among the more recent major works is Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* and Peter Katzenstein's *The Culture of National Security*[71] These approaches focus on the socially constructed nature of international politics and claim that world politics is embedded within a deep structure of norms and values that alter the identities and preferences of international actors. Social facts thus influence behaviour. Martha Finnemore defines constructivism as a social theory, not a theory of politics, holding therefore a complementary relationship with the political theories. It refers to a concern "with the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour and social values on political life and reject the notion that these can be derived from the calculations of interest".[73]

Finnemore problematises the way national interests are defined. She criticises the rational choice and strategic interaction literatures because they assume that state interests are unproblematic and that preferences are inherent in states. As a constructivist, she argues that states do not always know what they want and their perceptions of the world are *built* within the network of international social relations. Thus, their preferences do not necessarily derive from the domestic environment. The international system[74] can alter what states want, its preferences, by creating new interests and values for actors. States are 'socialised' to want certain things by the context of internationally held norms. Norms, "shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors", are distinct from 'ideas' because they have behavioural implications: "they create patterns of behaviour in accordance with their prescriptions".[75] These norms are therefore constitutive.

Finnemore's main argument is that, in international politics social norms shape interests and influence behaviour. Furthermore, norms may influence states preferences either directly either through the mass publics or through the international organisations.[76] Colonialism was during long-time accepted as the international norm because it had a strong humanitarian justification: The Europeans were mandated by God to bring civilisation to the other peoples. Until they became 'civilized' they were barbarians, something less than human. Colonisation was therefore a humanitarian mission: it created humanity. The development of the anti-colonial idea was based in a new way of understanding humanity: "Humanity was no longer something one could create by bringing savages to civilisation. Rather, humanity was inherent in individual human beings." Non-Western peoples were now believed to have Human Rights, as the right to self-determination. This normative change was due to three factors: The norms of Human Rights and self-determination derived from European norms about human equality, which gave them logical consistency and made it harder to attack them; The anti-colonial norms were consolidated by formal international organisations, like the UN; Sovereign statehood became associated with Human Rights and unilateral intervention – as it was the case of colonialism – was hardly accepted.[77]

Audie Klotz applies Finnemore's argument to the case of South Africa and the struggle against Apartheid. As Daniel Drezner noted, she asserts that the antiapartheid norm altered the interests of actors through discourse and institutions.[78] A global norm of racial equality plays crucial roles in defining identity and interests and led various international organisations and states to adopt sanctions against South Africa. Klotz argues that norms, "shared understandings of standards for behaviour", have a strong influence in global politics. They "may gain strength despite the interests of the great powers, or within broader institutions that were originally established with the support of great powers." Klotz gives decolonisation as an example of how norms and institutions may empower weak and non-state actors, and changed the distribution of power for the former colonial powers. "The history of decolonisation... demonstrates the power of weak and non-state actors to transform both global norms and the distribution of social power in the international system."[79]

While arguing that the normative shift had a profound impact on the decolonisation process, the thesis considers that the new global norms did not affect all the European powers in the same way. The first remarkable difference was the timing chosen by each European country to decolonise. For example, while in Britain the move away from colonialism with regard to India occurs in the Labour Party before the 1940s, in Portugal the new inter-

national norms had to wait for the fall of the dictatorship to produce effect Other main difference lays in the decolonisation strategies adopted by the European powers. This is criticised by some authors such as Robert Holland which argues that the different outcomes derived mostly from the disparity of the local situations: "Faced with identical colonial situations, each of the European decolonisers would almost certainly have taken the same decisions and ended up with the same results."[80] But it seems that the internal situation of the metropolis was equally determinant to the way the decolonisation process is managed.

Dennis Austin contrasts the two existing sets of arguments taking Britain as a case. Some authors say
"That the United Kingdom was politically distinct both in its view of Empire and in the mode of its withdrawal from colonial rule." Others argue that "Like their European counterparts... the British quite underestimated the cumulative force of nationalist sentiment in the colonial world. They also set limits... to the translation into effects of the 'progress towards self-government' as very often to nullify the process."[81]
Muriel Chamberlain is among the authors that argue that as the European powers conceived their empires differently they consequently approached decolonisation in a different way. Robert Jackson also says that the British planned the future of their colonies decades before the Dutch or the French planned theirs, and they were not willing to prolong their colonial rule in South Asia by force.[82]

There were common European norms that legitimised colonialism. Even if established for power purposes, colonialism was a normative order based on a doctrine of civilization and racial supremacy; otherwise its legitimacy would never have been destroyed.[83] The assumption of white superiority allowed the colonial powers to base their empires in racial discrimination, with the moral justification being the 'inferiority of the natives'.[84] All European metropolis argued that they were superior and more advanced than their colonies. They claimed therefore that it was 'the white man's burden' to help those 'inferior' peoples to achieve a higher level of development. Religion was another common justification. Colonisation was a crusade: the European powers claimed aiming to spread Christianity all over the world, even if this masked other practical aims such as trade. Europe would send missionaries to the Empire with the specific purpose of 'saving' the soles of these peoples. Christian missionaries were considered important agents of 'civilization'.[85]

Apart from all these common ideas that sustained the norm of colonisation for so long, there were slight variations in the way normative justifications were presented, in accordance with the way European colonial powers conceived their empires. For instance, French politicians perceived colonization as fundamental to the civilization of the 'barbarians' and this normative justification made colonialism compatible with democracy in France. French policy-makers never questioned that their subjects had to learn to feel French and that they felt a special obligation to improve the lives of all Africans[86], even if in the late nineteenth century France realised that assimilation could only be attained by the colonial elites – the *evolués* – as Chamberlain pointed out.[87] On the contrary, the British Empire originates in the principle of juridical and social racial discrimination; in the primacy of the economic and military interests (rarely religious interests); and the principle of cooperation between London and the indigenous authorities.[88]

In the Portuguese modern Empire, social racial discrimination was never officially accepted, economic and military interests never took the primacy over cultural and religious interests, and politics were centralised in the metropolis. The *Estado Novo* tried to justify Portuguese colonialism by distinguishing it from the economically motivated British and Belgian, saying that Portugal was not driven either by mere material interests and racial segregation but by the Portuguese Universalist mission.[89] Adriano Moreira, Salazar's Minister for Overseas, argues in 1956 that the British *concept* of autonomy was based on the *racial* superiority and did not necessarily translate in political independence, but simply letting the colonies rule their local affairs.[90] In contrast, the Portuguese assimilation concept was based in the belief of cultural superiority. This was particularly relevant because the cultural superiority could be overcome through assimilation, which could never happen with the belief of racial superiority.[91]

This (at least conceptual) difference between the Portuguese and the British colonialism had consequences over the decolonisation processes and will be further explored in the sections bellow. Douglas Porch talks about "an inverse relationship between large-scale economic penetration of a colony and the willingness of the colonial power to fight it out with the local *maquisards*." While Britain and Belgium hesitated little about ending their empires, France and Portugal, "where large economic interests did not provide a firm base for colonial exploitation", fought for years.[92]

In the 19th and 20th century Britain had the largest and most valuable colonial Empire.[93] As the British expansion took different forms, the colonies were classified in three categories. The Commonwealth of the Dominions was constituted by the most developed colonies, nations which were settled and

dominated by the British – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and later South Africa – and attributed a self-government system. The indirect rule was applied in the less developed colonies: nations with mainly Asian and African population governed by British through enforced racial discrimination, following military conquest.[94] Some were considered Crown colonies – power was totally in the hands of the Governor, appointed from London – others were protectorates – the domestic administration was left to the indigenous authorities, at least in theory.[95]

After the Second World War, British foreign policy was still characterised by a conservative thinking of a gradual evolution of the colonies towards independence in their own time. Independence depended on the economic and social situation of each colony and the majority of them still faced four major obstacles:

> *(1) the general populations were still 'too unaware' of modern governmental operations to be capable of citizenship; (2) most colonies as yet lacked any basis of national unity; (3) many colonies were so insubstantial that 'anything more than a limited internal self-government' was impossible; and finally (4) the level of economic development was still too low to support a modern state.[96]*

But this kind of paternalistic justifications became more and more criticised. When the Labour Party won the 1945 election, Clement Atlee met a different context than the one faced by the predecessor Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. The dissolution of the Indian Empire in 1947 and the end of the British presence in Suez in 1956 were key turning points. In 1960 the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declared: "The wind of change is blowing. ... Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact."[97] This, along with the exhaustion of Britain's resources in the Second World War made difficult to the British government to play the intended 'Third Force' in world politics, rival to America and the Soviet Union, making it instead becoming closer to Washington.[98]

Porter and Stockwell review the more common explanations to the British decolonisation process, concluding that a pluralist explanation is required and that "the balance of factors involved varies with time and place".[99] They analyse the 'liberal commonwealth' account and more realistic arguments. The liberal tradition holds that the British, being committed to a liberal democratic culture and representative institutions and cautioned by the experience in eighteenth century America, intervened little in the local colonial affairs and gave powers of self-government to white colonialists. Colonisation meant education, development and progress and decolonisation

was the end of the process, therefore intentional and planed.[100] It meant the building of a commonwealth, rather than the dismantling of an Empire.[101] Nationalists, on the other hand, say that far from planning to go, the British were driven out by the resistance of the colonial peoples. Others argue that after the Second World War the emerged superpowers, America in particular, pressured Britain to withdraw.[102] Another kind of argument is that the causes lie within Britain itself. Facing a comparative economic decline in the world, the British government would rather spend the resources in a welfare state than in the Empire, and when Conservatives returned to power in 1951 it was too late to undo the process started by Labours.[103]

John Darwin's multicausal argument is said to be the less controversial explanation for the end of the British Empire.[104] Darwin defines decolonisation as the dismantling of formal political and economic controls over non-European states, the dismantling of the 'open economy' in colonial and semi-colonial states, the changed character of Europe's demographic expansion into Afro-Asia and the open competition for intellectual influence in areas once formally or informally reserved to a particular colonial or great power. Darwin argues that the decolonisation process was not the intended consequence of the actions of British policy makers or colonial politicians. He says that it was the result of the interlocking of events at the international, domestic and colonial levels, and that the Second World War and subsequent effects served as the *trigger* for an infinite series of transformations.[105] The dissolution of the British Empire results of: the effects of political and social change within the colonial societies, culminating in the emergence of an irresistible mass nationalism; the accelerating decline of Britain's economic and military strength measured against the burdens of world power in a superpower age; a growing indifference to Empire in Britain and, to match it, an increasingly non-imperial orientation in the economy; the new conditions of global politics after 1945, in particular the obsolescence of colonial empires in the age of superpowers.[106]

As Muriel Chamberlain points out, attitudes towards Empire were already changing after the First World War: The League of Nations Mandate System imposed specific obligations on Mandatory Powers and the acquisition of new colonies became unacceptable.[107] But it was the Second World War that provided the catalyst for the change. Muriel argues that the fact of being involved in the war made the colonies more aware of their rights and made the emerging colonial elites demand progress to independence.[108] Hobsbawm notes that after the withdrawal from India in 1947 Britain knew "that once a serious nationalist movement existed the only way to hold on to the advantages of

advantages of Empire was to let go of formal power."[109]

Robert Holland, contesting the weight of the Second World War in the decolonisation process, argues that nationalism was not the most vital element of the end of the European empires, but the changing conditions *within* the metropolis. He criticises the arguments of the impact of the war on the UK's strategic and economic capacities in order to make the loss of Empire inevitable: "the successful orchestration of massive colonial war efforts indicated that Britain still had the leverage to operate an aggressive imperial states-system, if it chose to accept the costs of doing so." Holland argues that the causes are internal: colonialism did not fit the diplomatic, military and economic necessities of the metropolis. In the decade after 1955 the principal gains in international trade were occurring in exchanges within industrial blocs such as the EEC making the old concerns with imperial tariffs and trade completely outdated. The pessimist growth prospects of underdeveloped countries led to the fear that a colonial link with these economies could prove a burden. [110]

Hargreaves agrees that in the 1950s the British government was seeking sources of capital in Europe and the United States, not in the colonies. The British government saw the need to change the Empire into a Commonwealth as essential to Britain's economic recovery and its maintenance as Great Power. The historical conjuncture led colonial rulers to perceive that it was their interest to decolonise. The international pressure and insistence from colonial leaders obliged the British government to reformulate its political objectives even before the war.[111] Apart from the structural changes in trading patterns, Holland points other internal factors which contributed for the decolonisation. The Labour opposition used anti-colonialism "to make a clear contrast between the Conservatives' incorrigible reaction and their own progressive virtues." At the same time, there was social pressure – the emergence of a new middle class in the 1950s that resented any waste of resources on the colonies – and the development of the term 'progressive': "being sensitive to the special needs of new and aspirant metropolitan classes". The moral and intellectual context also changed: "colonialism came to be seen as plain wrong".[112] Jackson develops this latter idea. After the entrance of the United States in the war, the British had to justify their conception of evolutionary decolonisation to the anticolonial American allies. "The American view of decolonisation was almost exactly the opposite: idealist and revolutionary."[113]

In short, realist approaches argue that the British government was forced to decolonise because after the Second World War it was economically weak and militarily dependent on the United States while facing the rebellions of the Asian and African populations.[114] Normative approaches argue that Britain was led to decolonise by the change of the international (and internal) context in which holding colonies became seen as unacceptable. British officials, even when as divided over the means of decolonisation as their European counterparts, hide it from the public view, avoiding much controversy. They were proud to say that they had best managed the process, once they were the first to come to terms with African independence.[115]

In Portugal, the Liberal Regime introduced the concepts that then characterised the Portuguese colonial policy: *assimilation* and *centralisation*. *Assimilation* transformed the 'natives' into Portuguese citizens, with the same duties and rights of all citizens. Later, the First Republic considered the Creoles as 'assimilated' and thus 'civilised' clearly separating them from the 'uncivilised natives', probably trying to avoid a revolt of the semi-educated in the colonies. It was up to each colony to decide who should be considered civilised, as the Republic seemed incapable to enforce any legislation. In general, to be assimilated the 'native' needed to speak Portuguese, have a regular cash income, know the Portuguese culture and have good behaviour. The 'natives' were not subject to Portuguese civil law but to indigenous customary law.[116]

Salazar maintained the division between the *indígenas* (natives) and the *civilizados/cidadãos* (civilized persons/citizens), being the *assimilados* (assimilated) included in this latter category.[117] The 'civilised people' were given more autonomy and an undefined degree of self-government, while the 'natives' were treated in a paternalist manner.[118] In order to be allowed to adopt the common Portuguese law and being assimilated to the original citizens, the 'natives' should previously acquire the behaviour prescribed by the Portuguese law and convert to Christianity.[119] The colonies enjoyed a political autonomy with private parliaments where their inhabitants decided their own laws. But this autonomy was not supposed to endanger the principle of the national unity: Lisbon had the right of supervision and sovereignty.

The Minister for Overseas argued that a distinction should be made between colonialism of the vital space and missionary colonialism, in accordance with the aims of the colonising power. In the first situation, the colonial power only intends to control the territory and subjugates completely the natives. In the second case, the colonial power aims at civilizing the

natives. Only this form of missionary colonialism is legitimate. This civilizing mission achieved through the definition of a superior ethics should be seen by the international community as a duty towards the colonial peoples.[120] The Portuguese government could hardly accept the United Nations ignorance of Portugal's unique 'civilizing mission' and building of the only successful multiracial civilization, in a process that "never had anything to do with... imperialism."[121] However, it was difficult to become a 'civilised' person: more important than the candidate's suitability, what mattered was his contacts within the administration...[122]

The notion of Portugal's backwardness *vis à vis* the colonies and that Portugal could only exploit its African resources through direct control, as well as the theories of Portugal's economic dependence on Africa are an exaggeration. The Portuguese government would have probably been more capable of exercising neo-colonial influence in the colonies if it had decolonised before the war. Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s the Empire was increasingly a burden to the 'newly industrialised' Portugal and the Portuguese economy turned away from it despite the political attempts to avoid it. As Clarence-Smith argues:

> *"The overseas territories were a major obstacle to Portugal's request to join the European Economic Community, they placed political problems in the way of penetrating Third World markets, and they even laid Portugal open to ruinous competition in the case of Macau. In short, the war was fought to preserve the regime rather than to save the economy."[123]*

After the Second World War there was an increase of the internal and external pressures towards the Portuguese government to make it respect the international norm of decolonisation. Nationalist agitation in Asia and Africa were spreading into the Portuguese colonies despite the *Estado Novo* efforts to isolate them. But the regime never considered the possibility of decolonising and holding democratic elections or even of negotiating the nomination of the future leaders of liberation movements.[124] Instead, in 1957 Salazar established in the colonies branches of the PIDE (*Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado*, International Police for the Defence of the State) to smash opposition.[125]

To understand the Portuguese decolonisation process it is more important to focus on the political and economic developments in Portugal after the Second World War than on its colonies' liberation movements.[126] In 1961 India invaded Goa and overwhelmed the tiny Portuguese garrison very fast and almost without resistance, questioning the feasibility of colonial defence. At the same time France was withdrawing from Africa, leaving the Portuguese without defence in the international scene. With the Portuguese

integration in NATO, 'Atlantic' norms and tactics infiltrated the archaic Portuguese military caste.[127] Some Portuguese generals tried to force Salazar into retirement but they failed and were replaced by others charged of initiating the war against the guerrilla attacks in the African possessions. The unexpected dead of Salazar in 1969 and his replacement by Marcelo Caetano created illusions of a reform that never took place. General António de Spínola, appointed as commander-in-chief of Guinea-Bissau in the late 1960s, soon understood that the war could not be won by military means and tried in vain to convince Caetano to negotiate with the guerrilla. In February 1974 Spínola published the book *Portugal e o Futuro* (Portugal and the Future) showing that there were political alternatives to the colonial war, such as the constitution of a Portuguese-speaking federation with some autonomy for the colonies. On 25 April the Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*), under General Spínola and General Costa Gomes, rebelled against Caetano. This coup d'état, caused by the African issue, was highly supported by the masses and became known as the carnation revolution (*Revolução dos Cravos*).[128]

The Armed Forces Movement leaders, and the Portuguese public opinion, expected that the collapse of the dictatorship would necessarily lead to the end of the Empire, and not to Spínola's idea of a sort of Commonwealth. Spínola was forced to promulgate Law 7/74 of 26 July 1974 allowing the independence of the colonies. In September, he resigned from the presidency of the Portuguese Republic and was replaced by Costa Gomes. In 1975 the sovereignty of the colonies was transferred to the guerrilla African movements, as this was a condition for them to accept the cease-fire.[129] In Mozambique, Guinea, Cape Verde and São Tomé the Portuguese government transferred power to the dominant guerrilla group, but the three competing movements in Angola started a civil war and Timor was annexed by Indonesia. Many articles in the press noted that Portugal also offered Macau to China but the Chinese government refused to take over, although this was always denied by Portuguese politicians.

The economic crisis in Portugal that followed the decolonisation process, mainly caused by the world recession, and the leftward revolutionaries that took over the government rendered difficult to analyse separately the impact of decolonisation. There was a huge reduction in defence spending and the almost total suspension of the imports from the colonies, freeing the Portuguese manufacturers and importers of the obligation to buy colonial products, while exports to the colonies continued. The more immediate problems were the debts owed by the former colonial administrations to

Portugal and the inflow of refugees from the colonies, but in general these problems were resolved. The greatest legacy that Portugal left in its former Empire was the language, a powerful vector of culture.[130]

Conclusion

A useful starting point in this research was Robert Jervis' question: do perceptions matter? Although Jervis acknowledges three other levels of analysis (the bureaucracy, the nature of the state and the workings of domestic politics, and the international environment), he sees the actor's perceptions (the decision making level) as one of the immediate causes of his behaviour: "it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others."[131] Decision-making and cognitive psychology theories explain how European perceptions of China were formed and how important they are in the adoption of certain behaviour towards China: "International events are selectively perceived by key actors, and ...every 'reality' has multiple meanings depending on the nationality of the perceiver."[132] The states' rational choice is also shaped by the international system: interest change due to perceptual change. As Hollis and Smith argued, the problem is not on the process of decision making within a single state: "decision-makers cannot make rational choices without thinking about the process going on in other states. The problem is what each decision-making group is to assume about others".[133] As Robert Keohane stated, "intelligent and farsighted leaders understand that attainment of their objectives may depend on their commitment to the institutions that make cooperation possible."[134]

The second part of this paper argued that the British and the Portuguese governments hold different normative positions regarding their dependencies and different ideas about legality, procedure, and fair play. Differences over the treaties upon which the colonial states based their possession of the territories were overcome through the 1984 and 1987 Joint Declarations on Hong Kong and Macau and how the handover processes were managed by the three countries. The handover of Hong Kong and Macau can hardly be considered as a process of pure decolonisation. There are three main reasons to consider the British and Portuguese withdrawals cases of retrocession[135] rather than of decolonisation. The first is China's refusal to recognise them as colonies, and claiming their retrocession to its sovereignty. The second reason pertains to British and the Portuguese attitudes to Hong Kong and Macau: they always treated these territories as special cases. Finally, Hong Kong and

Macau did not achieve independence but they were integrated into a third sovereign country.

Despite the similarities, the positions adopted by the British and Portuguese governments towards China were very dissimilar; consequently, they also handled the negotiation processes differently. They had a very different perception of the situation of their enclaves and the legitimacy of Chinese claims, and planned their withdrawal according with those perceptions. So even if China made the two transition processes appear much alike, Britain and Portugal handled the handover of Hong Kong and Macau differently. The British government developed its own strategy and fight for it, even when this mean to confront China. The Portuguese government adopted a different logic than Britain, avoiding confrontation at all costs: the pressure was made in private in order to 'save face'. This different approach had consequences in many details of the negotiation process. For example, while the British government tried to introduce democracy in Hong Kong, the Portuguese government did not do that in Macau: it neither wanted to affront the Chinese government nor wanted to be confronted with a democratic force during the handover period.[136] In any event, the Portuguese government negotiated with China from a much weaker and submissive position than the British government.[137]

These enclaves played an important role in shaping earlier perceptions of China, as shown in European literature. Today, these Special Administrative Regions have autonomous relations with the EU and their traditional role of bridge between China and Europe dramatically diminished. However, their European legacy and the "one country, two systems formula" transformed them in the only regions in Chinese soil where the rule of law is meant to be respected, and this is not a minor thing in European perceptions of China.

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[129] *Ibid.*, pp.13-15.

[130] Clarence-Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-121.

[131] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception... op. cit.*, pp.14-15, 8 and 18-30 for the whole paragraph.

[132] Rosen and Jones, *op. cit.*, p.191

[133] Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, p.169.

[134] Keohane, *After Hegemony... op. cit.*, p. 259.

[135] For more details on the concept of retrocession see: Mendes, Carmen Amado, "The Implications of the Special Administrative Regions for the International System: Macau as a successful case study" in George Wei (ed.), *Macau: The Formation of a Global City*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, Routledge, New York, 2013.

[136] Edmonds, Richard L. and Yee, Herbert S., "Macau: From Portuguese Autonomous Territory to Chinese Special Administrative Region", *The China Quarterly*, 160, December 1999, p.815.

[137] For further details on the Portuguese withdrawal from Macau see: Mendes, Carmen Amado, *Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999*, Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Studies Series, Hong Kong University Press, 2013.

-Appendices-

Group photo of Macau delegates at the Conference (Courtesy of MHAA)

Group photo at the University of Coimbra (courtesy of University of Coimbra)

The opening ceremony - conference organizer Dr. Carmen Mendes(right) addressing the meeting (Courtesy of UC)

At the Opening Session - Prof. Ming Chan giving keynote speech (Courtesy of UC)

The opening ceremony - Prof. João Gabriel da Silva (right), Rector of the University of Coimbra, giving his welcome speech (Courtesy of Mr. Man Chenk Fai)

Group photo of Macau delegates at the exhibition space (courtesy of MHA)

Dr. Jorge Rangel donates books of Macau to the Rector of the University of Coimbra (Courtesy of UC)

Prof. Chan donates a book recently published to the Rector of the University of Coimbra (Courtesy of UC)


Some of the publications on display (Courtesy of IIM)

A "Porto de Honra" was toasted to the success of the event (Courtesy of the University of Coimbra)

The photo exhibition was held at Casa da Lusofonia (Courtesy of MHAA)

An aspect of photo exhibition (Courtesy of MHAA)


*Explaining Macau to a visitor (Courtesy of MHAA)*

HM's panel with Dr. Celina Veiga de Oliveira, Dr. Jorge Rangel and Alexandra Rangel (Courtesy of Prof. Ming Chan)

A panel by Macau scholars - Dr. Alex Choi (left), Dr. Jorge Godinho, Prof. Eilo Yu and Mr. Eric Sautedé (Courtesy of Mr. Man Cheuk Fai)

Aspect of a Macau panel (Courtesy of UC)

At the Offshore Chinese Soft Power Roundtable - Mr. Man Cheuk Fai and Jorge Eduardo (Courtesy of Mr. Man Cheuk Fai)

The panel of the Macau Heritage Ambassador Association (Courtesy of MHAA)

Banquet at S. Marcos Palace (Courtesy of UC)

Enjoying fellowship (Courtesy of UC)