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THE CULTURE OF PREVENTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOOLS, ACTORS, STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS FOR PREVENTING CONFLICTS UNDER THE UN SYSTEM

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THE CULTURE OF PREVENTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOOLS, ACTORS, STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS FOR PREVENTING CONFLICTS UNDER THE UN SYSTEM

Dissertação de Mestrado em Relações Internacionais - Estudos da Paz, Segurança e Desenvolvimento, apresentada à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra para obtenção do grau de Mestre

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Abstract

Great emphasis has been given to the need of preventing conflicts, and the international community does count with the tools necessary to do so (Lund, 2008). Moreover, prevention is less costly in financial, legitimacy, and life terms (Griffin, 2001). However there has always been a considerable gap between rhetoric and having the possession of information regarding the high risk of the emergence of a conflict and its actual prevention in a timely fashion (Ackermann, 2003). The reasons for this are numerous: lack of coordination and specific funding, high complexity of conflicts, issues regarding the political will and national geostrategic interests of players responsible for acting, and difficulty to maintain long term commitments for preventive measures (Lund, 2008). In quest of overcoming such gap and enhance preventive mechanisms, the r2p was designed, in 2005, with a focus on its prevention pillar. Nonetheless, expectations were frustrated by several amendments done to the project, which relegated preventive matters to the background, favoring the doctrine's tools for hard intervention (Bellamy, 2008). In that sense, the r2p was developed into a policy that legitimizes controversial and ad hoc interventions by actors that ultimately seek to advance their own liberal interests (idem, 2008). The work finishes by exploring possibilities to improve conflict prevention.

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Summary

1. Introduction

This work investigates the possibilities of a shift from the current conflict management-oriented international system to a conflict prevention one within the international community, especially at the UN. The present chapter briefly introduces the history of the ongoing status quo throughout the last decades for context. A second part covers the approach and methodology chosen to carry out this study, as well as the thesis and the main arguments to be explored. Subsequently, the scope and the relevance of the study are defined. The section is concluded with an outline of the entire research.

1.1. Background

On May of 1948, one year after the approval of the Palestinian partition plan, the United Kingdom waived its right to the territory's mandate under the Trusteeship logic of the United Nations. In parallel, the state of Israel was born, leading to its invasion by Arab states. Such conflict resulted in the adoption of Resolutions by both the General Assembly and the Security Council that enabled an international mission under the auspices of the UN to observe the negotiated truce (S/RES/54/1948). Despite the frozen aspect of the international system during the Cold War, that moment of History is the origin of the current UN peacekeeping system, a comprehensive, multiagency, broad, and global arrangement designed to create conditions of lasting peace in states affected by conflicts via the implementation of international missions.

As conflicts transformed from interstate wars characteristic of the Cold War into complex emergencies – conflicts of ethnic and civilian genesis with multiple informal non-state armed parties with strong potential of regional spillover (Bellamy, 2005) –, the UN peacekeeping system followed, expanding their once limited mandates into broader, more comprehensive ones. Since this new type of conflict challenges the Westphalian logic and responsiveness, the once very limited observation missions gained Wilsonian contours, thus becoming broader and more multidimensional. Currently, the system is responsible for a myriad of NGOs and agencies, an investment of 7.87 billion dollars per

year[1], and a large human asset (UNDP, 2017). Moreover, in order to ensure such operations, the principles of sovereignty, national independence, self-determination, and non-intervention, among others, had to be progressively relativized and reinterpreted with the construction of a vast legal framework (Bellamy, 2005), which has in the "Responsibility to Protect" its most refined policy: a global commitment, endorsed during the 2005 World Summit, to prevent genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against the humanity.

Since its endorsement, the r2p has driven interventions in Libya, Côte D'Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and the Central African Republic. Such narrative, that privileges the concept of responsibility to protect to the detriment of the right to intervene (Evans, Sahnoun, and Ignatieff, 2001), is contemporary to the War on Terror, policy designed by the US President George W. Bush soon after the 9/11 attacks. According to Vaux (2006), such concomitances lead to instrumentalization of the r2p by states to further their political, economic, and strategic interests abroad. Moreover, the underachievement – i.e., failure to create conditions of lasting peace – of recent peacekeeping missions has raised strong criticism from academics, practitioners, and decision makers regarding coordination between agencies, international organizations, governments, and NGOs, lack of local autonomy generated by the interventions, imposition of economic and political liberalism in the states where interventions happen, financing dilemmas and earmarking, and the fact that the decision making to intervene largely depends on the political will of the Security Council (Vaux, 2006). Such scenario of pitfalls within the current framework to solve the peacekeeping dilemmas renewed international discussions regarding the prevention of conflicts. In his first speech to the Security Council as Secretary General, in 2017, Guterres expressed that conflict prevention and sustainability of peace must be the priority of the UN (Guterres, 2016).

1.2. Approach and Methodology

The international system has broad networks of diplomats, agencies, international and regional organizations, think tanks, academia and researchers, civil

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[1] Approved budget for the period between July of 2016 and June of 2017.

society, NGOs, troops, early warning mechanisms, among other actors. Additionally, such specialized human asset is equipped with advanced technology, a vast legal framework, and billionaire investments to sustain the current global interventionism mechanism. However, decision makers, academics, and practitioners have not given as much emphasis to conflict prevention, in comparison to conflict management (Bellamy, 2008). In the face of that problematic, the thesis' research question is if and how conflict prevention practices may be adopted in an efficient[2] fashion in international politics. As previously noted, the international structures in place seem to have excellent tools to gather information and practice conflict prevention. Moreover, on the final document of the 2005 World Summit, in its paragraphs 138 and 139 (G/RES/60/1/2005), member-states reaffirmed their commitments to expand conflict prevention and Early Warning capabilities, as well as to adopt dispute settlement means, to collaborate on the construction of information management capacities, and to implement preventive measures before conflict outbreaks. These efforts were a consequence of international failures to prevent severe conflicts, which, in their turns, caused tragic outcomes, such as the Rwandan genocide – as argued by the African Union's report "Rwanda the Preventable Genocide" (2000), which points out the omission and the difficulty of states to avoid it –, despite having information regarding the high likelihood of occurrence of genocide, the international community did not manage to act on time.

On one hand, three main arguments may answer the research question and will be explored in depth: Firstly, coordination between so many players is challenging but key to guarantee that information regarding possible conflicts flows through the appropriate apparatus. Secondly, there could be a lack of political will by the actors. Lastly, there would be little incentive for conflict prevention in such a peacekeeping and statebuilding focused system. Mainly because such structure, at the UN level, may be instrumentalized by states in order to foster their international interests. On the other hand, nevertheless, a change of mindset towards prevention may save lives and avoid mass atrocities. First and foremost, such change is in perfect harmony with the United Nation's central mission, as highlighted by the UN Charter and several other treaties, which is the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, conflict prevention is also

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[2] Efficient in the sense of avoiding the outburst of conflicts and, therefore, widespread violations of Human Rights.

in line with the organization's secondary goals, which all derive from the latter: to protect Human Rights, to deliver humanitarian aid, to promote sustainable development, and to uphold the International Law. Also, conflict prevention is more cost effective. According to the World Development Report of the World Bank (2011), the average cost of a civil war is 65 billion dollars. Between 1990 and 2005, armed conflicts in Africa cost, approximately, 300 billion dollars, as calculated by IANSA/Oxfam/Saferworld's report "Africa's missing billions: international arms flow and the cost of conflict" (2007). In opposition, the UNDP estimates that conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan cost only 6 million dollars, avoiding a civil war in the country in 2010 (UNDP-DPA, 2017). Besides, Chalmers and Malcolm (2007) calculate that each dollar spent in preventive measures saves ten dollars in recovery costs borne by the international community, the nation itself, and neighboring countries.

Finally, conflict prevention may avoid deaths. According to the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs of Brown University, "The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taken a tremendous human toll on those countries. As of March 2015, approximately 210,000 civilians have died violent deaths as a result of the wars" (Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, 2013). Additionally, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015) conducted a study that shows that global armed conflicts are becoming more deadly due to intensification of violence.

Figure 1: Number of conflicts and fatalities. The Guardian, ISS Armed Conflict Survey (2015)

The research subject of this thesis is the dynamics and policies of conflict prevention with the objective of exploring and analyzing their elements to challenge the

peacekeeping consensus and understand how and if prevention can be furthered. Finally, in order to define conflict prevention, conflict needs to be defined, which shall be done with Svanström's and Weissman's (2005) theory. According to these authors, conflicts are not negative in themselves. However, when they mean the progressive inability of states to perform their roles as filters of different visions, interests, and projects, consequently failing to ensure that such divergences are solved through political debate (Hollanda, 2005), the use of violence transforms the conflict into an issue. In that sense, Svanström and Weissman (2005) define conflict prevention as the possible actions during the structural and direct prevention phases, as illustrated below. Therefore, this effort will attempt to explore both types of conflict prevention. The first will be interpreted as actions of sustainable development, international economic insertion, capacity building, technical cooperation, trust building, among other long-term measures of ensuring national peace and prosperity. The latter includes, but is not limited to, preventive diplomacy, sanctions, mediations, and legal processes. Both aspects of the concept will be explored in this work because while structural prevention is of first importance, as the next chapters will show, to generate a culture of prevention and to mitigate chances of crises that may lead to conflicts in the first place, direct prevention is necessary and difficult to achieve when crises do arise (Ackermann, 2003).

Figure 2: Phases of conflict and prevention methods. Svanström and Weissmann (2005)

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To carry out this study, a set of methodological steps will apply. Firstly, data collection from key primary and secondary sources – listed in the reviewed pertinent literature in the next sections of this document – will be explored in order to assess the general framework of conflict prevention in place and its main deficits and potentials. Such content will be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The aforementioned analysis will be used to develop a general frame of reference that shall be tested with the case study of conflict prevention in Macedonia. The choice is due to the adoption, in Macedonia, of most – if not all – current tools of conflict prevention, both direct and structural, since its independence to the present day.

Finally, when it comes to the theoretical approach, this dissertation adopts an institutional perspective of International Relations since it evaluates how the current UN framework and policy body for conflict prevention is being applied. Because the focus of this work regards the operationalization of conflict prevention concepts from a practitioner perspective, a conceptual framework was prioritized.

1.3. Scope of the Study

This research is a masters' thesis, being, therefore, limited in time and scope. Moreover, even though literature on conflict prevention is not rare per se, it is indeed scarce. Therefore, the project will focus especially on the work of the United Nations, the most well-known and researched international player when it comes to conflict prevention. Since regional actors play such a relevant role in conflict prevention, working in partnership with the UN, they will be briefly studied as well. Also, and as the study case will show, the UN, despite all its issues, namely with its power and decision-making structure materialized in the Security Council, seems to be perceived and to act, in terms of conflict prevention, in a more neutral fashion than others, such as NATO or individual governments.

1.4. Relevance

To conclude, the relevance of the theme of conflict prevention and of this thesis will be explained in two parts. First I will address its pertinence to the Masters of

International Relations – Studies of Peace, Security, and Development of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and, a posteriori, its scientific relevance to the field of International Relations. The course's current program is focused, just as international politics, on the mechanisms in place after the outbreak of conflicts, analyzing them in depth and stimulating critical thinking. The attempt to challenge this current consensus and search for viable alternatives to overcome the contemporary peacekeeping dilemmas and to deal with the sustainability of peace is a direct reflection of such critical perspective. This thesis will try to broaden the issues of peace by shedding light to what exists in a specific place before the conflict itself. The theme is also relevant to the field of International Relations in the sense that academics, practitioners and decision makers are looking in the same direction: the underachievement of recent peacekeeping missions and its issues require international relations' actors to search for other means of keeping sustainable peace, and exploring and deepening the conflict prevention field – which is already within the current legal framework –, as stated by the United Nations' Secretary General, shall be the organization's main priority. In that sense, theory and practice, academia and international politics, seem to be working together towards the same goals to improve and push the state of affairs and humanity forward.

1.5. Outline of the research

A first chapter will provide a conceptual framework with conflict prevention's definitions, as well as its tools. Next, a historic chapter will analyze the international orders promoted by the global society with conflict prevention lenses until the current status quo of the adoption of r2p as a policy to promote Human Rights and preventive measures. The reason for this is to show, under a historical and institutional approach, that international orders are per se conflict prevention-oriented in the way they are designed. Next, the case study will scrutinize Macedonia's history, political, economic, geographic, and social aspects, providing for a comprehensive understanding of the country's context in order to dive into the inter-ethnic issues faced by Macedonia and how they were dealt with in each phase of the conflict prevention framework, which is divided in three phases: during the 1990s, during the 2001 crisis, and afterwards.

2. Key Concepts

> We the peoples of the United Nations determined [...]to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.
>
> Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 1945

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims at explaining the concept and theory of conflict prevention, as well as its tools, which will be divided in two groups, as suggested by Lund (2008) in his works. The first group is direct conflict prevention, which encompasses early warning, preventive diplomacy, economic measures, and the use of force within UN Charter principles to tackle possible conflicts. The second is the structural prevention group, which counts with international law, rule of law, justice, sustainable development, and governance to avoid violent conflicts that may erupt. In that sense, all the aforementioned tactics may be seen as a toolbox of contemporary conflict prevention and will be discussed in a subchapter of the chapter with its main challenges. In fact, - and despite general consensus on the importance of preventing violent conflict – all the tools of conflict prevention, as well as the practice as a whole, face the same general challenges, according to all the authors analyzed throughout the chapter: coordination, funding, response, multiplicity of actors and stakeholders, and constituency and ownership of information and its analyses. Lastly, this section will focus on the importance of conflict prevention and why it is relevant, necessary, and challenging, as well as define important concepts to the upcoming analysis.

2.2. The concept of conflict prevention and its tools and players

According to Lund (2001) complex emergencies, among other current threats such as terrorism, nuclear races, environmental issues, poverty and inequality – which are

also intertwined – are making the world more dangerous and that preventing conflicts is much more cost-effective than war itself. He claims that "acting before high levels of conflict intensity is better than trying to end them [Miall, 1992 and Berkovitch, 1986, 1991, 1993]". In order to explain the warning-response dilemma, i.e., why there is a breach between rhetoric and action in conflict prevention (Lund, 2008), he defines conflict prevention, when it needs to be done, and how. His definition is quite broad, following the steps of the concept itself: conflict prevention is understood as measures to avoid the outbreak of disputes into major violence, that is, which are done before violent conflicts (Lund, 2008) since "bringing prevention into the realm of active wars would eclipse its proactive nature behind the conventional interventions that occur late in conflicts" (Lund, 2008, p. 289). He also uses Peck's (1995) concepts of early and late prevention to guide his own theorization. While the first represents the act of improving damaged relations between parties who are not fighting, the latter touches those situations in which conflict seems to be imminent. Nonetheless, for conflict prevention to be effective, it needs to be done timely. Lund's chart shows what that means and the ideal moment for action to be taken, under the names "preventive diplomacy" and "stable peace". After that, he argues it is much more complicated to stop a conflict, since the parts are already armed, organized, and taking lives. In fact, all authors mentioned in this chapter agree that conflict prevention done after this moment is one of the reasons why it is discredited by some political players as being undoable.

Figure 3: Stages of Peace or Conflict vs. Duration of Conflict (Lund, 2008)

Lund argues that conflict prevention can be seen as an umbrella of tools such as "early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventive deployment, and peace zones" (Lund, 2008, p. 289) but also a vast range of policies to address underlying issues to the conflict. In this sense, it is useful to adopt his division, which has become more or less consensual in the field of conflict prevention: the former are, as argued by Miall (2004), direct prevention, usually focused on a specific moment and specific players to avoid the escalation of a conflict, whereas the latter are tools of structural prevention, which aim at avoiding the onset of underlying issues that can cause conflict. Lund (2006), Miall (2004) and Griffin (2001) all conclude and agree, for instance, that structural prevention and development measures are intertwined to the extent that development can be a form of conflict prevention itself, depending on when it is done. Therefore, "conflict prevention evolved from being focused almost exclusively on preventive diplomacy, to a new more comprehensive approach that can be defined as structural prevention" (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2015, p. 1). Such broadening of the concept opened space for long-term measures, policies, and regulations on a myriad of themes. Galtung's (1996) concepts of peace can be adopted to better explain the difference between direct (quest for negative peace) and structural

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(quest for positive peace) conflict prevention: the first aims at achieving the absence of violence and the second, a just social, economic and political environment.

The broadening of the concept of conflict prevention was followed by the broadening of actors involved in it, as well. Lund highlights the participation of "governmental and non-governmental actors in social, economic, cultural, and other agencies, such as within the UN system; international financial institutions; regional organizations; and major governments through bi-lateral development and security assistance" (Lund, 2008, p. 290), but also NGOs, companies and celebrities, which, according to Kofi Annan, form the *culture of prevention* (Annan, 2001, p. 2). While the engagement of several players strengthens the case for conflict prevention, Griffin (2001) points it out as a possible negative factor, since a myriad of players with their own agendas, interests, and understandings of a situation that must be prevented may worsen it. Coordination is a key factor for conflict prevention to succeed (Lund, 2006).

Having defined conflict prevention and explored its players and types, the author also makes a distinction between ad hoc and a priori instruments, which is in line with the broadening of the term. According to him,

> A less recognized expansion of prevention extends it 'up' from actions directed at specific countries facing imminent conflicts (ad hoc prevention) to include global – and regional – level legal conventions or other normative standards, such as in human rights and democracy. These regimes seek to influence entire categories of countries or agents, where violations might contribute to conflicts although no signs of conflict have yet appeared (a priori prevention). Whereas the former actions are hands-on ways (either direct or structural) to respond to country-specific risk factors, the latter are generic international principles agreed on by global and regional organizations as guideposts that whole classes of states are expected to stay within. There are two varieties: a) supranational normative regimes, such as human rights conventions, and b) international regulations of goods that may fuel or ease conflict such as arms, diamonds, and other trade. (Lund, 2008, p. 291)

In that sense, Lund broadens even more the concept of conflict prevention, extending it to international treaties focused on democracy and Human Rights, since by agreeing to such treaties, states are bound by them, i.e., by following their rules and by suffering consequences if not. The author, therefore, argues that the trend of constitutionalization and institutionalization in International Law are important to prevent conflicts as well. Lund's table below presents the taxonomy of illustrative conflict prevention instruments:

	A Priori Measures (Generic norms and regimes for classes of countries)	Ad Hoc Measures ('Hands on' actions targeted to particular places and times)
Structural Measures (Address basic societal, institutional and policy factors affecting conflict/peace)	Standards for human rights, good governance Environmental regimes World Trade Organization negotiations OAS and AU's protocols on protecting democracy International organization membership or affiliations	Economic reforms and assistance Enterprise promotion Natural resource management Decentralization, federalism Long-term observer missions Group assimilation policies Aid for elections, legislatures Human rights and conflict resolution education Aid for police and judiciary Executive power-sharing Security sector reform
Direct Measures (Address more immediate behaviors affecting conflict/peace)	International Criminal Court War Crimes Tribunals Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights Arms control treaties Global regulation of illegal trade (e.g., Kimberly Process for 'conflict diamonds') EU Lome and Cotonou processes on democracy, governance, and human rights	Human rights capacity-building Inter-group dialogue, reconciliation Conditional budget support Fact-finding missions Arms embargoes 'Peace radio' Good offices, facilitation, track-two diplomacy 'Muscular' mediation Preventive deployment Economic sanctions Threat of force Rapid reaction forces

Figure 4: Taxonomy of illustrative conflict prevention instruments. Lund, 2008.

The table is important to shed light onto one of Lund's main arguments: that conflict prevention is often done with other terms or names. According to him, that is also one of the reasons why it seems like prevention is not happening or working. However, the author defends that independently of the name of an action, if it does prevent conflict, nomenclature is irrelevant.

2.2.1. Early warning

In "Conflict and Fragility, Preventing Violence War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response", a manual made by OECD in 2009, early warning is not new. Having been initially created to forecast natural disasters, the systems started being envisioned by scientists such as David Singer (1979) and Israel Charny (1992) as a possible tool to prevent war and genocide during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1981, Prince

Aga Khan delivered a report gathering proposals for early warning systems aimed at conflicts to the UN Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights. Six years later, the UN founded the Office for the Research and Collection of Information, which had the goal of developing, monitoring, and analyzing data for conflict prevention. However, the tool was mainly used to manage already existing conflicts. Only with the end of the Cold War would Boutros Boutros-Ghali release his historical report "An Agenda for Peace", in 1992. The document highlighted the UN's most important goal, which is to prevent conflicts before they happen, and the need to focus the organization's efforts into it. The report carried several directives such as "to seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence erupts", to develop "an understanding of developments and global trends, based on sound analysis" (United Nations, 1992), and to develop policy integration. The report resulted, among other things, in the initiation of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, an African early warning system that will be analyzed in the coming chapters due to its importance since a large number of conflicts have been happening in the continent.

The international failure with the Rwandan genocide forced the international society to rethink conflict prevention strategies. Just as nowadays, where specialists and authors agree that lack of information is not the issue with conflict prevention, several reports such as "Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide" by the African Union, in 2000, proved that "pieces of information were available that, if put together and analyzed, would have permitted policy-makers to draw the conclusion that both political assassinations and genocide might occur" (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). The gravity of this situation led to several initiatives, as it can be seen in the table below, based on the OECD report:

Table 1: Initiatives for conflict prevention

Document (year)	Conclusion
OECD DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-operation	Importance of early warning systems and analysis to achieve early responses.

(1997)	
Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997)	Reasons for violence conflict can usually be foreseen, such as in Bosnia and Rwanda, and, therefore, local solutions and early responses are needed.
Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations - Brahimi (2000)	Early warning as the tool to transform the UN from a "reactive organization" into a "preventive" one.
UK White Paper of International Development (2000)	Need to implement the Brahimi Report, cohesion in policies, and establishing the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools.
Khartoum Declaration (2000)	Need to establish early warning systems for inter and intra-state conflicts.
Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General (2001)	Need to strengthen the Secretariat's DPA capacity to do early warning analysis in a way that timely responses may be achieved.
EU's Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention (2001)	Links between early warning and other instruments and the need to create a EU early warning mechanism.

Initiatives were also taken by academia, NGOs, consultancies, among other players, leading to several early warning systems and forums such as the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning (EAWARN), and the Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions (FAST), which were responsible for initial discussions regarding "the purpose of early warning, the differences between conflict early warning and traditional intelligence work, gender considerations, the constituency and ownership of early warning systems, paradigms, and the link between warning and response" (OECD, 2009).

The first issue debated back then, regarding the purpose of early warning, engaged two different perspectives on the topic: while one believed it should be completely separate from response and its advocacy in order to maintain rigor, the other believed early warning had to be directly linked to response efforts in order to save lives.

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Regarding the difference between early warning and traditional intelligence, Adelman (2006) argues that the first:

> Followed the pattern of climate and humanitarian-based early warning systems in adopting a global perspective and not looking at potential or actual violence from the perspective of the threat to one's own state. Further, early warning relied primarily upon open sources in adopting a non state-centered approach to conflict management." (OECD, Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: the Future of Conflict, Early Warning, and Response, 2009, p.34).

In that sense, achieving consensus that early warning is a mechanism for peace and all its stakeholders, not a tool for states, solved this part of the debate. Questions regarding constituency and ownership, however, are more delicate. Since concepts such as peace and conflict are perceived in different ways by different actors, regarding their own perspective of what those terms mean and what their interests are, this part of the debate is still very relevant. Since individuals cannot distance themselves from the object of study in a neutral way, the OECD report states that early warning workers questioned what peace they were advocating for. (OECD, 2009). Not only different lenses used to envision reality may be an issue, but civil society groups started arguing that early warning did not provide a local-based perspective on possible conflicts (OECD, 2009). That critique came along with many others (OECD, 2009), such as the dominance of Northern countries over the information produced by early warning systems, the inconsistency, bias, and lack or coordination of interventions, the delay in responding to problems, and the state-focused way of responding that ignored other interest groups and seemed interventionist and foreign. Such critique was embraced by research and some international players (OECD, 2009), changing the shift of early warning and its funding from a global to a regional level in order to make them closer to their subjects.

Conclusions achieved in different political panels and academic debates back in 1996 were consensual and still pose a challenge nowadays: the international society failed by acting late, uncoordinatedly, and contradictorily. Also, many mistakes were made by decision-makers in the political, institutional and individual levels (OECD, 2009). were seen as an issue as well. The Brahimi Report, which advocated for coordination and integration in conflict prevention policies, became an important tool for the development of early warning systems in the late 1990s.

The methodological aspect of early warning systems was – and still is – extremely important. As stated in the OECD report of 2009,

> Much research was done in the 1990s by American academics in particular, to develop (most quantitative) methods of analysis. Initiatives […] developed a strong empirical base for theories of violent conflict and advanced significantly on the coding (automated and manual) of information. Work also started towards the end of the 1990s on several qualitative conflict analysis methods […] that linked conflict analysis with stakeholder analysis and later, peace analysis. (OECD, 2009, p. 32)

The events of 9/11 were important to deepen early warning work. US State Department understandings that failed states allow for the rise of terrorist organizations developed a foreign affairs philosophy in Washington DC that ensuring security abroad was a matter of national security as well. Within this logic, early warning systems were expanded to suit that agenda. After much debate and lessons learned from conflicts in the 1990s, around 2001 and 2002, OECD claims that:

> […] broad-based consensus emerged that a 'good' early warning system was one that: (a) is based 'close to the ground' or has strong field-based networks and monitors; (b) uses multiple sources of information and both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods; (c) capitalizes on appropriate communication and information technology; (d) provides regular reports and updates on conflict dynamics to key national and international stakeholders; and (e) has a strong link to responders or response mechanisms. (OECD, 2009, p. 34)

The aforementioned characteristics became a best practice guideline for most systems from that time and kept developing to form what is now called the three generations of systems, which still are used currently, as explained below:

Table 2: Generations of early warning systems

First generation (1990s -)	- Headquarter-based; - Multi-source information; - Qualitative and quantitative analysis;
Second generation (2000 -)	- Networks of monitors operating from the ground

	(more local oriented);
	- Qualitative and quantitative analysis;
	- Provide reports and recommendations;
	- Advocate and plan responses;
Third generation (2003 -)	- Based in conflict areas (very local oriented);
	- Information is used to de-escalate situations, with local and national monitors being used as responders (stronger response links);

The advancements through these generations where also felt at institutional levels. Regional organizations, agencies, NGOs, among other international players, have done considerable efforts to develop a panoply of new early warning systems and enhance existing ones since the genocide in Rwanda, allied with analysis, policy, and response capacity improvements. Early warning systems were linked with other types of conflict prevention, both direct (preventive diplomacy, economic measures, and the use of force within UN Charter principles) and structural (international law, rule of law, justice, sustainable development, and governance), as argued by OECD (2009) and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997).

2.2.2. Relationship between early warning and timing to act

Adopting the broader definition of conflict prevention advocated by Lund (2002), which is similar to the one adopted by most policy makers throughout the years, as the concept evolved, it becomes harder to operationalize it. In that sense, the major gap identified by the UN, academia, and policy makers, is the one between having the information and acting. Even in 1994, during the Rwandan genocide, several authorities – including UN officials – had the information about the escalation of the conflict in the country (African Union, 2000). That is way before the r2p or the operationalization of several early warning mechanisms. The reason for this is that direct conflict prevention is

way harder to achieve than structural (Lund, 2002). Ackermann (2003), for instance, claims that:

> Significant advances have been made in conflict analysis and, while there is no consensus as to the exact causal mechanisms, there are certain key variables as well as structural and mobilizing causes that can be identified and that can inform an appropriate conflict analysis strategy. […] While conventional wisdom holds that there is often not enough early warning, the opposite is often true. In fact, there was ample warning with several severe violent conflicts, such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda, but there was a lack of appropriate response. (p. 342)

Despite the emergence of a rhetorical conflict prevention culture, the warning-answer dilemma remains, and the causes for this remain understudied (Matveeva, 2006). The author claims that:

> The UN claims such a role, but its institutional capacity and political constraints are too severe for early actions and its record so far has not been promising. Thus, there is a paradox: those who want to intervene (civil society or regional organizations), have no capacity to do so, while those with capacity are seldom interested in early intervention. (p. 30)

Early response consists of three intrinsic parts: receiving the warning, believing it, and acting on it (Matveeva, 2006). In that sense it is important to focus on why responses happen or not. Despite the aforementioned lack of studies regarding this vital issue, Matveeva (2006) argues that, first of all, international response happens depending on aspects such as public opinion's knowledge about a conflict-prone country, media coverage, proximity to the EU and the US and the degree of the security threat to the West. Moreover, the author cites Lund (1996) to outline other difficulties for action: "these revolve around the role and motivation of the actioneer and include the pressure of on-going commitments, altruism versus egotism, the confusion of an intervention and 'noise', i.e., more pressing matters, such as an actual violent conflict" (p. 31).

Matveeva (2006) cites Susanne Schmeidl's 'Early Response and Integrated Response Development', in which the latter developed categories to explain obstacles to response, from which the table below was created:

Table 3: Obstacles to Respond

Situation dynamics	Some regions are more interesting to outside

	actors, certain situations are more familiar than others, in some conflicts incentives are more ready at hand, i.e., EU membership proposal.
Political dynamics	Constraints at home, overall relationship with a government in question, i.e., Russia with regards to the conflict in Chechnya.
Human dynamics	Psychological factors such as cognitive structures that impair our perception and judgment, fear of failure, delayed learning.
Institutional dynamics	Bureaucratic factors such as the capacities and mandates of organizations, UN inertia which played a detrimental role in Rwanda genocide case, for instance.
Analytical capacity	Early warning needs to be unique to the situation, counterintuitive and draw attention to what could be done, while this is not always the case.

It is important to highlight that effective early warning integrates different mechanisms that already exist, permits analyzing available quantitative and qualitative data, and is done continuously, not in an ad hoc fashion, with the production of frequent analytical reports regarding each country. In this sense, and to overcome the warning-response dilemma, recommendations are needed based on the available capacity to respond, which also needs to be developed (Van de Goor and Verstegen), shifting the logic from warning to indication of how to deploy available policy instruments (Matveeva, 2006).

Policy instruments available, as argued by Lund (2002), include a myriad of actions that must be done to attempt reversing the situation: acting before a triggering event, be swift and decisive, use influential international diplomats, convince parties that the international community is committed to a fair solution, combine different tools such as incentives and sanctions in a coherent fashion, support moderate, cooperative and non-violent leaders, establish local networks to address conflict drivers, use credible

threat of force and be ready to deter violence, neutralize regional factors such as neighboring countries who support specific sides, work through legitimate local institutions to strengthen them, involve regional organizations, and act through the UN to ensure legitimacy. Aware of the need of different responses to different situations and moments of a conflict, Lund goes beyond and agrees with all authors hereby analyzed by claiming that instruments are not enough. What is needed is a coherent conflict prevention strategy depending on the moment of a conflict:

Table 4: Moments of a conflict and possible tools

Conflict	A priori instruments	Ad hoc structural instruments	Ad hoc direct instruments
Latent: changes are generating underlying but unackowledged strains among societal groups but interests have not yet been mobilized. The goal is structural prevention to avoid escalation.	- Promulgation of standards by regional and international organizations; - Incentives to encourage respect to Human Rights, democracy, and peaceful settlement of disputes;	- Incentive reforms in order to mitigate underlying causes of conflict such as poverty and inequality, inter-ethnic legislation, and others.	Since conflict is latent, direct prevention would be premature and, moreover, having the international community point out issues may worsen the situation. In this phase, efforts should be focused on ad hoc structural instruments.
	In this sense, causes of conflict may be mitigated before conflict, with time to adjust policies and build confidence. However benefits cannot intensify issues with neighbors of the recipient country.	Structural adjustments can increase stability and worsen the situation, as vastly studied by Roland Paris (2004).	
Manifest limited conflict: potentially diverging positions are decided upon and voiced by irregular acts, including violence. The goal is to	Invoking a priori norms is still effective.	Structural measures continue to be useful. However, "less for alleviating the underlying sources of the conflict than as 'purchase', to sweeten an agreement, that purveyors of direct prevention can use tactically" (Lund, 2002).	- Soft mediation; - Creation of inter-party communication; - Preventive deployment. These measures are intended to facilitate norm and behavior changes with communication between parties.
Escalating violent conflicts: positions are harder and issues grow into violence, with major hostilities becoming imminent. The goal is to avoid irreversible spiral.	Invoking a priori norms might still be effective, with less than totally punitive actions being able to reach those looking to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute. Coercive diplomacy, however, must only be used if a clear pattern of open violence is already present.	Tackling root-causes becomes a mistake since violence is now the main driver. Ad hoc structural measures become less efficient as well.	- Tough tools of formal diplomacy to buy time and achieve cease-fires; - Incentives to ensure agreements; - Strengthen the power of weaker parties; - Coercive diplomacy; - Comprehensive sanctions; - Threat of force backed by credible force;

			- Use of force to limit violence; -
			Excluding the country from international organizations, non-targeted sanctions and indictment of war crimes are not helpful for causing more distress.

Tools of conflict prevention must be, therefore, used within a broader, comprehensive strategy created for each specific case, taking into consideration not only national and regional contexts, possible underlying causes for conflict, and the moment of the conflict, as shown by Lund (2002) in the table above.

2.2.3. Preventive diplomacy

UN's Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld first used the term 'preventive diplomacy' in 1960. According to the "Agenda for Peace" (UN, 1992), preventive diplomacy means "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur". In that sense, it is linked with other actions such as good offices, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjucation and arbitration (Zyck and Muggah, 2012), as well as peace conferences, consultations, campaigns, unilateral goodwill gestures, civilian fact-finding missions, observers, monitoring, and verification teams, conditionality (stick and carrots strategies), special envoys, and diplomatic appeals and condemnations (NCDO, 1997 - From Early Warning to Early Action, A Report on the European Conference on Conflict Prevention, NCDO, The Netherlands, 1997, pp. 128-129.).

Since the early 2000's, UN led the international community in an effort to develop preventive diplomacy initiatives. In 2001, the UNDP founded its Bureau for Crisis

Prevention and Recovery, and in 2004, the Department of Political Affairs established its Mediation Support Unit. While in office as Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon released several reports (Zyck and Muggah, 2012) requesting more funding, partnerships and capacity building to improve preventive diplomacy. Most international and regional organizations followed the UN's footsteps, creating their own preventive diplomacy initiatives, such as the World Bank's World Development Report, NATO's Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center, African Union's Peace and Security Council and its associated bodies, ASEAN and OAS with regional forums, the OSCE's High Commission for National Minorities, and the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council with mediators and envoys to negotiate crises (Zyck and Muggah, 2012). At a national level, states followed suit, especially within countries such as the United States, the BRICS, and Qatar. Lastly, NGOs and consultancies started their own projects. Still according to Zyck and Muggah,

> As with gender, climate change and other transversal priorities, conflict prevention and resolution have become core cross-cutting themes to be addressed through a wide array of humanitarian and development programs in fragile and conflict-affect countries. (Zyck and Muggah, 2012, p. 71)

As with many other tools of conflict prevention, authors point out the lack of coordination as a main issue to be dealt with in preventive diplomacy (Zyck and Muggah, 2012). The creation of several organizations and instances that deal with it create a huge challenge since they do not always share the same interpretations of conflicts – again, the different lenses that are available in international politics are key to determine how each instance decides the best way to deal with a specific situation. Just as with early warning systems, the international community and academia have agreed with the importance of the local (Zyck and Muggah, 2012), i.e., decentralizing preventive diplomacy in order to empower local and regional players that are closer to the issues being dealt with.

While the academia has reached some consensus on the importance of regional, national, and subnational stakeholders to achieve peace through preventive diplomacy, Zyck and Muggah (2012) claim that, in practice, the perception of state actors is put above others, leaving NGOs and civil society undermined. According to them, that happens because such organizations aim at meeting the interests of their members, which are states. They go on to claim that quite often, those players have "strongly

emphasized strict notions of national sovereignty in which many forms of prevention action are deemed to be inappropriate if not hostile" (p. 72). Zyck and Muggah (2012) give the example of 2012's ASEAN Regional Forum to illustrate this. According to them, issues such as "North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan, and nuclear proliferation" were key topics during the meeting, instead of focusing on challenges within the group's member states, which is more delicate.

Recently, regional organizations started acting as relevant players in preventive diplomacy and their role must be addressed. Their geographical and cultural proximity, the need of fewer actors to reach consensus, the peer pressure in regional affairs, and their work as a middle ground between the international and the national levels justify this trend and are important to foster conflict prevention actions. However, in many cases they have been inefficient, lacked financial, logistical, and human resources and know-how, and were not impartial. Many authors – Lund (2008), Gowan (2017), Ackermann (2003) – mention the timing between perceiving a threat and acting as an issue for preventive diplomacy as well, i.e., stakeholders are usually involved with ongoing issues that are already threatening peace, leaving possible threats in the background. Zyck and Muggah (2012) state, as an example, that the "Arab League and GCC did not begin addressing political instability until regimes in the Middle East were already rapidly deteriorating".

2.2.4. Economic measures

The UN's primary goal, which is to maintain peace, is a responsibility of the Security Council, which may adopt, if a breach in peace is observed, several steps enlisted in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For instance, the UN Charter (UN, 1945), in its 41st article, determined that

> The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, see, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

In situations where breaches in peace arise, the article permits and defines the rules of the adoption of economic measures, among others, to influence perpetrators to act as desired by the international system. The UN states, therefore, that economic sanctions are effective and legal to stop or prevent violent conflicts. Such sanctions may restrict the flow of goods, services or money and the access to markets (Ruiz, 2012).

In "An Agenda for Peace" (UN, 1992), Boutros Boutros-Ghali had already envisioned economic measures as a tool of conflict prevention. In the 41st article of the said document, he recommended that "the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that can be put in place to insulate states from(…)" economic distress. Such preoccupation is key to address the impact of economic sanctions on civilians. The UN's primary goal of maintaining peace is in the hands of the Security Council, which must act accordingly to the UN Charter (Ruiz, 2012). Still according to Ruiz, economic sanctions are seen as a middle ground between verbal condemnations and the use of force, an understanding that allows such actions to be perceived as moderate. Moreover, economic sanctions may be used against non-state actors, which may be effective to disarticulate terrorism, for instance, while avoiding the expenses – both financial and in human resources – of military intervention. However, many Reinisch (2001) argues that such sanctions, in practice, affect the civilian population severely, creating what he calls a "Human Rights paradox". According to him, Human Rights have become the main reason for economic sanctions, which, in its turn, creates even more Human Rights issues, therefore disregarding the same principles they aim at defending, generating poverty, undermining the middle class, and often stimulating black markets controlled by a rising organized crime.

Since economic sanctions are a responsibility of the Security Council and the Chapter VII of the UN Charter is very broad, leaving a lot of practical and ideological margin for members to establish them, and given their severe impact on civilian populations, many efforts have been put forward by the UN to frame sanctions in a more balanced fashion between effectiveness and civilian impact. According to Ruiz (2012),

> The imposition of limits and/or obligations to an entity such as the Security Council depend on its legal position under the System where it is performing its functions; on one hand, it is a political organ created by an

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International Agreement with a constitutional character (The Charter of the United Nations), and on the other, it is part of an Organization that is subject of rights and obligations under International Law. (Ruiz, 2012, p. 225)

In that sense, Ruiz claims that the first limitation to the Security Council's action is its character under International Law, within the legal personality of the United Nations. However, while having to abide to International Law, this limitation is quite vague and subjective. The Charter itself is a second source of limitation to the establishment of economic sanctions by the Security Council, from which Ruiz highlights three specific points, as illustrated in the table below, as cited by the author:

Table 5: Legal dispositions under the UN Charter – limitations to the power of the Security Council

Disposition	Limitations
Preamble	"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth to human person" "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".
Article 1(3)	"solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights"
Article 55	"higher standards of living" "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction"

Since the UN is not a party to Human Rights treaties, being solely bound by its Charter, Ruiz (2012) suggests looking at Customary Law and General Principles of International Law to find limitations to the Security Council's action when establishing economic sanctions. In that sense, two branches are relevant to the analysis: Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. The first one, while being useful both in

times of peace and war, and ensuring the right to life – a disposition with jus cogens status – is otherwise vague when it comes to the adverse effects of economic sanctions. The latter, as claimed by the International Court of Justice in the case Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ICJ Reports, 1996):

> The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant treaties, as well as the fact that the denunciation clauses that existed in the codification instruments have never been used, have provided the international community with a corpus of treaty rules the great majority of which had already become customary and which reflected the most universally recognized humanitarian principles. (ICJ, 1996, p. 258)

According to Ruiz (2012), Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005) in *"Customary International Humanitarian Law"*, a study produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross, four rules of Humanitarian Law[3] have customary value. First, "the use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited". Secondly, "Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are prohibited". In third place, "The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to the right of control". Lastly, "The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in case of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted". Despite such dispositions, Ruiz rightly accentuates that such rules are only valid in cases of armed conflict and were not made to tackle the adverse effects of economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council. (Henckaert and Doswald-Beck, 2005).

Given the existing shortfalls to guide and limit the establishment of economic sanctions, Ruiz (2012) proposes applying "well-established Principles of International Law" and "minimal humanitarian standards", and developing a code of conduct to the Security Council. However, the mitigation of possible issues caused by sanctions remains in the hands of the Security Council itself, which tries to impose them in a targeted

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[3] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).

fashion with the help of humanitarian specialists (Ruiz, 2012). The improvement of this tool of conflict prevention relies on International Law advancements, engagement of the international community, coordination between actors to decide whether or not and how to create a legal framework for the designing of economic sanctions.

Economic measures may as well be used as incentives in order to shape relations among states. Cortright (1997, p. 5-6) defines incentives as "the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a specific policy adjustment by the recipient nation" and gives, as an example, the World Bank's initiative of assisting Uganda and Mozambique in demilitarization by offering financial provision for demobilized fighters. However, the author also highlights a different kind of incentive, called by him as "pure". In this modality, the sender offers benefits with a long-term perspective of generating cooperation and trust. The EU's proposal for Macedonia's membership, among other nations, is an example of this. Mentioning Keohane, Cortight says that such initiatives result in behavioral adjustments by states to actual or anticipated preferences of others (Cortright, 1997). Baldwin lists positive sanctions in *Economic Statecraft* (1985), mentioning actions such as most-favored-nation status, tariff reductions, direct purchases, subsidies, export and import licenses, foreign aid, investments, capital import and export, favorable taxations, access to advanced technology, diplomatic and political support, military cooperation, environmental and social cooperation, cultural exchanges, support for citizen diplomacy, debt relief, security assurances, membership in international organizations or security alliances, lifting of negative sanctions, or the promise of the above.

2.2.5.   Military measures in conflict prevention

Many military measures can be taken as tools of conflict prevention, such as preventive deployments – as the one applied to the case of Macedonia, which will be studied in depth in the next chapter –, restructuration and professionalization of military forces, demobilization, reduction and reintegration of distinctive forces, military to military programs, military confidence building measures, non-aggression agreements, security guarantees, the establishment of demilitarized zones, disarmaments, among

others. Such actions may be perceived by some actors as direct interventions, but since they lie between both fields and they can, indeed, be used as tools of conflict prevention, this work will focus on preventive deployment to better introduce the case study that follows.

In cases where preventive diplomacy fails to put conflict tendencies to a halt or keep parties in a constructive situation to work on their differences, preventive deployment may be adopted. Likewise, peace maintained through diplomatic efforts might need to be consolidated by more coercive measures, as argued by Waniz and Grizold (2012) The authors claim that "there are two cases of preventive action that successfully combined preventive diplomatic action by the UN and other international actors with a Blue-Helmet preventive military deployment" (Waniz and Grizold, 2012) because they were put in place in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities: Minurca, in Central African Republic, and UNPREDEP, in Macedonia or Macedonia.

2.3. Structural conflict prevention

Lund (2008) claims that "Boutros-Ghali listed early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventive deployment, and peace zones" (Lund, 2008) as the tools of conflict prevention. In the 1990s, however, UN documents enlarged such list to encompass a myriad of new tools that are greatly linked to development, which can be put in practice by numerous actors as well, ranging from states to civilians. Such tools are known as integral, structural or deep prevention. Citing Lund (2008):

> Integral also is 'structural' or 'deep' prevention, meaning actions or policies that address deeper societal conditions that generate conflicts between interests and/or the institutional, procedural and policy deficits or capacities that determine whether competing interests are channeled and mutually adjusted peacefully. These more basic factors make up the environment within which contending actors operate and thus policies toward them can create constraints or opportunities that shape what the actors do. Diverse examples are reducing gross regional disparities in living standards, reforming exploitative agricultural policies, and building effective governing institutions.17 These structural targets make prevention more than simply avoiding violence, or 'negative peace,' b ut rather aspiring to positive peace. (p.290)

Integral prevention can be especially done in times of durable peace, stable peace and unstable peace, but are also maintained in times of crisis or war, since humanitarian and development affairs are progressively more linked. However, and as stated in the introduction of this work, when these measures are taken in times of unstable peace, crisis, or war, they are unlikely to be successful and, as argued by Lund (2008), such situations are one of the reasons why many actors perceive conflict prevention as ineffective. The tools include, but are not limited to "policies that address the institutional, socio-economic, and global environment within which conflicting actors operate" (Lund, 2008, p. 289).

International organizations play an important role in structural prevention of conflicts. By demanding standards such as democracy, respect to Human Rights, mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes, among other principles and requirements from future members, more accountability is created. According to Lund (2008), such instrument is effective when penalties for violations are relevant. Root causes of possible conflict are also targeted by many actors, such as NGOs, international organizations and states, which try to promote stability abroad. The African Union, for instance, promotes structural conflict prevention along with their members, as stated in several documents issued by their Council, such as the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Follow-up to the Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 27 October of 2014 on Structural Conflict Prevention, during the 502th meeting of the Security Council, on April 29 of 2015:

> Council stressed the need to address the root causes of conflicts in a systematic and holistic manner, and the imperative for all Member States, in line with their commitments under relevant AU instruments, to work towards ever-higher standards in the areas of human rights, democracy, good governance and conflict prevention, a prerequisite to attain socio-economic development and integration on the continent. Council agreed, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, to effectively follow-up the progress made by Member States towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as provided for in article 7 (m) of the PSC Protocol [PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLX)].

The AU has also done relevant work on a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF), in partnership with the European Union, the UN, and

some NGOs, by adopting "several normative instruments to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts" (Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework, African Union, 2016). According to the document, such instruments "relate to human rights; governance and the fight against corruption; democratization processes; disarmament; terrorism; and the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts" (Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework, African Union, 2016, pp. 12). The framework contemplates capacity building in the national and the regional levels, outlines a process through which members may identify their vulnerabilities, and determines how the AU can work to mitigate them, increasing peace drivers locally. There are two main processes comprised by the AU's framework. The first one, the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA), under Africa's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), serves as a study to identify a country's vulnerabilities and to establish peace drivers to be analyzed through time, which include the areas of socio-economic development, governance, rule of law, democracy, and Human Rights, security, environment and climate change, gender and youth, post-conflict peace-building, and transitional justice and reconciliation. The CSVRA is the basis to the Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS). According to the Framework document, "the CSVMS is a key output of the process. It explores the dimensions upon which the AU and the RECs can best support the actions to be undertaken which may include measures at regional levels to address structural/ root causes of violent conflict.". In this sense, AU's member states may require such assistance, and the regional organization appoints a team to lead the work and draw a report, which will result in feasible measures to be taken by the state in cause. The CSVRA is updated annually to allow an understanding of the progress.

The European Union's structural conflict prevention framework is also based on its Early Warning System (EWS), which serves, as with the AU's, as the source of its conflict prevention strategy. Risk information is compiled twice a year and a prioritization is done, which results in the index of quantitative risk. The index is then crossed with intelligence analysis and qualitative situation analysis from open sources, and compared to previous cycles of the EWS (Davis, Habbida and Penfrat, 2017). All phases are done by several stakeholders, such as staff and management of the EU, delegations, the Political and Security Committee, and in-country actors. Based on this work, the EU prepares

reports with key risks and recommendations for preventive action, always in consultation with member states and local stakeholders. The Global Conflict Risk Index, as of 2015, took into account twenty-four indicators divided in five groups: political, security, social, economy, and geography and environment. The table below, from http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Methodology, demonstrates the concepts, indicators, and sources used.

Risk Area	Concept	Indicator	Source
Political	Regime type	Regime Type	CSP
		Lack of Democracy	CSP
	Regime performance	Government Effectiveness	World Bank
		Level of Repression	CIRI
		Empowerment Rights	PTS
Security	Current conflict situation	Recent Internal Conflict	HIIK; UCDP/PRIO
		Neighbouring with HVC	HIIK; UCDP/PRIO
	History of conflict	Years since HVC	HIIK; UCDP/PRIO
Social	Social cohesion and diversity	Corruption	World Bank
		Ethnic Power Change	ETH Zurich
		Ethnic compilation	ETH Zurich
		Transnational Ethnic Bonds	CIDCM
	Public security and health	Homicide Rate	UNODC
		Infant Mortality	UNICEF
Economy	Development and distribution	GDP per capita	World Bank
		Income inequality	World Bank
		Openness	World Bank
	Provisions and Employment	Food Security	FAO
		Unemployment	ILOSTAT
Geography and Environment	Geographic challenge	Water Stress	WRI
		Oil Production	World Bank
		Structural Constraints	BTI
	Demographics	Population Size	World Bank
		Youth Bulge	UNDESA

Figure 5: Indicators of conflict prevention by the Global Conflict Risk Index (2015)

The EU aims to "promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples" (TEU Art. 3(1) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) and to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security" (Art. 21(2). The table below shows how it responds to conflict risks. According to De Zan, Tessari and Venturi (2016):

> Conflict prevention is implemented through long and short-term action. Long term actions include programs related to human rights protection, democracy, rule of law, education or disarmament. The short-term actions are based on economic, diplomatic and political measures. Some key financial instruments can be used both in the long or short run, as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)60. This instrument is also responding to the EU's objective to both intervene through specific instruments (e.g. DDR or SSR) and create partnerships with relevant nongovernmental actors, which in many cases are the implementers of the projects. (p. 19)

2.4. Lack of political will or excess of wills?

Political will, understood here as a common or collective will to act, is commonly mentioned by conflict prevention actors and authors as key to conflict prevention. Lenzi (1997), for instance, starts his subchapter named "political will" as follows:

> Problems of coordination are important, but political will is clearly the determining factor. If the concept of conflict prevention has become a tool that is widely used, its nature and scope are prone to confusion and raise a certain number of problems. The prevention of conflicts should not be confused with the management of conflicts, during the stage of the outbreak of hostilities and armed confrontation, and the resolution of conflicts following the cessation of hostilities. Next, political choice is inherent in conflict prevention. It often implies adopting a position, which excludes the idea of political neutrality; moreover, there is no truly neutral mediation between parties, as the Yugoslav conflict has shown. Lastly, political will is essential in conflict prevention. Its absence within organizations or states responsible for conflict prevention can be attributed to a lack of means, the too high costs or the absence of vital interests. (Kühne, Lenzi and Vasconcelos. 1995, p. 8)

In that sense, he claims that conflict prevention, as a concrete policy, highly depends on the engagement of actors, which are constrained by several variables regarding the interests on the table. Lund (2008), on the other hand, has a very interesting perspective on the matter. The author defends that pointing out a lack of political will to prevent is vague and fails to explain why, in some cases, prevention is done. In his opinion,

> More often, the problem may be that there is an excess of political wills. The major powers and international community are present extensively in most developing countries, including those vulnerable to conflict. This presence takes many forms such as diplomatic missions, cultural activities, health and education and infrastructure development, trade and commerce, military assistance, as well as efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and civil society. But this multitude of activities building schools, training nurses, assisting elections, digging wells, teaching good business practices, you name it, is pursuing a variety of differing policy goals that are not necessarily supportive of conflict prevention. If many actors are already engaged in conflict-prone places, often in sizeable numbers, the problem is not what is commonly depicted as receiving an early warning from some remote country and then pressuring international actors to rush to it before a crisis erupts. International actors are already there. Yet each mission is expending energy and resources in many dispersed directions other than preventing violent conflicts. An effective prevention system does not operate in potential conflict areas because everyone is busily pursuing other mandates. While some of these conflict-blind activities may help, some enable or worsen conflicts. (Lund, 2008, p. 296)

Lund, therefore, believes the lack of coordination, and not the lack of political will, lead to issues in conflict prevention. Not only actors have their own interpretations

of root causes of conflict, interpretations of data, recommendations, and manners of achieving peace, but they also have different interests and expertise on the ground. Moreover, the author argues that more than disparate wills, different professionals, with their own backgrounds, have their own values and notions regarding each issue that is analyzed (Lund, 2008). Professionals from conflict resolution, peace studies, Human Rights, economic development, political development, and security studies allow for a comprehensive understanding of conflict prevention at the same time they have competing goals. Even though they are all in search of peace, there usually are different notions of peace. It is important to highlight that "the prevailing Western liberal model often assumes that the democracy, Human Rights, rule of law, free markets, and economic growth are all compatible with one another and with peace" (Lund, 2008). However, many authors, such as Roland Paris (2004), conducted relevant work to show how sometimes those concepts are incompatible. According to him, the adoption of the liberal model propagated by the West in weak states may result in a rise of intolerance, ethnic divisions, polarization and radicalization of the electorate, political regimes that work in a gray zone between democracy and dictatorship, and inequality followed by high social costs. Lund (2008) and Paris (2004), therefore, point to two different issues that had already been presupposed in the introduction of this work: coordination of efforts and the issues with the liberal paradigm.

The case study of Macedonia is illustrative of how political will is important also in a national level, as it will be seen in the coming chapters. A conflict prevention document called Ohrid Framework Agreement was brokered by the international community (especially by the European Union) and adopted in Macedonia to tackle root causes – mainly focused on ethnic issues between Macedonians and Albanians – of conflict in the country. Bieber (2008) claims that:

> The biggest challenge related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement is the fact that, although it has been incorporated into the Constitution, it itself is not a constitutional act, nor is a law that would oblige the ruling elites to implement it. In other words, the Framework Agreement is not a binding document from a formal and normative point of view. This is why, very often, its implementation depends solely on the political will of the government. Therefore, an imperative need emerges for seeking functional normative mechanisms that would ensure the implementation of the agreement without too much political bargaining and debate. (p. 87)

2.5. A "culture of prevention"

The work done so far in the field of conflict prevention indeed generated global conscience and consensus regarding the need to prevent conflicts. As illustrated by this dissertation so far, rhetoric on the matter is predominant in the international arena. In his remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office, António Guterres (2016) said: "Our most serious shortcoming – and here I refer to the entire international community – is our inability to prevent crises. The United Nations was born from war. Today, we must be here for peace." This statement shows not only continuity, but also an intensification of the conflict prevention rhetoric. Much has also been done in the last couple decades: reports, policies, early warning systems, specific agencies, NGOs, funding. The culture of prevention did succeed to some extent and crises were avoided, such as the one in Macedonia. The establishment of a culture of prevention is relevant since it can open space to the theme in the international agenda as well as gather support to it. Lund (2008) claims that several institutions and organizations have set up their own early warning and advocacy mechanisms, trained staff, and are currently working to integrate systems, change policy and transform early warning into action:

> Conflict prevention entered the official policy statements of the USA and other major governments, the UN, the EU, and many regional bodies. The title of the 1999 annual report on all the activities of the UN system summed them up as 'Preventing War and Disaster'. Conflict prevention was the topic of two UN Security Council discussions in 2000 and 2001; a priority urged in July, 2000 by the G-8 Okinawa Summit; and the focus of major reports of the UN Secretary General in June 2001 and 2006 (Lund, 2008, p. 293).

The author highlights efforts on the ground as well:

> Prevention has gone considerably beyond exhortation and policy into actual efforts in specific countries. Though little-publicized, direct and structural activities have been applied in such diverse places threatened by conflict as Slovakia, Indonesia, and Guyana. These activities range from bi-lateral and regional high-level diplomacy (e.g., by ECOWAS) to NGO projects in peace building at the local level, such as dialogues, peace radio, and inter-ethnic community development programs, to mention a few. The UNDP local community development program in southern Kyrgyzstan was explicitly entitled 'preventive development'. Again, many programs in potential conflict settings are intended as conflict-preventive but not so labeled, like the UN good offices' efforts with the Myanmar regime, and the World Bank offer in 2000 to help fund land reform in Zimbabwe as its political crisis over land worsened (Lund, 2008, p. 294).

Capacity building was an important focus in the efforts to preventive conflicts and many mechanisms have been created to generate automatic actions based on risk analysis (Lund, 2008, p. 294):

> Ongoing response mechanisms have been set up to trigger actions automatically based on risk criteria, at least in principle. The UN Secretariat, the European Commission, and inter-governmental, regional, and sub-regional bodies have staffed small units to watch for early warning signs and consider preventive responses. At UN headquarters, the Secretariat's 'Interagency Framework Team for Coordinating Early Warning and Information Analysis' identifies countries at risk of conflict and applicable UN preventive measures. In addition to the most active regional mechanisms of the OSCE and OAS, all African sub-regional organizations have agreed to prevention mechanisms (e.g., AU; ECOWAS; IGAD; SADC; ECCAS).

Some authors, however, do not see improvements as optimistically. Despite relative agreement regarding the improvements made in literature, Aggestam (2003) suggests that deeper research that actually sheds light on to conflict prevention was not done, lacking theoretical and operational frameworks. While Lund (2008) claims that much conflict prevention is being done by other names, Aggestam (2003) suggests that what is being done is a reconceptualization of traditional diplomatic tools without actual changes in content. The author goes beyond to say that even the concept of conflict prevention is unclear, with actors adopting diverging and often competing understandings about it. Despite some contradictory opinions in the academia, authors such as Ackermann (2003) and Lund (2009), notable names in the field of conflict prevention, agree with Wallensteen and Möller (2003), who, before adopting Lund's definition of conflict prevention, claimed:

> Carment & Schnabel argue that the definition of conflict prevention should be 'broad in meaning and malleable as a policy'. Furthermore they claim this broad approach has empirical validity because it is applicable accross a variety of cases and phases of conflict. However, we argue that most definitions are used very loosely which make them too broad to be researchable and, thus useful. Many do serve a policy purpose, rather than delimiting a field of inquiry into conflict prevention. It is not surprising that they are weak on operationalization. (p. 5)

2.6. A cost analysis

In her article "A Stitch in Time: Making the Case for Conflict Prevention", Michèle Griffin (2001) is critical of the interventions put forward by the international society to stop conflicts. According to her,

> The lessons of international intervention efforts, in particular, are mostly about what not to do: ignore brewing problems until large-scale violence and media attention force the issue; intervene selectively and often with tenuous legal cover; undertake ambitious operations on the basis of best-case scenario projections and without the resources or will to see them through; promote flawed peace agreements and premature elections; exit hastily when Western military lives are endangered or when political will dries up; substitute humanitarian assistance for political solutions; and fail to develop clear exit strategies or adequately resourced transitions to peacebuilding and development. (p. 483)

Such argument allows her to explain why interventions have become uninteresting to several states and to start, as the title of her article suggests, a case for conflict prevention, i.e., to demonstrate that acting before conflicts surface is the best option. In that sense, she points out three main arguments related to costs. First and foremost, the most shocking cost related to conflicts is the human one. The conflict in Nicaragua resulted in 22 thousand deaths, while in Mozambique, 490 thousand children lives were scythed, 200 thousand were orphaned, and 10 thousand became child soldiers, an absurd image that is still a reality in the 21st century. It is also important to point out two trends that make the death tools pike: more advanced weapon technology and conflicts becoming more dangerous to civilians than before. The table below, created by Brown University's Cost of War Project – which has 35 scholars, legal experts, Human Rights practitioners and physicians who began working together in 2011 to provide account of human, economic, and political costs of the scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – shows the direct death numbers for the three conflicts. It is fundamental to highlight the exorbitant quantity of civilian casualties, which represent between 52 and 55% of the total amount.

Human Costs of War: Direct War Death in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Oct. 2001 – July 2016) and Iraq (Oct. 2001 – April 2015)[1]

	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Iraq	Total
US Military[2]	2,371[3]		4,489	6,860
US Contractors[4]	3,540	90	3,481	7,071
National Military and Police[5]	30,470[6]	8,214[7]	12,000[8]	50,684
Other Allied Troops[9]	1,136		319	1,455
Civilians	31,419[10]	22,100[11]	137,000 - 165,000[12]	190,519 – 218,519
Opposition Fighters	42,100[13]	31,000[14]	36,400[15]	109,500
Journalists and Media Workers[16]	24	53	221	298
Humanitarian/NGO workers	382[17]	92[18]	62[19]	536
TOTAL	111,442	61,549	194,000 - 222,000	366, 991 – 394, 991
TOTAL (rounded to nearest 1,000)				367, 000 – 395,000

Figure 6: Human Costs of War: Direct Conflict Death in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Costs of War, Brown University, 2016.

Table 3: Direct Death toll of conflicts in Congo, Syria, Darfur, Iraq, and Afghanistan

Conflict	Death toll (source)
Second Congo War (1998-2003)	~5.4 million (IRC report, 2005)
Syrian Civil War (2011-)	~400 thousand (April 2016, UN and Arab League)
Darfur Conflict (2003-)	~300 thousand (April 2008, UN)
Iraq War (2003-2011)	~208 thousand (Cost of War Project, 2016)
Afghanistan War (2001-)	~111 thousand (Cost of War Project, 2016)

The human cost of conflict, however, is much higher than the number of deaths. Indirect deaths, high displacement rates, destruction of infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, lost opportunities and reversal of development gains, as argued by Griffin (2001), also need to be accounted for. The civil war in Yemen has displaced approximately 3 million people (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018). In Angola, 80% of the agricultural land was abandoned, while 70% of the Mozambican schools were destroyed during the conflict in the country. In Burundi, a drop of 17% was felt on food production while war took place. Cambodia, El Salvador and Rwanda had their trade disrupted by predatory war economies, and Sierra Leone has the title of poorest country in the world because of the war that took place there between 1991 and 2002. In that sense, the cost of conflict is felt long after the end of it, impacting several generations.

The second cost analyzed by Griffin (2001) is the one paid by the international community to intervene in such conflicts. According to her, the reconstruction of Kosovo by NATO cost around 50 billion dollars alone and humanitarian aid in Somalia reached the cost of 2 billion dollars for one single year. Also, she claims that estimates are that the international society has spent 200 billion dollars on seven large interventions during the 1990s, without taking Kosovo and East Timor into consideration, out of which 130 billion could have been saved with an efficient preventive method" (ICISS Report, 2001). Bellamy (2008) argues that in 1997 the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict projected that "even a maximal commitment to direct and structural conflict prevention would cost less than half the price of intervention and subsequent rebuilding".

Lastly, Griffin (2001) mentions the credibility cost. According to her, the bad history of interventions discredits the UN, NATO, and other players involved while also damaging relations between countries and within the area of intervention itself. Moreover, she argues that interventions have worsened situations in some cases, while the best attempts were only able to stop fighting, but not to promote lasting peace. Such argument is deeply analyzed by Roland Paris in his work "At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict" (2006). In this work he develops Griffin's (2001) point that interventions may worsen the state of affairs in a region impacted by conflict with the adoption of the liberal agenda too soon after conflict, which end up intensifying competition in environments deeply divided by conflict. His 14 case studies – Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique –, can be subdivided in three main groups: missions where a part involved left the territory in the end of the conflict, making the peacebuilding process easier; missions that had their efforts reversed by the election of leaders who were not binded by the liberal peace concept, therefore producing "fake democracies", i.e., political liberalization prevented the maintenance of peace; and missions in which economic liberalization deepened socio-economic inequalities, thus, once again, obstructing peace.

Griffin (2001) brings enough evidence to make a case for conflict prevention, as the title suggests. In fact, and despite having been written in 2001, there is a general

consensus in the academia regarding the benefits of conflict prevention in contrast to interventions after the beginning of a conflict. Several authors have gathered broad evidence showing the advantages of a shift in mindset and the debate on conflict prevention is intense among decision making players in the political arena as well. Many have been the efforts of the UN, among other organizations, to focus on prevention and advocate for it with thematic debates, reports, manuals, resolutions, interagency agreements, trainings in early warning, investment in staff, software and coordination, and the creation of, as Griffin (2001) puts it, "a culture of prevention". Nonetheless, the topic remains rhetorical. Many attempts to put ideas in practice are delayed and conflict prevention stances are usually underfunded. Griffin (2001) argues that skepticism exists because of states that oppose conflict prevention on the grounds of sovereignty and those who doubt its feasibility when so many ongoing conflicts require funding and attention.

2.7. Diverging definitions of conflict prevention

Conflict prevention has gained much support in the last decades. Nonetheless, effective prevention is hard to achieve also because of a divergence regarding its own concept (Stewart, 2003). The expansion of what conflict prevention stands for might have led actors to interpret it as vague and idealistic (idem), ranging from general stability promotion to mechanisms for crisis management. If on one hand the enlargement of the concept was done to respond to evermore-complex scenarios, on the other hand conflict prevention became harder to achieve, requiring:

> A broad, global strategy and targeted regional and country specific policies to cover both long-term and short-term objectives. It needs expertise in politico-diplomatic mediation and negotiation as well as military crisis management and post-conflict peace-building. Above all, a successful conflict prevention policy requires an accurate interpretation of root causes of conflict and an understanding of conflict dynamics. (Stewart, 2003). (p. 17)

Wallensteen and Möller (2003) argue that the definition of conflict prevention should, indeed, be "broad in meaning and malleable as a policy" (p. 5). Moreover, they defend the broad approach advocated by Lund (2008) and many other authors is valid empirically, since it needs to be applicable "across a variety of cases and phases of conflict" (Carment and Schnabel, 2003). On the other hand, the authors agree that such

broadening of the concept makes it rather complex to be researched and operationalized, as previously argued. Lund (2012) agrees with this argument and advocates for a more precise definition as well. Such difficulty to define precisely what is conflict prevention has a direct impact in what is considered successful as well (Wallensteen and Möller, 2003). In that sense, they defend Sriram and Wemester's (2006) case by case approach without adopting a specific success definition:

> They argue that success must be very context-sensitive and take history, risks and goals etc into consideration. Väyrynen agrees that the success depends in large on the political context and the ability to read it correctly. Furthermore, he argues that the outcome vary between the stages of the conflict cycle; i.e. pre-war, escalation and post-war prevention. The method of defining success does to some extent depend on the availability of comparable indicators. At present, there exists no precise indicators to determine the outcome, and therefore each case must be interpreted separately. This technique does, however, require deep examination of cases and is, at least, a highly time-consuming method. Comparability is possibly lost an thus the ability to make broad generalization for research and for policy. (p. 7)

Other authors, however, do define success and failure. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) define success as "the conjunction of a de-escalation of political tensions and steps toward addressing and transforming the issue in the conflict" (p. 119). In that sense, light measures are successful when they avert conflict and unsuccessful when armed conflicts occur, while deep measures are seen as successful when they promote peaceful change and unsuccessful when they lead to quarrelsome situations. Using Rothchild's argument, Wallensteen and Möller (2003) agree that "partial and limited success should also be considered" [Rothchild, 2003, p.36] and cite Talentino (2003) saying that "it is not constructive to view success in either short or long-term. Instead conflict prevention can only be considered successful when it prevents or ends conflict in the short-term and undertakes efforts to alter the underlying causes of violence" (p.8).

> Short-term success:
> 1. Have the adversaries engaged in negotiations, truce talks, or any head-to-head meetings?
> 2. Has an effort been made to reduce violence and prevent its re-escalation?
>
> Long-term success:
> 3. Have conflict-generating structures been identified and is there a plan to alter conflict dynamics?
> 4. Has the salience of group identity been decreased in the political and economic realms?
>
> From: Talentino in Carment & Schnabel (2003) p. 73

Figure 5: Definitions of "success" in conflict prevention.

The authors conclude that "still the discussion so far suggests that the effects of preventive measures have to be seen as a continuum of several levels of success and, furthermore, effects have to be seen in at least a medium-term perspective". (Wallensteen and Möller, 2003, p. 10). To overcome such complexity of conflict prevention – myriad of tools and actors, lack of definition, work being done under other names, and lack of confidence on early warning – Lund (2008) suggest consolidating what is known:

> Professionals need to gain access to top officials to present promising options and evidence of their results. The main problem is not epistemological but organizational. We need not wait until social scientists have found the universally highest correlations among the limited set of variables already most plausibly known as relevant before we continue to gather, synthesize, and disseminate the existing findings among policymakers and field practitioners. Enough is known to produce heuristic guidance, for even the most verified conclusions are cannot be implemented mechanically in any particular conflict setting, but used as action-hypotheses to be combined with astute political judgments. A structured framework could pull together the preventive instruments available with guidelines about which are likely to be most feasible and productive in what conditions. (p. 307)

2.8. Coordination and institutionalization

The issue of coordination happens in many levels and has a historical dimension to it. According to Bellamy (2008), UN efforts on conflict prevention were not done in a systematic way, but in an "ad hoc fashion based mainly on the secretary-general's preventive diplomacy and crisis management and the proliferation of social, economic, cultural, and humanitarian organizations under the UN umbrella, none of which has been integrated into a system of conflict prevention" (p. 137) . Given such issue, Kofi Annan designed procedures to institutionalize and organize all conflict prevention initiatives within the organization, rearranging funding and staff while preaching a "culture of

conflict prevention" (Annan, 2001). Only after the publishing of "Prevention of Armed Conflict" (ibid, 2001) the UN would establish a fund specific to conflict prevention, train staff, and work with regional players to enhance its capabilities.

Lund (2002) argues that the multitude of different professionals with different backgrounds in the field of conflict prevention results in different understandings of each conflict, their root-causes, and moments, resulting, therefore, in different recommendations. This happens in an already fragmented context of actors with their different works on the ground, which may generate a lack of coordination in the action. The author defends sharing of information, communication and task division between parts on the ground under the auspices of an international organization equipped to coordinate the work of all actors on the ground.

2.9. Funding

Funding is a vital issue to conflict prevention, especially because such type of intervention demands long-term commitments from the international community in order to succeed (Lund, 2012). That means channeling funds to conflicts that do not exist in detriment of existing ones. This issue must be tackled by the progressive advocacy of the culture of prevention. Moreover, to receiving countries, as Lund (2003) argues, negotiated preventive interventions may be seen as a better path than forced hard ones. Bellamy (2008) says that:

> By 2005, the UN's Trust Fund for Preventive Action had received US$33 million from thirty-five donors. This compares to an annual running cost of around US$5 billion for the UN's peace operations. This suggests that states are willing to contribute to international peace and security efforts but advocates of conflict prevention have not yet succeeded in persuading governments of their case. Analysts have long argued that this is because it is difficult to draw direct causal links between preventive action and the absence of conflict. (p. 143)

2.10.   Conclusion: an update of the r2p

Great emphasis has been given to the need of preventing conflicts, and the international community does count with the tools necessary to do so (Lund, 2008). Moreover, prevention is less costly in financial, legitimacy, and life terms (Griffin, 2001). However there has always been a considerable gap between rhetoric and having the

possession of information regarding the high risk of the emergence of conflicts and their actual prevention in a timely fashion (Ackermann, 2003). The reasons for this are numerous: lack of coordination and specific funding, high complexity of conflicts, issues regarding the political will and national geostrategic interests of players responsible for acting, and difficulty to maintain long term commitments for preventive measures (Lund, 2008). In quest of overcoming such gap and enhance preventive mechanisms, the r2p was designed, in 2005, with a focus on its prevention pillar. Nonetheless, expectations were frustrated by several amendments done to the project, which relegated preventive matters to the background, favoring the doctrine's tools for hard intervention (Bellamy, 2008). In that sense, the r2p was developed into a policy that may legitimize controversial and ad hoc interventions by actors that ultimately seek to advance their own liberal interests (idem, 2008). In this chapter, visions of several authors will be explored to demonstrate the current debate on conflict prevention and all the aforementioned topics.

In 2008, Lund wrote about the r2p saying that it could become "a critical impetus for conflict prevention, for the Commission argued that the duty to protect also 'implies an accompanying responsibility to prevent' such threats (ICISS, 2001: 19)". He continued by arguing that even if countries under risk of conflict understand such policy as interference in national affairs, "the more that late and possibly non-consensual armed interventions are justified and necessary to halt atrocities, the more acceptable earlier and consensual preventive engagement may become as an alternative" (p. 295). Such optimistic understanding of the r2p was the norm in 2001, when ICISS published its report, which was indeed focused on prevention.

> This Commission strongly believes that the responsibility to protect implies an accompanying responsibility to prevent. And we think that it is more than high time for the international community to be doing more to close the gap between rhetorical support for prevention and tangible commitment. The need to do much better on prevention, and to exhaust prevention options before rushing to embrace intervention, were constantly recurring themes in our worldwide consultations, and ones which we wholeheartedly endorse. (p. 19)

The above text opens the Chapter 3 of the ICISS Report, which specifically addresses the responsibility to prevent conflicts within the framework of the Responsibility to Protect. The theme is, at least rhetorically, the most important aspect of the doctrine, as claimed by Rosenberg (2009), who goes beyond to say, "the

Responsibility to Protect is a doctrine of prevention". At first, his point of view seems to clash with less optimistic authors such as Bellamy, Evans, Griffith, and many others, who claim, among other arguments, that the r2p is a tool to legitimate international intervention under the name of Human Rights. However, and despite the lack of consensus on the feasibility and the real interests behind the Responsibility to Protect, Rosenberg analysis is relevant for highlighting the "often neglected legal aspect of the prevention dimension of r2p" (p. 443).

The Responsibility to Protect and its chapter 3 on the responsibility to prevent reflect the current issue in international relations between actual prevention and hard, non-consensual military interventions, such as the one seen in Libya. While it starts with the commitment to prevent, repeating the already old rhetoric about leaving the realm of rhetoric and moving onto actual prevention, it goes on to analyze early warning, root cause prevention efforts, and, finally, what it calls "direct prevention efforts". Moreover, it has called for measures "to centralize preventive efforts, tackle the root causes of conflict, and enhance direct prevention capabilities" (Bellamy, 2009). However, such recommendations were neglected and states decided to institute early warning capabilities only. The ICISS Report is firm when claiming that:

> For the effective prevention of conflict, and the related sources of human misery with which this report is concerned, three essential conditions have to be met. First, there has to be knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it – so called "early warning." Second, there has to be understanding of the policy measures available that are capable of making a difference – the so-called 'preventive toolbox.' And third, there has to be, as always, the willingness to apply those measures – the issue of 'political will. (p. 20)

Many can be the root causes to a conflict, which makes it harder to predict and to prevent. It is for that reason that the ICISS report was, according to Bellamy (2008), "more opaque" in that sense. ICISS divided possible root causes into four groups: political, under the Secretary General's preventive diplomacy efforts for good governance, Human Rights, and confidence building; economic, with positive and negative incentives to tackle poverty and inequality and to generate economic opportunity; legal, including measures from mediations to sanctions to ensure the rule of law and accountability; and military –

which should be limited –, which includes preventive deployments, such as the one in Macedonia, to promote disarmament, reintegration, and reforms.

According to Bellamy (2008):

> The ICISS also identified two political problems connected with the proposed shift to a culture of prevention that were likely to mitigate against host-state cooperation. The first was that at-risk states were likely to resist external prevention efforts on the grounds that 'internationalization' is the start of a slippery slope toward intervention, a problem made much more acute by the Bush doctrine's insistence that the United States has a right to use force to prevent the emergence of threats. Second, the commission pointed out that states worry that third-party intervention might inadvertently legitimize rebel forces by awarding them the status of negotiating partner. (p. 138)

The only recommendation to tackle such issues were very limited and vague, requiring states to be sensitive and non-intrusive (Bellamy, 2008). ICISS already broad and vague recommendations were used by the UN High-Level Panel in 2003 to design policies based on the report. Despite adopting the language of r2p, the responsibility to prevent was put in second place and combined with other issues:

> The responsibility to prevent was jettisoned in favor of an approach that combined the prevention of deadly conflict with the prevention of a range of other ills, including environmental calamities, poverty, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and infectious disease, and wider aspects of prevention together with economic development." (Bellamy, 2008, p. 146)

> The focus of the ICISS on centralizations was eschewed; and the thorny question of bridging the gap between early warning, practical commitment, and the generation of consensus was overlooked entirely. Moreover, each of the nine recommendations pointed to work already under way. Given the fact that the High-Level Panel replaced the innovation of the responsibility to prevent with calls for the UN and its members to continue work to which they were already committed, it is not surprising that the preventive element of the R2P received much less attention than the other aspects. (Bellamy, 2008, p 148)

According to Bellamy (2008), three features have contributed to the neglect of the responsibility to prevent: difficulties to transform engagement to prevent into consistent policies, the impact of the position of prevention in the War on Terror, and the issue of authority and agency. In order to explain the main issues to an update of the r2p, he points out sets of inhibiting factors. The first one is what he calls the "dilemma of comprehensiveness": conflict prevention is a somewhat amorphous idea given the "bewildering range of structural and direct causes of conflicts". Despite the cost efficiency of conflict prevention, it requires funds prior to a conflict, as previously argued above,

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which hinders the "direct causal links between preventive action and the absence of conflict" (p. 147). Secondly, there is no consensus regarding how comprehensive the responsibility to prevent should be:

> Conflict prevention tends to be associated with early warning, preventive diplomacy, and crisis management. Even here, though, engagement with conflict prevention can involve diplomatic processes ranging from mediation to coercive diplomacy; economic considerations such as sanctions, trade, humanitarian, and financial aid; military measures such as deterrence, embargoes, and peacekeeping; and a variety of legal questions. (Bellamy, 2008, p. 147)

However, such efforts do not mean conflicts will necessarily be avoided. For that, deep commitment to structural prevention is needed. Bellamy (2008) claims that this sheer range of policies and tools, it is difficult to separate prevention from security, while the lack of limits also scares states away due to high costs without measurable results (Bellamy, 2008). Moreover, possible recipients of conflict prevention fear progressive interventionism. ICISS tried to limit these issues by focusing on four areas: political/diplomatic, economic, legal, and military. This attempt was reversed by the High Level Panel in 2005, which substituted the concept to a broader definition of "international threat" emphasizing terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and development, worsening the comprehensiveness dilemma and scaring states even further away from prevention.

The War on Terror, in its turn, had important impacts regarding conflict prevention since it took attention from it, focusing on policies drawn to mitigate terrorist attacks in the West at the expense of other regions of the globe in need of preventive efforts. As Bellamy (2008) says, "Indeed, since 2001, the West's financial and troop contribution to UN peace operations has declined in both absolute and relative term, primarily because of its commitments to war on terrorism-related operations in Afghanistan and Iraq" (p. 145). According to the author, such strategy "made other states reluctant to espouse measures that might make it easier for powerful states to interfere in their domestic affairs" (p. 146), especially because "advocates of a broader US right to use force preventively have attempted to garner legitimacy by using language similar to that of the r2p" (p. 146). The invasion of Iraq, in 2003, for instance, was advertised by

Washington DC as a preventive exercise, limiting even more the world's openness to policies that relativize sovereignty.

> On the one hand, conflict prevention and humanitarian activism have been replaced on the West's order of priorities by terrorists and WMD proliferators. Evident throughout the negotiations prior to the World Summit was a determination, especially on the part of the United States to avoid taking new commitments. On the other hand, the advent of another form of prevention has served to heighten concerns that a meaningful responsibility to prevent might be used to justify hegemonic interventionism. (Bellamy, 2008, p. 147)

The third set of issues considered by Bellamy (2008) are related to institutional responsibility. According to the author,

> Resolving questions of authority and agency in relation to conflict prevention is particularly difficult because those questions go to the heart of what states are entitled to do within their borders, the nature of international authority, and the role of culture in shaping and preventing violent conflict. (p. 147-148)

The author claims that most preventive initiatives since the 1990s have been taken at the region level. This is problematic because some regions, such as the Middle East, have no regional settings, while others have "paper institutions" with weak preventive capacity, leaving conflict prevention in the hands of developed regions. Moreover, he argues that regionalization may take funds away from international organizations, therefore worsening their finances and ability to generate change (Bellamy, 2008). The ICISS suggested in its report a centralization of conflict prevention to improve coordination, but once again the High Level Panel denied this approach.

While the above issues hindered the possible impact of the responsibility to prevent, the r2p does come with strategies to change international behavior and intensify the "culture of prevention", namely setting down "parameters of responsibility", defining when the international society should assume responsibility for massive Human Rights issues via accountability at a national, regional, and international levels; and the adoption of "language to guard against potential abuse and therefore allay fears about the erosion of sovereignty" via thresholds of just-cause and precautionary principles to intervene (Bellamy, 2008). However, both strategies created a problem the author calls "indeterminacy": despite establishing rules and principles, propagators of the doctrine do not control developments to the norms created not their application:

> The problem of indeterminacy means that there is nothing to prevent states from using the Responsibility to Protect's inhibiting mechanism to eliminate preventive action by arguing, for example, that the threat is not sufficiently grave to warrant making a potentially costly commitment. This problem is particularly acute in relation to prevention, which is an inherently speculative domain. This is precisely how several Security Council members used responsibility-to-protect language in 2003-2004 to oppose preventive action in relation to Darfur. (Bellamy, 2008, p. 152)

The r2p is based on the idea that governments might be pushed to commit funds and political will by the accountability owned by states to international and domestic actors, which is not necessarily true. Bellamy (2008) suggests that these challenges may be partially overcome by "granting individual states specific responsibilities related to the pursuit of their own foreign policy" and "locating a specific and carefully delimited range of prevention measures within an institutional setting" (p. 152), which together may form association among states committed to prevention who can advocate for the cause to gain more partners and reinforce conflict prevention, reinforcing the "culture of prevention".

In order to update the r2p as an important framework for conflict prevention, Bellamy (2008) highlights two important and plausible efforts to be taken by the international society. The first one is the do no harm policy, which should be commited to by all actors involved in conflict prevention. According to him,

> It is often the very policies of outside states, nonstate actors, international organizations, and the international financial institutions (IFIs) that exacerbate the grinding poverty, inequality, poor governance, and patrimonial politics that are often identified as the root causes or armed conflict. In almost every case, those who react to a humanitarian crisis are already related to the targets in one way or another and in many high-profile cases have actually contributed to the seeds of conflict. (Bellamy, 2008, p. 150)

Bellamy (2008) claims that this is a measure that states can actually take, has no precedents, requires no additional funding or measures, and can contribute to prevent deadly conflicts for the cost of sacrificing some interests and trade deals but without the need to funding humanitarian and preventive efforts later on. Moreover, such practice is everyday government practice and allows for accountability toward civil and international societies. Secondly, Bellamy (2008) suggests that a renewed institutional focus is key to advance the r2p as an actual preventive doctrine. Despite ICISS' recommendation of the

primary responsibility to protect being the state's, secondly the Security Council's, and thirdly the regional organization involved, such distribution of responsibilities has generated issues in cases such as Darfur. He advocates for a return to this ICISS' road map. Finally, the author re-emphasizes the importance of "cultivating the political will of those like-minded states that have already declared their commitment to the Responsibility to Protect" (p. 153).

3. Conflict prevention throughout the international orders: an analysis from the Order of Vienna to the present day

3.1. Introduction

> International systems live precariously. Every "world order" expresses an aspiration to permanence; the very term has a ring of eternity about it. Yet the elements which comprise it are in constant flux; indeed, with each century, the duration of international systems has been shrinking.
>
> Henry Kissinger in "Diplomacy"

Conflict prevention is not a new concept (Ackermann, 2003). In fact, the idea of preventing the escalation of an endemic violent conflict can be traced back to Thucydides' book "History of the Peloponnesian War" and is, as well, at the core of all great moments of redefinition of the international order. The failures of each attempt served as "lessons learned" for the upcoming ones, marking the history of conflict prevention attempts in large and small scales. As Lund (2008) wrote, citing himself:

> Many de facto direct, structural and generic preventive instruments may not be recognized as such because they operate under aliases. Historically, the Congress of Vienna, League of Nations, the United Nations system of agencies, Marshall Plan, European Union, and NATO and other security alliances were all established to reduce the potential for future inter-state or intra-state conflicts and are thus fundamentally preventive (Lund, 1996a, 1997).

In that sense, this chapter aims at more than contextualizing conflict prevention's development, but to analyze it historically. The next subchapters will explore the concept since the beginning of the XIX century, with the international order resulting

form the Congress of Vienna up to the present day, going through the changes in humanitarian and development affairs during the XX century, its debates, and the emergency of the Responsibility to Protect in order to tackle Human Rights violations in a preventive fashion.

3.2. The Order of Vienna: the system of congresses and its resulting order

The conservative order created by the Congress of Vienna used current tools of conflict prevention to resolve disputes in Europe, such as consultations, the creation of neutral states and demilitarized zones, among others (Craig and George, 2005). While having been created to contain the revolutionary waves that flourished throughout Europe and restore the monarchic status quo pre-French Revolution, it was as well a conflict prevention system that functioned until 1854 and successfully avoided interstate wars.

The system of congresses was based on secret diplomacy, resulted in an agreement between the five European superpowers (Austria, England, France, Prussia, and Russia) to establish an international order that combined an hegemonic logic and multiple independencies (Kissinger, 1957) i.e., it attempted to ensure that an hegemon would not impose its interests upon others through collective decision making, therefore functioning as a collective hegemony practiced by conciliation. Geopolitically, the Pitt Plan was adopted. It aimed at altering European borders with the ultimate goal of fragmenting the territories of the old Holy Roman Empire enough to avoid the formation of a strong state in the heart of Europe and not too much to avoid invasions as a means to maintain peace (Burns, 1948).

The irreversible changes caused by the Revolutions of 1848, which redesigned the class struggle – opposing the monarchies or the liberalist bourgeoisie and a democratic, internationalist and socialist working class – impacted the bases of the conservative order of Vienna (Hobsbawm, 1994) and saw the rise of three new statesmen who were not bound by its founding values: Cavour, Napoleon III, and Bismarck, who adopted a realpolitik logic. In that sense, the shared values lost their meaning with the rise of a realist balance of power (Kissinger, 1957) and the beginning of the Age of Capital (Hobsbawm, 1994).

According to Hobsbawm (1994), the Age of Revolutions saw the confrontation of transformative and conservative forces. The forces of transformation, led by the bourgeoisie, finally won and became a conservative force against popular movements. Such change of governing elite resulted in the use of political influence to advance bourgeois interests, instrumentalisation of the concept of nationalism to contain the international proletariat, and economic growth.

Despite the political ability of men such as Metternich and Castlereigh, conflicts such as the wars of Germany's and Italy's unifications and the Crimea War[4] as well as the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire changed the international balance of power, altering the Order of Vienna and its geopolitical bases. Hence, the development of a new order (Kissinger, 1957) was required: the European balance of power or Bismarckian Age, based on the Bismarckian systems, which were as well a policy of conflict prevention: its ultimate goal was to avoid an anti—hegemonic alliance against a newborn Germany.

3.3. The Bismarkian systems: League of Three Emperors, Double Alliance, and Reinsurance Treaty

The German chancellor's model of conflict prevention, in force with the establishment of the II Reich, in 1871, aimed at reorganizing the conciliation between the European superpowers with realpolitik, non-aggressive foreign policy and himself as a mediator of conflicts in a new context where maintaining peace was still necessary, as shown by the three wars of readjustment (Crimea and the unification of Italy and Germany) and the strengthening of the states' interests over the collective ones (Kissinger, 1957). However, while the Order of Vienna was based upon conciliation between partner states, the new order that emerged was based upon threat and distrust, especially with a revanchist France. In that sense, Bismarck adopted three strategies: the League of Three Emperors (1872-1978), based on conservative terms, between Germany, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, all potentially France's allies; the Double Alliance (1879-1886), between Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy in 1882; and the Reinsurance Treaty, between Germany and Russia,

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[4] The Crimean War was the first continental armed conflict since the establishment of the Order of Vienna, which makes it the longest period of peace of modern times (Kissinger, 1957).

avoiding the lasts approximation with France. All these agreements included neutrality clauses in case of war with third parties and were mostly signed in secret. For instance, Russia didn't know about the Triple Alliance and Germany kept a secret agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, at the same time, another secret agreement with Russia, the Austro-Hungarian enemy in the Balkans, that if the Kremlin attacked, it wouldn't protect its ally – one agreement meant betraying the other. Such complicated and delicate system would be challenged by several events that led to the First World War: imperialist disputes, the crises of Morocco, the Armed Peace, nationalist policies throughout Europe, the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of new states, the Bosnian Crisis, the Turkish-Italian War, the Balkan Wars, and the Anglo-Germanic naval dispute (Hobsbawm, 1994). Bismarck's international order ended up hardening the international system with inflexible alliances.

3.4. The post-First World War order

The First World War, notable given its scale, human cost, duration, and geographical reach, led to a new attempt of international order focused on preventing conflict with several lessons learned, such as the end of secret diplomacy and the internationalization of the seas. Three proposals to peace and a new order post-First World War were suggested: Lenin defended an internationalist order that would end nationalist conflicts with the working class in control of the means of production throughout the world; Wilson, in its Fourteen Points, advocated for a peace without winners or losers, avoiding, thus, the rise of revanchist ideals; and France made the case for a peace of the winners, i.e., scapegoating Germany for the conflict (Kissinger, 1957).

The Fourteen Points of Wilson, idealist in character, aimed at building a lasting peace by solving the issues he understood as causes of the First World War: secret diplomacy, systemic bipolarities, nationalist and revanchist ideals, and the Balkan crisis. In that sense, he proposed the freedom of the seas to end maritime disputes, the end of secret diplomacy to mitigate secret alliances, the League of Nations to avoid rigid coalitions, and the right to self-determination to guarantee independencies. Germany surrendered while Wilson's proposal was at the table. However, the French victor's

proposal prevailed during the Conference, imposing the Carthaginian Versailles Treaty upon Germany, according to which Berlin had to end its naval and air forces, demilitarize, give Alsace-Lorraine back to France, allow Poland access to the sea, and abusively indemnify the winners. Wilson was defeated twice, both at home and abroad: while the peace talks resulted in a French victory, the right to self-determination was instrumentalized to create multiethnic states that didn't meet the peoples demands as a means to build a buffer zone that isolated a communist Russia from the rest of Europe and the Congress of the United States vetoed Washington DC's participation in the League of Nations and voted Neutrality Acts to ensure US Presidents couldn't take the country to wars overseas (Saraiva, 2012). The prevailing model of peace, based on the Paris Talks of Peace created, according to Hobsbawm (1994) and Carr (1961), an "Illusion of Peace", i.e., the international order was reorganized from an idealist perspective of International Relations with three important actors isolated: Russia, Germany, and the USA, which weakened the League of Nations. Moreover, England did not accept any of the League's mechanisms such as disarmament, compulsory arbitration, and military sanctions. Most agreements of this period were, in fact, on the margins of the organization (Hobsbawm, 1994) due to the difficulty to reach consensus via its General Assembly with over fifty members. Finally, according to Carr (1961), the League had legitimacy issues for not being able to approve effective mechanisms of coercion. The organization's only achievement was the approval of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited chemical weapons. However, many of its measures were drained out and once Germany was incorporated in the League, Hitler did not accept to sign it. Finally, secret diplomacy prevailed with the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), among others. Such international rearrangement set the basis for German revanchist feelings amid the unprecedented international financial crisis of 1929.

With a failed League of Nations, incapable of putting forward disarmament agreements, and the worsening of economic and political conditions in Europe, Washington, worried about the military rise of Japan in the Pacific (Hobsbawm, 1994), took the lead and promoted several international conferences, limiting naval investments in 1922, incorporating Germany to the League of Nations and approving an agreement between France, England, Belgium and Germany on the respect for the established

borders and the renounce of the use of force to change them, as well as a deal for the eviction of France from the Ruhr (1924-1925), occupied in 1922. In 1928, France and the USA put in motion a campaign to ensure the adoption of the Briand-Kellog Treaty, an instrument through which states abdicated from war as a means of dispute settlement. Fifty-seven countries signed the agreement. In the 1930s, several attempts on correcting the route of the international order were put in motion, such as the German debt write-off, ending Berlin's economic strangling, and the admission of Russia in the League of Nations. The moment shows a rise of the United States as an international political actor as well as economic, with the implementation of the New Deal, Washington's plan to overcome the Great Depression via capitalism, political liberalism, and a Keynesian "avant la lettre" economic policy (Carr, 1961). The American solution to fight economic depression shared space, internationally, with two others: fascism and soviet socialism. The first broke with political and economic liberalism, maintaining capitalism, while the latter broke with all the three concepts.

The rise of the fascisms was a revanchist response to the international order created after the First World War and to the crisis of liberalism, signaling to the problems of the interwar order that led to the Second World War, in which soviet socialist forces and the West united against fascisms – an alliance between different ideologies against a common enemy that will prevail and, afterwards, lead to the Cold War. As the Axis expanded and broke with the terms of the Peace of Paris, England, France, and the USA adopted a policy of appeasement as a means of avoiding direct confrontation and the logic of aggression as a primary tool of foreign policy. Paris and London believed that by accepting some conditions imposed by aggressive states, it would be possible to avoid a war.

3.5. The post-Second World War order

As argued by Kissinger (1994):

> Each of the victors was speaking in terms of his own nation's historical experiences. Churchill wanted to reconstruct the traditional balance of power in Europe. This meant rebuilding Great Britain, France, and even defeated Germany so that, along with the United States, these countries could counterbalance the Soviet colossus to the east. Roosevelt envisioned a postwar

order in which the three victors, along with China, would act as a board of directors of the world, enforcing the peace against any potential miscreant, which he thought would most likely be Germany – a vision that was to become known as the "Four Policemen". Stalin's approach reflected both his communist ideology and traditional Russian foreign policy. He strove to cash in on his country's victory by extending Russian influence into Central Europe. And he intended to turn the countries conquered by Soviet armies into buffer zones to protect Russia against any future German aggression. (p. 395)

Differently from the First World War, states did not wait for the end of the Second World War to architect the new international order. The conscience of a new time in international relations guided the construction of possible scenarios to its aftermath and the alliances built between 1941 and 1945 reflected the attempt of the emerging superpowers – the USA and the USSR – to frame the old European powers (Sombra Saraiva, 2012). Roosevelt, despite not willing to negotiate the postwar order while the conflict was still in course, took the lead and put in motion a series of international conferences that would serve as "blueprints for the cooperative components of the postwar world order" (Kissinger, 1994, p. 396).

In 1941, England and the USA signed the Atlantic Charter, through which, in exchange for emergency support against Hitler, London accepted several principles of the American foreign policy, such as free trade and free navigation, and agreed that no war would be admitted and that Nazi tyranny should be fought by all. The Soviet Union adhered to the document partially, starting its articulation to occupy a central role in the new order about to be created after arriving in Berlin first during the end of the Second World War (Saraiva, 2012). Stalin required the recognition of territories occupied by Russia, the substitution of the colonial system for a trusteeship one, and the creation of an international organization for peace that associated Moscow, London and Washington (Hobsbawm, 1994).

The first Anglo-American meeting regarding the post-conflict order was in 1943, where the future of Germany, the Soviet territorial claims, and a collective security system were addressed. Back then, Roosevelt proposed a concert similar to the one established by the Congress of Vienna, with a power-sharing system between USA, UK, USSR, and China, while others considered a federal project for Europe, which did not please Stalin, fearing another European strategy to isolate his country (Burns, 1948). Sombra Saraiva (2012) claims that, at this point, many differences already showed how

hard it would be to conciliate the differences between Washington DC and Moscow. The Conferences of Moscow (1943), Cairo (1943), and Tehran (1943) would make that clear to all parties involved.

The Conference of Moscow gathered the governments of the USA, the UK, and the USSR. It versed about the creation of an international organization and a system of previous consulting for common matters, as well as the use of territories freed of German occupation. The final document, also signed by Beijing, established three common points between the four parts: total surrender of Germany, occupation of its territory by the Allies, and total disarmament (Hobsbawm, 1994). The Conference of Cairo, signed between the UK and China with the USSR's approval, requested the devolution of all territories occupied by Tokyo, especially those taken by China (Woods, 1996).

In Tehran, the leaders of the USA, USSR, and UK discussed once more the future of Germany's territory, the creation of an international organization and its bodies, and the establishment of a cupula composed by the new four great powers, which would act as "the police of the world" (Girault, 1988). In parallel, Stalin and Roosevelt advanced their policies of superpower in private discussions. The Conference of Yalta, in 1945, confirmed the previous division negotiated by the Allies and the rise of influence of Moscow, drafting the politics of influence zones in Europe that would end up being globalized by the System of Yalta.

The following meetings in San Francisco between April and June of 1945 and Potsdam between July and October of the same year were to negotiate the tools of peace management during the post-Second World War period. Initially, leaders attempted to collaborate in the construction of an international peace based on dialogue and cooperation between the victors (Sombra Saraiva, 2012). During the creation of the United Nations, in San Francisco, France and the UK were granted seats in the Security Council due to their efforts with the Allies, despite the evident loss of importance of Europe in this new face of international relations (Girault, 1988). The Letter of San Francisco, agreed upon still in 1945, enshrined the preponderance of realism over the failed League of Nation's idealism, the principle of universalism – putting an end to Europe's dominance in international affairs – the system of veto of the Security Council, therefore ending the rule of unanimity and affirming a new international balance of

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power, and the interventionism in social and economic levels (Sombra Saraiva, 2012). The Conference of Potsdam occurred right after the explosion of the first nuclear bomb by Washington, which pointed to an unbalance between the superpowers and, therefore, changed the context of negotiation, hardening it. Several issues, especially regarding the Polish borders, the German reparations of war, and Italy's situation, opposed the Western alliance, led by the USA, and the USSR. Despite such antagonisms, the Security Council did function as an international directory for peace management between 1945 and 1947, successfully negotiating occupation zones in Asia, among others (Kissinger, 1994).

During the aforementioned conferences, the victors focused on solidifying an alliance against Hitler. This difficulty of negotiating actual postwar arrangements was due to a progressive and undeniable antagonism between Washington and Moscow. According to Sombra Saraiva (2012), Kennan had warned Truman, in 1945, about Stalin's efforts to reconstruct his country's economy outside of the Western model, planning it under the socialist project. The difference between ideologies and the European vacuum of power under the order that emerged from the Second World War would harden the international scenario throughout the entirety of the cold conflict in a nuclear context.

3.6. The Cold War order

The Cold War started with a clear advantage to the USA. Washington's promise to aid USSR's economy was not accepted and Stalin was aware of Moscow's weaknesses: Washington had nuclear superiority; the Soviet economy had been suffering with deindustrialization and deficits during the Second World War; and over 20 million soviets had died in the conflict (Burns, 1948). However, both superpowers understood the ideological battle and its consequent need of disputing areas of influence. Simply put, given the nuclear capacities being developed by Washington and Moscow, a direct conflict was not possible due to its high risk. In that sense, both countries started a race to extend their tentacles throughout the globe in search for allies. In places where other states were divided between liberalism and socialism, civil wars were financed in order to ensure new alliances, until the world was divided in two blocks: the Soviet and the American. The dispute between both superpowers happened simultaneously in battle fields and ideologically, creating disputes in several levels such as spatial, sports,

propaganda, political doctrines, aid packages for allies, defense alliances, etc (Kissinger, 1994). The world was divided in a rigid fashion until 1955, when the bipolar order was relatively eased (Saraiva, 2012). The perception of their destructive capacities were the main cause for it, creating what Girault (1993) called a "first détente". Other causes mentioned by several authors, such as Kissinger, were the European growth, both politically and economically, mitigating the vacuum of power left between both superpowers; the lessons learned in the Korean War, in which heavy investments did not mean more international legitimacy for the superpowers; the death of Stalin; the disintegration of the communist front with the Chinese rupture later on and growing divergences with satellite states; the advancement of the decolonization process in Asia and Africa, which multiplied the number of states and resulted in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World Movement; the Latin American attempt of searching for its own development and international insertion models, of which the Independent Foreign Policy of Brazil is a notable case (Saraiva, 2012); and the decline of nuclear weapons in the world balance of power, since utilizing them was not realistic while causing generalized panic among the public opinion after the missile crisis in Cuba.

During the 1970s, the détente period was marked by a concertation between USSR and USA as well as by the gain of conscience, in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, of their own interests in detriment of those of the superpowers (Girault, 1993). Finally, the new international world economic order that was arising, built by the so called Third World and the economic crisis generated by oil prices and the convertibility of the dollar also played important roles for this second moment of flexibilization of international affairs (Saraiva, 2012). The moment was marked by negotiations for nuclear and strategic weapons' limitations, which were an attempt of Washington and Moscow to show they could manage the global order. Moreover, economic difficulties for both superpowers reactivated several financial and commercial fluxes (Kissinger, 1994). Despite political erosion of both superpowers, impulse by the Vietnam War, economic crises, and a negative public opinion, Moscow and Washington wanted to maintain the international order, despite movements that forced its change, such as the European and Japanese growth, the creation of the European Community, the French determination to build

military capacity, the difficulties to maintain the Atlantic Alliance, and the affirmation of the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movements (Burns, 1948).

Saraiva (2012) defines the last two decades of the XX century as "an unfinished process, the geopolitical equivalent of a construction site, acting as dividing line between two eras: the classic Cold War phase an emerging and incipient new international order", while Hobsbawm (1994) highlighted the importance of the end of the Cold War by claiming that the fall of the Soviet Union, in December of 1991, was the end of "the short twentieth century". The moment was one of intertwined political and economic transformation as well as of rupture with the end of the Third World and of the political dualism between socialism and capitalism, the deepening of the division of countries between rich and poor, the reaffirmation of market economies and democracies, the emergency of new global issues such as environment, development, Human Rights, health, information crises, terrorism, among others – which would dominate the international agenda once the system was unfrozen, and the technologic revolutions. Such transformations happened in an eventful context: the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, the Iranian Revolution, the Second Oil Crisis, the fall of socialism, the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait, the debt crises in Third World countries, the Star Wars between USA and USSR, the progressive growth of Japan's and Europe's economies, and the process of globalization (Saraiva, 2012).

The period of the Cold War, despite being one of conflict in itself, did aim at preserving peace as well. First and foremost, the USA and the USSR maintained, throughout most of the conflict, a joint ownership of the international order. In many situations, both joined efforts to mitigate crises and dissipate conflicts (Kissinger, 1994). Finally, the International Relations' theory of nuclear peace can be adopted to analyze the Cold War period. According to it, the costs of a nuclear war are unacceptably elevated and defense is impossible. In that sense, the result would be a loss-loss for both parties involved in such conflict due to the condition of mutually assured destruction (Parrington, 2015). Such condition makes all humans "hostages", therefore generating a possibility for cooperation between parties. The death toll on civilians also would have the outcome of reducing the historical value of war as a measure of state power (Deudney, 1983). Secondly, the theory claims that nuclear weapons minimize the importance of security

alliances with other actors, thus avoiding chain ganging, i.e., when several states are drawn into war due to military agreements – just as it happened in the First World War, when the death of Ferdinand resulted in a domino effect of war declarations in Europe (Waltz, 1979). Finally, Rauchhaus (2009) analyzed that nuclear arms uphold strategic stability and avoid major conflicts, i.e., since the USSR and the US both had nuclear arsenals, chances of direct war were extremely low. However, the same study shows that such context increases chances of smaller conflicts in the periphery of the world, which indeed happened during the period. However, critics like Gallucci (2006) and Allison (2009) argue that a nuclear war is possible since humans may take subrational decisions. Moreover, terrorists and other non-state actors may end up acquiring such weaponry, damaging deterrence and causing nuclear destruction. The Cold War structure also prevented peace by freezing the international scenario under spheres of influence. The conflicts that would erupt after the fall of the Berlin Wall are a proof of that.

3.7. The post-Cold War order

In "Diplomacy", Kissinger (1994) defines the world order of the post Cold War:

> For the third time in this century, America thus proclaimed its intention to build a new world order by applying its domestic values to the world at large. And, for the third time, America seemed to tower over the international stage. In 1918, Wilson had overshadowed a Paris Peace Conference at which America's allies were too dependent on it to insist on voicing their misgivings. Toward the end of the Second World War, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Truman seemed to be in a position to recast the entire globe on the American model.
> The end of the Cold War produced an even greater temptation to recast the international environment in America's image. (p. 805)

With the end of the Cold War, the East-West paradigm was surmounted and a *pax consortis* was established between the main global players, indicating the end of the bipolar logic, which gave space to a multipolar one fomented by a rising competition in the spheres of economics and technology. Despite having won the Cold War (Kissinger, 1994), Washington's supremacy was attenuated in the 1990s by the rise of Germany, Japan, and many Asian countries. Despite a relative optimism regarding a possible new phase of international affairs in which the rule of force would be extinguished of the interstate affairs. Such notion, however, was frustrated with the nationalisms in the Balkans and the intensification of Middle Eastern and African conflicts.

The new context brought the affirmation of the International Law (Saraiva, 2012), which propagated several new rules for international relations via international organizations. The risk of a total war was allayed while regional and localized tensions rose. The end of the East-West logic revitalized the Security Council and the UN gained relevance, introducing a new dimension to foreign affairs (Saraiva, 2012), despite the still undeniable importance of bilateral relations. In this new context, therefore, a new agenda started gaining space in the international arena, as mentioned above. The diversification of the international agenda reflected the rise in the complexity of the global dimension (Kissinger, 1994). The complexity of entities and organizations took a similar path: new groups such as OECD, G7, NSG, etc. were strengthened.

A stronger new agenda during the 1990s was the Human Rights one, which, despite the Human Rights declaration of 1948 and the Pacts of 1966. The result of the Cold War put dictatorships in a delicate situation and democracy started being heavily promoted (Sombra Saraiva, 2012): the UN promoted its main conferences of the decade on the subjects of kids (1990), environment (1992), Human Rights (1993), development (1994), social development (1995), women rights (1995), and settlements (1996), among others.

3.8. Humanitarianism, development, and the shift to conflict prevention: a historical perspective and the evolution of concepts and perceptions.

In the context of dispute between the USA and USSR during the Cold War, the modern concepts of humanitarianism and development became more prominent in international affairs. The classic humanitarianism, also known as Dunantist as a reflex of the Battle of Solferin, in 1859, inaugurated the basis for human protection done in a neutral, impartial, and independent fashion (Skinner and Lester, 2012). Such model of acting, which aimed at ensuring the trust of all parts of a conflict during the Cold War, (O'Sullivan, Hilton, and Fiori, 2016), was slowly but surely transformed (Vaux, 2006) after the 1940s, albeit having been predominant throughout the entirety of the cold conflict: as argued by Vaux (2006), a myriad of new international actors, non-statal and interstatal, set in motion a process of institutionalization and bureaucratization of the humanitarian apparatus based on the transference of responsibility from the statal sphere to the non-

statal but financed by the former. Such model was successful in the reconstruction of Europe and was, therefore, reinforced. In parallel, the field of development was born during the Conference of Bandung. This already recurrent theme in the British international relations with its colonies and in Washington's relations with Latin America during the Good Neighbor Policy (Hellener, 2006) and with Europe during the Marshall Plan, had in the process of Afro-Asian decolonization a new propulsion: as they became independent, such states took advantage of international platforms, such as the UN and the G77, to act via the Non-Aligned and the Third World movements (Saraiva, 2005). According to the rhetoric from the South, much emphasis was given to the international East-West axis in detriment of the North-South, which explained the international asymmetries between rich and poor nations. These movements argued that peripheral underdevelopment was a reflex of colonialisms and, therefore, historical reparation was owed by the former colonial powers so they could overcome their difficulties (Bandung Declaration, 1955). Given the Cold War structure, it was vital for the Global North to bring these new states to their zones of influence (Saraiva, 2012). Such interest is the very root of the institutionalization and bureaucratization of humanitarian and development fields.

Throughout the bipolar conflict the classic logic of continuum prevailed in humanitarian affairs. According to it, when serious violations of Human Rights in third parties happened a Dunantist humanitarian apparatus was brought into the field, by states or third sector players, with the goal of saving lives and reducing suffering within International Humanitarian Law boundaries (Vaux, 2006). Only afterwards would a peacekeeping mission be established to stimulate development with a long-term perspective, in some cases. In the immediate post-Cold War, however, International Relations debates between neorealist and neoliberal theories, as well as the proliferation of new theories, pointed to two paths: the continuity of interstate conflicts, as argued by International Relations debates in the 1990s and "the end of history", as proposed by Francis Fukuyama (1992). Both showed to be imprecise. The unfreezing of the international system came with the rise of several conflicts, hitherto latent and of a new kind: the complex emergencies (Goodhand, 1999), characterized as conflicts of ethnic and civilian genesis with multiple informal non-state armed parties with strong potential of regional spillover (Bellamy, 2005), as explained in the introduction of this work. These

conflicts, also characterized by armed social formations mobilized by the dispute of power and resources without respect to *jus in bello* challenged states' capacities of response to such conflicts and exposed new issues such as mass civilian dislocations, and the failure of states. Amidst such context of the 1990s, the international response was to deepen a historical process that had already debuted during the second half of the XX century: the intensification of Wilsonian humanitarianism, with its agencies working for the interest of their financers, which are states themselves (Vaux, 2006). In that sense, humanitarianism started becoming partial and political. The progressive increment of humanitarian funding resulted in the proliferation of new agencies and NGOs incentivized by a public opinion who watched the unfolding catastrophes of complex emergencies through technologies that were becoming popular, such as televisions and the internet. The meaning of "saving lives" was transformed to justify high investments. As claimed by Vaux (2006), nurturing individuals with basic and immediate needs such as food and water was no longer enough, and humanitarian agents started focusing on solving the causes of issues. These changes impacted a delicate equilibrium that had prevailed until then: the trust of all parties in conflict on humanitarian agents, a fact very well illustrated by the suicidal attack at the Hotel Canal, the headquarters of the UN in Bagdad, in 2003 (Saraiva, 2012). Led by Washington, the international answer for the loss of its neutral image in the eyes of parties involved in the Iraqi conflict was the securitization of humanitarian action. At this point, only institutions such as the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders kept their dunantist positions, whereas the vast majority accepted working under national armies to ensure the security of their staff. In the field of development, the logic was accordingly: maximization of the apparatus followed by securitization (Vaux, 2006). The logic of implementation of humanitarian activities in the terrain was also impacted. If before, to contain violations of Human Rights, the international action happened in a process with a defined flux – emergency humanitarian intervention done impartially, then followed by peacekeeping and only afterwards with development missions –, it started being done in what is called a "contiguum", i.e., humanitarian action, development work, and peacekeeping concomitantly under military auspices, in the name of liberal peace, i.e., the peacebuilding consensus (Richmond, 2006), which aims at going beyond the containment of Human Rights violations and

creating states in the image and likeness of the Western ones and that can serve, as well, as political, economic, and geostrategic partners.

The context of rise in terrorism together with complex emergencies and the new responses the international society started drafting to handle these matters, as well as the failures to deal with the crises in Rwanda and Srebrenica, in 1994 and 1995, respectively, raised a broad and global debate on the capacities of the existing apparatus to effectively solve Human Rights violations. Questions emerged regarding when and how to act in face of such events in the form of a report by the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, before the intervention in Kosovo. The report explored if humanitarian interventions were indeed an assault to sovereignty and how the responses should be regarding systematic Human Rights violations, which, according to him, affect all the principles of our common society (Annan, 2001). To find answers to the dilemma, an ad hoc commission called ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and states Sovereignty – was established in 2001, led by the Canadian government and composed by Algeria, Australia, Germany, Guatemala, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States. In the same year, the commission's work resulted in the much criticized report "Responsibility to Protect", which was divided in eight chapters that included a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty, responsibility to prevent and to react, a definition of authority to decide on intervening, and the operational dimensions of the concept. The criticism was due to a couple of aspects of the report: the utilization of loose concepts, its defense of preemptive use of force in International Relations, the adoption of non-quantifiable terms to decide when an intervention is needed, leaving states to interpreting them and, finally, the commission did not explore deep enough failed states that went through conflicts or how to rebuild them (Lotze, 2001; Chandler, 2015, Goodhand, 1999; MacFarlane, Thielking, and Weiss, 2004).

The main innovations brought by the ICISS Report (2001) were the development of a new narrative for humanitarian interventions: the concept of responsibility to protect in detriment of the right to intervene, subverting the classic logic; the relativisation of sovereignty under the argument that such principle is composed by obligations as well, such as the one if protecting its people from Human Rights violations; and that when a state is incapable or reluctant to protect its citizens, the responsibility shall be

transmitted to the international society. It is apparent that the commission decided the debate in favor of the interventions with the goal of promoting Human Rights in detriment of sovereignty. The report suggested, also, that interventions should follow specific criteria such as just cause, last resource, proportionality and reasonability – which are hard to measure. They should also be approved by the Security Council of the UN. Finally, the text determined that interventions should happen only in extreme cases – again, without defining what "extreme" means.

Normatively, the ICISS suggested that the responsibility to protect the peoples should lie, first and foremost, with the state. If that is not possible, it should lie with: domestic authorities that work in partnership with international agencies, the Security Council, the General Assembly under the auspices of "Uniting for Peace", and, lastly, with regional organizations, successively. Such definition of responsibilities means that the proposal was also aimed at offering solutions for most possibilities, such as crimes against humanity perpetrated by the state itself, coordination with local agencies to ensure information flows, and possible blockages of the Security Council via veto – and highlighting this point in order to emphasize that the UNSC must be committed to handle emergencies immediately, without obstructing action. The accountability system proposed was also built to pressure the Security Council at the risk of losing decision power to the General Assembly, a broader and more plural instance which, for that reason, takes longer to make decisions.

In 2002, the Bush administration did not demonstrate favorability to the report: Washington was not interested in making a formal commitment to a document that anticipated the involvement of members in foreign conflicts despite national interests, especially after the Somali disaster, in 1992 (Vaux, 2006). Moreover, Security Council members believed that the lack of political will would be an insurmountable barrier to the effective application of the r2p (Bellamy, 2005).

In 2005, during the World Summit – meeting promoted by the UN on its 60th anniversary to approve reforms to the system –, the r2p was adopted unanimously. The approved project, however, differs from the original in many aspects, especially when it comes to the decision power: the Security Council became the only instance judicially allowed to approve interventions, which would only happen in the case of genocides, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing – a narrower scope in comparison to the original report by ICISS. Moreover, the signed document kept the vague criteria upon which intervention is decided. States committed, among themselves, to protect their populations against mass disrespect of Human Rights, without establishing precise norms, which leaves margin of discretion when peaceful solutions fail. According to Lotze, keeping and ad hoc basis allows for arbitrariness on the adoption, impacting its legitimacy.

In 2009, Ban Ki-Moon, charged with the task of elevating r2p from concept to policy, published a report entitled "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect". The document proposes three pillars for the r2p's mise en place: The first, in line with the approved r2p document, highlights that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from the four typified crimes. The second advocates for the global commitment to build state capacity for Human Rights protection internationally. Lastly, the third pillar focuses on the international responsibility to act in a decisive and coordinated fashion to prevent and to end the typified crimes in case states fail to do so.

Despite the great support to the r2p during the debate at the General Assembly in 2009 (Lotze, 2010), after Ban Ki-Moon's report was published several members highlighted the need to deepen the r2p prevention mechanisms and to better define the role of different UN organs and agencies in the implementation, both themes that were in the report of 2010 (Lotze, 2010). Since then, the UN presented yearly reports on the r2p, exploring the role of regional arrangements (2011), measures of decisive collective response (2012), and conflict prevention (2013), without, however, finding a solution for some key aspects of the r2p: discretion in the use of force to impose the peace and the lack of political will to act by some states according to each case.

The events that marked the world on September 11 of 2001 played a key role in the development of the r2p and of the war on terror. The US government, throughout the 21st century, instrumented the humanitarian narrative to justify a military attack in Iraq, which raised suspicion and skepticism among different governments (Lotze, 2010). If previously different voices raised questions regarding the r2p, after Iraq the international perception seemed to think that instead of effective responsibility to protect people, they

were facing an instrumentalization of it to legitimize Western interference in internal affairs of other states (Vaux, 2006).

The State Department's priorities on foreign affairs help shedding some light to the new order that emerged: focused on the security-prosperity axis (Bellamy, 2008). The expansion of terrorism brought to Washington DC the perception that without promoting security and prosperity abroad, those same elements would lack in the USA as well, i.e., not being present in other regions was a risk to themselves and their own people, which explains the strong lobby efforts to approve a reviewed r2p bill (Kralev, 2015). The practice of interfering in third parties internal affairs to advance national interests in disregard of local populations, allied with the imposition of liberal principles and values, aims at forging states from above, in the image and likeness of Western states, without substantially ensuring lasting peace – which can be observed in cases such as Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In that sense, the r2p seems to legitimate wars in the name of convincing ideals organized in an involving narrative.

4. Macedonia: a comprehensive conflict prevention case study

4.1. Introduction

As previously argued, the end of the Cold war unfroze the international system, allowing the eruption of several wars in the following years. There was a change in the security paradigm, from interstate proxy wars in the very state-centered system of the Cold War (Wanis and Grizold, 2012) to the complex emergencies and the relativization of the concept of sovereignty in an ever more globalized multi-stakeholder system. In parallel, during the Cold War international principles such as non-interference in internal affairs and State sovereignty ruled conflict prevention as well. According to Wanis and Grizold, based on the works of Crawford (1998),

> The emergence of weak democratic institutions, coupled with economic liberalization, old social contracts fall away and political activity is more easily mobilized on the basis of identity groups that then seek distribution of resources exclusively toward their own, rather to any cross-cutting national identity. The weak democratic institutions cannot repress violence or separatism the way prior authoritarian forms did, but neither do they provide for equality of political opportunity in the quest to access the resources of the state. Identity politics exceed the bounds of advocacy and take on an aura of

real or perceived grievance and non-negotiable stances on basic political issues, setting the stage for violent instead of 'normal politics. (p.33)

Such change in the security paradigm that resulted from the end of the Cold War was intensely felt in the Western Balkans, where the disintegration of Yugoslavia significantly changed the geopolitical scenario in the region, which counts with countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, the region was in a situation of extreme ethnic violence, prompting, as argued by Paintin (2009), "unprecedented international intervention in the region". According to Wanis and Grizold (2012), Macedonia – the only country to have attained its independence from Yugoslavia by peaceful means – had been an example of relative coexistence between the Macedonian and the Albanian ethnicities up until 2001, when tension between those two groups started emerging. In fact, authors such as Gounev (2003) and Clément (1997) suggest that tension had always existed, even before the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, but it was latent. Wanis and Grizold (2012) explain the structural nature of the conflict between Albanians and Macedonians:

> The conflict existed before the disintegration of the SFRY, however, it was perceived primarily as a struggle by Albanians for their national rights in a broader sense, namely, within the framework of the SFRY rather than being limited to Macedonia; Albanians living in the SFRY were divided by internal borders – these did not hinder movement nor Albanian political activity. An important reason why the conflict did not erupt earlier lies in the policies of Tito's Yugoslavia, which, as a rule, oppressed nationalist tendencies through the use of force. (p. 40)

Authors such as Gounev (2003) and Paintin (2009) agree that the Macedonia made the transition from a Yugoslav republic to an independent state due to "the sustained preventive engagement of international actors in the country" (Paintin, 2009). Gounev, for instance, highlights the importance of the neighboring region of the Balkans to EU's foreign policy during the decade following the end of the Cold War – with Russia to the East, fighting for influence in the region of the previous USSR –, which later on would result in the European understanding that Macedonia's membership to the EU was fundamental to maintain regional stability. The case of conflict prevention in Macedonia is relevant for several reasons. First of all, successful examples of conflict prevention are rare (Paintin, 2009). Also, "it has experienced the full panoply of conflict prevention initiatives, ranging from the pre-emptive deployment of international forces, through

high-level diplomacy to confidence building initiatives" (Paintin, 2009). The author also highlights that the conflict prevention process in the country kept evolving with time, being transformed and adapted according to the needs, allowing for lessons learned and corrections in the path to peace. Moreover, actors in the country did work in a more or less coordinated fashion, with Paintin (2009) declaring that "whether in the form of shared strategic goals or coordinated programming, the preventive activities of different international bodies have, on the whole, been well aligned and complementary and this has often been critical to their success".

4.2. Country overview

4.2.1. History

After being a part of the Ottoman Empire for nearly five hundred years, the region in the center of the Balkan Peninsula in south eastern Europe we currently call the Republic of Macedonia or Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) stayed under Serbian rule from 1912 to 1944, with a brief interval of Bulgarian occupation between 1915 and 1918 and during the Second World War, when it was quartered between Albania controlled by Rome and Bulgaria, a German ally. In 1919, as Serbia integrated the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Macedonia did as well. In 1929, the kingdom was renamed Yugoslavia. With the end of the World War II, Tito's Yugoslavia became a federal state and Macedonia became one of them under the name of Socialist Republic of Macedonia, situation that remained until the early 1990s. With the fall of communism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia declared independence on September 17 of 1991 as a result of a referendum on independence just a couple days before. Independence was chosen by 95.32% of the votes accounted for (Wanis and Grizold, 2012), despite legitimacy issues due to a boycott by Albanians. The new Constitution, adopted in January of the following year, cut all ties with Yugoslavia and overthrew all its old representatives. Only one year later, in 1993, the Macedonia became a member of the United Nations.

4.2.2. Geography and demographics

Macedonia is a small land-locked country of 25 thousand square kilometers, sharing borders with Serbia and Kosovo (North), Greece (South), Albania (West), and Bulgaria (East). It has a population of around 2 million (Paintin, 2009) with ethnic diversity, as shown on the table below, created by Paintin and based on the most recent census, in 2002:

Figure 7: Ethnic make-up of Macedonia by the State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia

The ethnic make-up of the country sheds light on to a relevant Albanian minority who "found itself in the new political reality that was taking shape on the territory of the former Yugoslavia" (Wanis and Grizold, 2012). The division created ended up separating ethnic Albanians who had lived in Yugoslavia between Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

Figure 8: The Albanian population in the Balkans. Le Monde Diplomatique, 1999
https://mondediplo.com/maps/albanianmdv1999

4.2.3. Economics

According to the World Bank (2017):

> Political uncertainty took a toll on growth in 2016 and early 2017, but a recovery is expected as confidence is being restored. Growth fell to 2.4% in 2016 (from 3.8% in 2015), supported mainly by household consumption linked to rising employment, wages, pensions, and credit. Concerns about the political situation had begun to affect investment, which subtracted 1.3 percentage points (pp) from growth in 2016. Net-exports added 0.7 pp, supported by foreign directive investment (FDI)-related and services exports propelled by the euro area recovery. The economy contracted by 0.9% in the first half of 2017, as investment declined by double digits. Private consumption growth remained positive, while net exports had a marginal negative contribution. Construction and services, traditional drivers of growth, contributed negatively in the first half of 2017, while other sectors had small positive contributions. The establishment of a new government in June is helping restore investor confidence, which is likely to support growth in the second half of the year. The economy contracted by 0.9% in the first half of 2017, as investment declined by double digits. Private consumption growth remained positive, while net exports had a marginal negative contribution. Construction and services, traditional drivers of growth, contributed negatively in the first half of 2017, while other sectors had small positive contributions. The establishment of a new government in June is helping restore investor confidence, which is likely to support growth in the second half of the year. (p. 1)

4.2.4. Internal Politics: an electoral inter-ethnic arrangement

Macedonia is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system and coalition governments. While the PM is chosen by Congress' majority party according to the results of the general elections the President is chosen by direct vote. The major parties are organized as follows:

Table7: Main ethnic Macedonian political parties in Macedonia and their positions

Ethnic Macedonian Parties		
Abbreviation	Name	Political position
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity	Center-right to right-wing, nationalists
SDSM	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia	Center-left

Table8: Main ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia and their positions

Ethnic Albanian Parties		
Abbreviation	Name	Political position
DUI	Democratic Union for Integration	Center-right
DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians	Center-right to right-wing

The polarization of politics in the FYR of Macedonia starts with its independence, in 1991 (Clément, 1997), between Albanians and Macedonians in a complex regional scenario. In Macedonia's first elections after independencye in 1992, "two main streams emerge from the plethora of political parties that sprang up" (Clément, 1997): moderates and radicals, cutting across ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. In 1997, Clément wrote:

The two communities are experiencing major political, economic, and social imbalances. The difficulty of integrating the Albanian minority and arriving at a consensus among the two communities is raising tensions between them and in part reinforcing *mutual negative perceptions*. A series of events, such as confrontations between the two communities and the creation of an Albanian University in Tetovo, have already poisoned their mutual relationship. The implementation of reforms, the guarantee of Albanians' essential rights and the passing of a resolution by the parliament in March 1997 on tolerance and cooperation between ethnic groups in practice, according to Albanians, come up against discrimination that some have no hesitation in branding 'apartheid based on nationality'. Agreement on teaching in Albanian at the teaching faculty of Skopje, quotas for Albanian students and legislation on the use of the Albanian flag are considered to be inadequate and tardy measures. (p. 15)

And regarding Macedonians, she continued:

The Macedonian government criticizes the Albanians' non-participation and the setting up of 'parallel' structures (schools, universities) that could lead to a Kosovar model. The Macedonian nationalist parties see in this an 'Albanianization' of higher education that could threaten the official language, and have organized a series of demonstrations by Macedonian students. As they see it, recognition of the Albanians as a constituent nation would be the first step towards autonomy and secession. They see a dilution of Macedonian identity in every measure adopted in favor of the Albanians, and a desire to create a ' Greater Albania' in every Albanian claim. (p. 16)

Ethnic Albanians and Macedonians had different initial positions (Clément, 1997) which led to diverging interpretations of the tensions and possible solutions. Albanians understood that they had inherited the right of being a constituent nation in the country and disputed the fact that they had no preferential treatment when compared to other ethnicities in Macedonia, such as Turks (4 per cent) or Serbs (2 per cent), for instance. According to them, they were not a minority, as claimed by the Macedonian Constitution, but a constituent people. They saw Macedonia as a multiethnic state, which is denied by the country's Constitution, which states that "Macedonians of Slav origin the status of sole constituent people" (Clément, 1997). Secondly, they believed to be discriminated based on their nationality, being denied access to their own education, culture, and language. Lastly, Albanians claimed that they were not proportionally represented within institutions. On the other hand, Macedonian perspectives vary. While nationalists rejected any form of dialogue with Albanians, abiding by Macedonia's Constitution, moderates understood Albanian integration as the one solution to the country's stability in the long term. Clément (1997) wrote at the time that policies of Albanian integration

started reviving Macedonian radicalism while Albanian radicals intensified their own demands, with a small minority propagating independence wills.

4.2.5. Foreign Policy: a regional quagmire

After independence, the FYR of Macedonia found itself isolated in a complex regional scenario, which led the government to adopt an equidistant strategy at the regional level. Clément (1997), claims that "most neighboring countries were late in recognizing the new state, refusing, for various reasons, to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian nation separate from its ethnic (Bulgaria, Greece) or territorial (Serbia) dimension" (p. 17). Macedonia limited Serb access to the sea and cut its border with Greece, its traditional ally and important player for regional balance of power. However, recognition of Macedonia by the international society and its neighbors started happening for the need understanding that its failure as a unitary state would dramatically impact the region, possibly leading to generalized conflict. Macedonia's foreign relations have also been dominated by disputes with Greece. While the country's constituency eliminated the Greek-Serb border, separating traditional partners and leaving Greece farther away from an important regional power, a dispute over the name "Macedonia" impacts the bilateral relation. As argued by Paintin (2009), "Athens does not recognize the country by its constitutional title The Republic of Macedonia, viewing it as an apropriation of Greece's Hellenic heritage and a potential territorial claim against Greece's northern province of the same name". The relations have been affected by several treaty breaches, economic and political embargos, and a case in the International Court of Justice (Paintin, 2009).

4.3. Conflict Prevention in the 1990s

As an independent Macedonia arose, two issues became imminent to its survival: maintaining its territorial integrity in a regional scenario of threats and conflicts where spill-over effect was a possibility, and dealing with the inter-ethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians. Those challenges were complex for a newly born country,

with a fragile economy and government. The example of neighboring Bosnia, which had fallen into a violent conflict after its independence from Yugoslavia, motivated the engagement of international actors and multilateral initiatives in Macedonia with preventive mandates (Paintin, 2009) to avoid a violent conflict in the country: the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities (ICFY Working Group), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with its High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the United Nations.

4.3.1. United Nations International Conference on Former Yugoslavia: Peace Implementation Council and Initial Action

Given the inter-ethnic characteristics of Macedonia and the potential of conflict in the region, in 1991, the UN's ad hoc working group on ethnic and national communities and minorities started designing comprehensive recommendations on relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia such as inter-community dialogue, development of teaching in Albanian, and media democratization. In the early stages of the process, EU's role was not clear due to relations with Greece and the non-recognition of Macedonia by some members (Paintin, 2009). However, the EU ended up making up for the lost time and providing Macedonia with economic aid and an Association Agreement. Moreover, there was an European understanding of integrating Macedonia in international institutions under the argument that inclusion would facilitate relations and confidence-building, and that the initiative would serve, as well, as an incentive for the country to maintain peace – it became a member of the UN in 1993, NATO's Partnership for Peace and OSCE in 1995, and got the Association Agreement with the EU in 1996. In parallel, mediators (EU, UN, and USA) played an important role in maintaining stability throughout the whole process by ensuring dialogue between all parties (Clément, 1997). Such coordinated efforts allowed for continued internal reform in Macedonia.

4.3.2. The IFCY Working Group

The ICFY Working group was the first preventive actor working in Macedonia, in October 1991. It was a part of the Conference of Yugoslavia, promoted by the then European Community, and designed to reach peace and stability in the Balkans. However and as explained previously, disagreements between members put an end to the Conference (Paintin, 2009). In 1992, the Working Group was reformed by the EC and the UN under the auspices of Geert Ahrens, a German diplomat introduced a dialogue mechanism between Macedonia's government and the minorities living in the country, especially the Albanian and Serbian ones. It promoted field visits, personal shuttle diplomacy, and trilateral forums (Ackermann, 2000), which allowed the group to develop trustbuilding between the actors, channel issues into constructive dialogue, and to perceive potential sources of conflict (Paintin, 2009). The group also played an important role in the field of minority rights in Macedonia, increasing Albanian participation in several areas of government, military, and civil services. The Group contributed, as well, to increase media coverage in minorities' languages and reached an agreement regarding the Albanian flag displays during their holidays (Ackermann, 2000). As for the Serbian minority, progress was achieved in the fields of education, religion, culture and heritage, media, and group status (Ackermann, 2000). Max van der Stoel, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, was another relevant name in the establishment of inter-ethnic dialogue, minority accommodation, and policy recommendation in Macedonia, especially regarding his efforts to negotiate higher education between fighting parties (Paintin, 2009).

4.3.3. OSCE's Spillover Monitoring Mission

In September 1992, parallel to UN's UNPREDEP deployment to the region, the OSCE sent a "Spillover Monitoring Mission" assisted by the High Commissioner on National Minorities and tasked with isolating Macedonia from the risk of spillover coming from the region (Paintin, 2009). With a dual mandate of acquiring information to evaluate stability and promoting good offices and mediation between ethnicities and political actors, it contributed "towards resolving a number of border incidents concerning Serb incursions" (Paintin, 2009, p. 10)) in its early phases, despite the missions small size and its substitution by the UNPREDEP in December 1992. OSCE's mission also functioned as an

early warning tool for minority issues and was capable of reporting on incidents due to relevant network with high-level and grassroots contacts locally (Paintin, 2009).

4.3.4. United Nation's Preventive Deployment in Macedonia – the UNPREDEP

In December 1992, responding to a request by Macedonia's president Kiro Gligorov, the UN put in place its first preventive mission, under the name of UNPREDEP – Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (Paintin, 2009). The mission was initially part of the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia and became its own mission in 1995, due to the increasing in tension. With a contingent of 1049 plus 35 military observers and 26 civilian police (United Nations, 1999), it remained in the country until 1999 with an approximate total cost of 570 million USD (Fleitz, 2002). The mandate covered peacekeeping tasks of social and political situation, early warning, observation, reporting, and good offices, which was added later on to adapt the mission in accordance to the country's evolving situation (Clément, 1997). The main objectives of UNPREDEP were to monitor Macedonian borders with Serbia and Albania to avoid threats to territorial integrity, and to guarantee stability via good practice and governance with the Macedonian government (Wanis and Grizold, 2012): the mission aimed, as well, at implementing reforms, strengthening the judicial system, enhancing police capabilities, and at developing the country. Wanis and Grizold (2012), therefore, argue that "UNPREDEP was a very broad mission of preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment with a multifunctional strategy in which preventive action was holistically planned and implemented" (p. 43). Clément highlights that UNPREDEP was also the first involvement of the US Army on the former region of Yugoslavia: approximately 500 US troops formed the contingent (Paintin, 2009). On May 1997, the Security Council of the United Nations approved unanimously the resolution 1110, extending UNPREDEP mandate until 30 November of 1997 (https://undocs.org/S/RES/1110(1997), due to the elections in Albania and the rise of tensions in Kosovo (Clément, 1997). The mandate ended in 1999 after the veto of China in the Security Council to renew the mandate – Macedonia had recognized Taiwan, causing this reaction. According to Wanis and Grizold (2012), Macedonia wanted to ensure the end of UNPREDEP to receive protection of NATO while others see the movement as a "short-sighted political decision as a result of

manipulation of a group of influential people" (p. 44), since the recognition was rewarded with 1.8 billion dollars.

According to Paintin (2009), UNPREDEP was an efficient tool for Macedonia while the rest of Balkans found itself in bloody armed conflicts. The author judges that it contributed to Macedonia's transition to independence peacefully in a context of the country's lack of military capacity. According to Ackermann (2003), given the small size of the mission's contingence, it would not have been able to stop a Serbian incursion. In that sense, Paintin (2009) claims that the mission's force was what it represented: "the support of the Western powers and particularly of the United States". UNPREDEP meant that the international community favored Macedonia's integrity and represented a serious threat with severe consequences to any regional actor who considered challenging it.

4.3.5. Diplomatic tools, Confidence-building and Development

UNPREDEP's and OSCE's missions were effective protecting Macedonia from external threats, but dealing with inter-ethnic issues internally and reaching peaceful coexistence between its population required a different set of tools of those put in place by military. Nonetheless, UNPREDEP also had inter ethnic dialogue as an objective within its political pillar, promoting good offices, quiet diplomacy, mediation efforts, and confidence building (Paintin, 2009). Henry Sokalski, head of the mission, dedicated himself to the mediation of many disputes in Macedonia, such as the ones regarding education (Ackermann, 2003). To some extent, development work was also done by UNPREDEP (Paintin, 2009) in the fields of economics, social development, institution building and governance, as well as building trust between Macedonia's government and the UN later on.

4.3.6. Overall evaluation of Conflict Prevention in Macedonia during the 1990s

All authors analyzed in this section agree that, overall, conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia were positive. Paintin (2009) argues that "each organization played to its strengths by bringing relevant and complementary expertise to the table, be that in the

form of military muscle, preventive diplomacy, or mediation" (p. 13). She highlights the importance of coordination between all actors, since separately the efforts put in place would likely not avoid conflict in the country and argues that coordination happened because all the actors on the ground shared the same goals of avoiding regional spill-over into Macedonia and averting tensions between Albanians and Macedonians. However, she blames the 2001 conflict on the "lack of sustained engagement": ICFY's mandate was terminated in 1996, leaving inter-ethnic dialogue in the hands of the UN and the OSCE. In parallel, UNPREDEP ended in 1999 with the Chinese veto – despite demands of the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, for the renovation of the mission's mandate (United Nations, 1999) –, also leaving the country under the auspices of a very small OSCE mission. The latter became the only organization promoting conflict prevention in Macedonia. The author defends that the end of UNPREDEP left a "security vacuum" and showed to be a "massive error of judgement" in a context of escalation of issues: the Kosovo factor[5] and internal issues between ethnicities in Macedonia, such as the status of the University of Tetovo and general tensions due to the lack of integration of Albanians in the Macedonian society. These factors, added to economic difficulties and high levels of unemployment, are seen by Paintin (2009) as evidence that the country needed more international work, which she believes was left unfinished.

Wanis and Grizold (2012) agree that UNPREDEP was a successful paradigm of conflict prevention and a relevant result for the international community. They claim that without the mission, the scenario of ethnic cleansing, massacres, destruction, and refugees, unfortunately common in the region then, could have been repeated in Macedonia as well. Nonetheless, they consider that the mission failed to deal with fundamental problems of Macedonia. After the end of UNPREDEP, NATO forces were deployed in a complicated moment of the country to answer to a new challenge: Macedonia took in approximately 300,000 refugees escaping from Serbian persecution in Kosovo (Wanis and Grizold, 2012), which rose the population of Macedonia in almost 15% and deepened ethnic Macedonian's feelings of threat in their own country. Wanis and Grizold (2012) wrote:

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[5] Kosovo, as previously noted, borders the northwestern provinces of Macedonia, which are predominantly Albanian. The volatile ethnic situation in the country, which escalated after the 1980s and developed into a war in 1998, threatened Macedonia's stability in the region (Paintin, 2009).

> After the NATO attack on the FRY in the spring of 1999 and the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution, a majority of the Kosovo refugees returned to their homes. The Kosovo crisis resulted in the re-emergence of the question of ethnic identity in an already fragile and non-cohesive society: Macedonian Albanians accused ethnic Macedonians of lacking sympathy for their brothers from Kosovo, while the Macedonians saw in the refugees potential combatants for the Kosovo Liberation Army. At the same time, the Macedonian police conducted several raids in northern Macedonia in villages predominantly occupied by ethnic Albanians, and seized large quantities of arms and ammunition. There were reasonable grounds to believe that northern Macedonia served as a base and recruitment center for KLA combatants, who were fighting the army of the FRY in Kosovo. (p. 44)

Moreover, since the Macedonian Constitution defined Albanians as a minority, and not a constitutive nationality as it used to be in the Constitution of 1974 (Bieber, 2008), their rights were still lesser than those of the former Yugoslav Constitution. Access to work, education, culture, and to their own language was still limited. These very same reasons would lead the country to the outbreak of hostilities and armed conflict in 2001 (Wanis and Grizold, 2012). The authors are also critical of the lack of transparency, corruption, organized crime, and smuggling in Macedonia, issues that, according to them, UNPREDEP's designers failed to address and would end up fueling conflict in 2001.

Clément (1997) evaluates that "certain initiatives taken to stabilize the FYR of Macedonia constitute an example of effective coordination between international organizations and the complementarity of preventive measures". On one hand, she applauds international efforts to integrate Macedonia in the international system, the permanence of the international community and its coordinated, the clear definition of mandates locally and the persuasive capabilities showed. On the other hand, she laments "the absence of a priori coordination between international organizations in some cases" (p. 21), the delay caused in conflict prevention by "tensions between Western partners" (p. 21), and European's lost chance of playing a bigger part in the process due to tensions with Greece. She also points out a "duplication of tasks" (p. 52) between the mandates of the OSCE and the UN, which caused some levels of competition between the players. Regarding the international perspective, the author concludes that "preventive measures were implemented sufficiently far in advance of a potential conflict to allow them to be adapted progressively to the situation on the ground at the bottom end of the scale". Regarding the internal situation in Macedonia, she looks positively at the fact the levels of

violence were low despite polarization and that radical forces seemed to be well controlled. Clément claims that "the OSCE and UNPREDEP missions made it possible to check and contain border incidents between Serbia and the Macedonia in 1992-93 at a time when the border between the two had not yet been clearly demarcated. Internally, they contributed, together with the High Commissioner, to the suppression of interethnic tensions" despite the international embargo imposed by the international community in Serbia[6], Macedonia's traditional economic partner, and economic impacts caused by internal reforms.

4.4. The 2001 crisis, the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Operation Essential Harvest

The root causes to ethnic tensions in Macedonia, not dealt with by previous missions in the country, gained contours of a violent armed conflict in January 2001 when the National Liberation Army (NLA), mostly composed by unemployed Albanian youth, attacked the Macedonian government (Paintin, 2009) due to dissatisfaction with minority rights. The attacks, despite geographically limited, risked a generalized civil war in the country: according to Wanis and Grizold (2012), based on data published by the International Crisis Group in 2001, it is estimated that the NLA counted with an army between 1200 and 2000 fighters. NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and Washington acted fast to put conflict to a halt and to negotiate a peace agreement between VMRO and SDSM and DPD and DPA, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), in August of 2001. While guerillas members did not take part in the negotiations, they agreed on the final document. After the adoption of the OFA, these fighters were demilitarized and founded a new party, the DUI, which is currently the Albanian hegemonic party (Bieber, 2008).

In 2001, Macedonia's foreign policy was focused on international participation: it was working to become member of several international bodies and had the main goal of accessing full membership at the EU and NATO (ibid). In that sense, right after the start of the crisis, "there was intense engagement in Macedonia in the form of shuttle diplomacy from the EU and NATO" (Paintin, 2009, p. 13). The author claims that, initially, such

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[6] The embargo was adopted by unanimity at the Security Council under the Resolution 757 in the context of the Bosnian War.

strategy was effective in controlling the spread of the conflict. However, rebel advances and failed negotiations between Macedonia and rebels led to a more firm international engagement in the form of the deployment of a permanent negotiating team led by the US and EU to start the Ohrid peace process. Paintin (2009) wrote:

> A framework agreement, based on a proposal from French legal expert Robert Badinter, was agreed and signed by all political parties on 13 August 2001, formally ending hostilities just seven weeks after international negotiators had arrived. The Framework Agreement negotiated by the international community was specifically designed to go to the very root of the conflict and aimed to address many of the minority rights issues that had not been successfully tackled in the 1990s. Unlike Bosnia's Dayton Agreement, the OFA aimed to foster 'institutional inter-ethnic integration and accommodation in a unitary state' (Ordanoski and Matovski, 2007). Its purpose was not only to ensure an end to the violence but also to build a more inclusive political settlement in the country and lay the foundations for a functioning and multi-ethnic country. (p. 13)

The OFA, a pioneer agreement when it comes to conflict prevention and power-sharing, introduced important constitutional and legislative changes in order to promote the decentralization of power, guarantee the representation of minorities in the public administration and police, expanding the use of minorities' symbols and languages, as well as making Albanian one of Macedonia's official languages, and to adopt the Badinter majority in order to prevent the "majorisation of minority groups in the Assembly" (Paintin, 2009), i.e., some projects of law involving minority issues required a double parliamentary approval: a majority of the total of congressmen, and a majority within the minority's congressmen. Finally, the preamble of Macedonia's constitution was amended in order to grant the same constitutional status to all communities within Macedonia, and not only to ethnic Macedonians. The treaty also included disarmament and disbandment of the NLA, and guaranteed amnesty to fighters. Immediately after the signing of the agreement, NATO deployed its 30-day mission Operation Essential Harvest, with 3,500 troops for logistical support. The mandate was to collect NLA's military hardware (ibid).

4.4.1. Overall evaluation of Conflict Prevention in Macedonia during the 2001 crisis

A civil war in Macedonia during the 2001 crisis was avoided by the "early, decisive, and coordinated action of the international actors involved" (Paintin, 2009) in a context of change in government – in 1998, VMRO took office, replacing the former social-democrat party – and dissatisfaction of Albanians with their own parties, which despite participating in politics, did not manage to concretize their agenda (Bieber, 2008), situation which led some Albanians to see the resource to violence as the only way to reach their political goals. Paintin (2009), once again, highlights the coordination aspect of the process and that its success is much owed by a common vision of such actors for the country, claiming that the EU and NATO acted together both at the highest and operational levels, promoting weekly meetings to share data and coordinate activities in a cooperative fashion with international and local actors. In that sense, trust building between national and international players was also relevant.

Wanis and Grizold (2012) recognize OFA's achievement of putting violence to a halt, avoiding a civil war, transforming NLA into a political party (under the name of DUI), promoting disarmament, and including Albanians in the police and military forces. Nonetheless, they weight the fact that "provisions were implemented slowly and interpreted primarily in the interests of political parties rather than in the interest of the Albanian community" (p. 57). They argue as well that "tensions were reduced but the basic contradictions and causes for the outbreak of the conflict were not eliminated" since for some Macedonians the agreement broadened the gap between both ethnicities by conceding too much to the Albanians. Finally, they underline the high levels corruption and organized crime – two issues that were not tackled by the OFA – as risk factors for renewed conflict in Macedonia.

4.5. Post-2001 International Presence in Macedonia

The end of the 2001 crisis in Macedonia intensified international presence in the country, as established by the OFA, in order to maintain peace and to cooperate with the adoption of the agreement's reforms (Paintin, 2009). The EU, OSCE, NATO, the US, the World Bank, and the UNDP were and remained the main actors in the country, supported by several other organizations, donors, NGOs, and civil society (ibid).

The EU established a delegation in Skopje in 2000 with the aim of maintaining peace, facilitating development policies, and foster EU's values in Macedonia under the auspices of the Stabilization and Association Agreement[7]. Between 2001 and 2008, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) directed more than 300 million EUR to Macedonia for state-building activities. In 2005, after the country's application to the EU, the focus on ensuring Macedonia meets the required criteria for membership (Paintin, 2009) was deepened. Judicial, public administration and political reforms, corruption, and political dialogue became the main priorities. Paintin (2009) argues that "addressing the root causes of conflict (for example inter-ethnic tensions) remains an important cross-cutting theme in much of the EU's ongoing work, particularly in areas such as justice and home affairs" (p. 17). Despite the transition from EAR to Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), Macedonia is still eligible for European funding. Several agencies and institutions of the EU are present in the country, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Commission, and the Council. The EU Special Representative is praised by Paintin (2009) for his relevant work in the negotiating of complex and often controversial new laws, mediating political parties' relations, mitigating political crises, collaborating with the government in the implementation of OFA in the fields of security and inter-ethnic tensions, and promoting dialogue between parties. Militarily, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUNM) deployed a small contingent in Macedonia to monitor political and security issues and to serve as an early warning system. Finally, Operation Concordia, under EU's auspices, took over the military control of international players from NATO in 2003, two years after the crisis. In December 2003, it was substituted by an EU Police Mission, Operation Proxima, with 200 personnel with a mandate to assist Macedonia's police to meet EU standards (Paintin, 2009).

The end of the 2001 crisis dramatically increased OSCE's mandate and operations in Macedonia, augmenting its personnel from 26 to 210, out of which almost one half was

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[7] The Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, was signed on March 26, 2001 and registered as the Interinstitutional File 2001/0049 (ACV). It was established considering the will to strengthen the links between the parties within the scope of a shared strategy for the region, and to stabilize Macedonia's political, economic, and institutional spheres. As stressed by Paintin (2008), the document was used as a positive incentive by the EU to advance conflict prevention, governance, and institutionalization in Macedonia under the principles of the organization in the form of a agreement to include the country as a member in the future.

focused on confidence-building. Together with EU's representatives on the ground, they concentrated efforts into monitoring, security, and police advisory and training, public administration and rule of law reforms, media development, education, reconciliation between parties, and good governance (Paintin, 2009). Their work in education, according to the author, is relevant for "facilitating inter-ethnic dialogue among students, and the depoliticisation (and de-ethnicisation) of schools and education". Writing in 2008, Paintin claims that OSCE's main priority in Macedonia is rule of law, which is also its expertise.

It is relevant to highlight that Macedonia became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1995, NATO's Membership Action Plan and the PfP Planning and Review Process in 1999. NATO kept a military role in the immediate post-crisis scenario in Macedonia, focused on keeping the order for OFA's implementation. After a 30 day mission to collect surrendered weapons from NLA, a follow up mission of 700 troops was put in place between 2001 and 2002 to protect the aforementioned monitors from EU and OSCE. The operation was then succeeded by a smaller one, of around 450 personnel, to maintain monitors' protection and show the organization's commitment to the country. (Paintin, 2009). Despite some work in the field of security and military development, NATO has faded out and the EU took operational control in 2003. The organization remained in the country with some advisory capacity and in case an emergency happened.

The US remained, as claimed by Paintin (2009), "an active partner for Macedonia", especially after 9/11, with military, operational, and financial perspectives. Washington has, since, supported Macedonia's access to the Euro-Atlantic integration. Besides its diplomatic importance, the US is a relevant donor in Macedonia, supporting several causes ranging from assistance for democracy to education improvements. Paintin (2009) argues that after the 2001 crisis,

> The US bilateral assistance increased from US$32.9 million to $41.644 million and bilateral assistance to Macedonia under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act totaled over $440 million between 1990 and 2008 (US Department of State, 2008) (p. 21).

USAID was a relevant tool for the implementation of OFA as well, especially in the areas of governance reform, decentralization, prevention of corruption, and

economic reform for access to the World Trade Organization – which happened in 2003. In 2009, Paintin stated that USAID focused its efforts into "democracy and rule of law; economic growth; and education" while also collaborating with "judicial reform, tackling corruption, strengthening civil society, capacity building for local government and strengthening internal democratic practices among political parties (USAID 2008)". Washington has also provided Macedonia with military equipment.

In the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the World Bank started a Transitional Support Strategy in Macedonia, which provides a "framework for rapid assistance in the post conflict period, in addition to the Bank's establish Country Assistance Strategy in Macedonia for the years of 1999-2001" (Paintin, 2009). The World Bank's priorities in Macedonia are "promotion of private sector growth and job creation, improving efficiency of state administration and poverty alleviation / human capital development", as well as reconstruction, public administration reform, effective management promotion, and improving governance and transparency of public service to foster the market economy.

After 2001, the UN is present in Macedonia with several agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, IMF, UNAIDS, UNOCHA, UNMAS, and WFP. The most involved of them all, however, is the UNDP, through which the organization put in place the 2001-2003 Country Cooperation Framework for Macedonia, "focused on the areas of local government and municipal development, and environmental governance and sustainable development. After completing that phase, the agency prioritized governance, rule of law, poverty reduction, economic development, sustainable development, environmental protection, natural resource management and conflict prevention until 2006, when a strategic review reoriented its activities to social inclusion, gender equality, decentralization, Human Rights, environment protection, and disaster capabilities (Paintin, 2009). The author states that UNDP:

> Takes a capacity-building approach to its work, aimed to develop institutional and human capacity within government and civil society in order that the country can achieve its objectives for European integration and attainment of the UN's development goals. (p. 23)

Paintin (2009) suggests that international actors have achieved much since 2001 by their cumulative effect. She claims the combined work avoided another outbreak of

violence by focusing on security, political stability and decentralization, and minority rights and inter-ethnic issues. She believes the success of this phase of conflict prevention in Macedonia is due to the fact that efforts were focused on tackling root causes of the conflict, based on the OFA. The author claims that "The Framework Agreement was in itself an instrument of long-term conflict prevention" (p. 29), which focused primarily on the issues the conflict prevention strategy of the 1990s failed to address, namely an inclusive political settlement, the recognition of Albanian as an official language of Macedonia and its use for education purposes. Moreover, OFA and the EU standards for accession served as a set of goals to be achieved by international players locally, ensuring coordination between them (ibid). Coordination in Macedonia also happens in other fields, with all players sharing early warning, intelligence, data, and reports. Lastly, the prospect of EU and NATO memberships has served as an incentive to enable several national reforms, to stabilize and to unify the country (Politico, 2018). In the last session of the General Affairs Council of the EU, in June of 2018, members such as France and Netherlands advocated for the postponement of Macedonia's accession to the organization. According to the final document, Macedonia must advance reforms to tackle corruption and organized crime and to strengthen the rule of law and their judicial system. A new intergovernmental conference will happen to reassess the country's eligibility will take place by the end of 2019, depending on the next European Commission's report (Politico, 2018). NATO's membership, on the other hand, was approved in July 2018. The negotiations, which were being blocked by Greece due to the country's name, were resumed after an agreement between Macedonia and Greece regarding the country's name in 2017, which should become "Republic of North Macedonia" after a referendum that will take place in September, according to the government in Skopje (Reuters, 2018).

The OFA, divided in three parts (amendments to the constitution, changes in legislation, and a plan to end hostilities and to implement), focused on changing the constitutional preamble to include all peoples and citizens, a key point of controversy between Macedonian and Albanese ethnicities (Brunnbauer, 2002), achieving equal representation, decentralization, and use of language and symbols, among others. Nonetheless, most deadlines decided by the OFA were not met (Bieber, 2008). Delays are

due to several challenges, such as changes in government – i.e., depending on the elected representatives, the OFA is more or less adopted –, lack of legal provisions to guarantee that decisions made will not be reversed, generating legal insecurity and constant revisions to laws already adopted (Bieber, 2008). Regarding the implementation of the plan, Bieber (2008) wrote:

> The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement is the foundation of the democratization process in the multi-ethnic society of Macedonia. Therefore this process must not be undermined under any circumstances. Simultaneously, this process should not be held hostage to the will of the political elite in power. Since 2006, however, the Ohrid Agreement – the key to the European future of Macedonia – became a subject of unprincipled political bargaining for key questions that derive from it, including the question on use of the languages or resolving the status of the participants in the armed conflict in 2001. Should the policy of revising the basic principles and the spirit of the Framework Agreement continue, an emerging question would have to be addressed: does Macedonia need a new, more advanced model of multi-ethnic organization of our society? If the contents of the Framework Agreement are constantly revised, maybe it should be concluded that this document has neither fulfilled the demands of the Albanians nor of the Macedonians. (p. 87)

4.6. Conclusion of the case study

Paintin (2009) claims that much has been done by international actors in Macedonia since the 1990s and the risk of a renewed crisis is low[8]. Nonetheless, many challenges remain and if not tackled, could signify risk factors for conflict, especially combined with economic distress and unemployment:

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[8] In 2015, Macedonia went through a series of protests against the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and its government. Protesters took the streets of Skopje after opposition's claims of wiretapping of officials and murders by the police. Despite some cabinet resignments, Gruevski remained in power, and protests continued for over a month. Pro-government protests followed, opposing the population. With the support of the EU, negotiations took place and all parties agreed upon anticipated elections, a deal called the Przino Agreement. In the following year, the President Gjorgje Ivanov decided to put investigations against Gruevski and his allies on the wiretapping case to a halt, generating renewed distress in Macedonia. The protests, also called the Colorful Revolution, reclaimed government's resignation, the formation of a technical government, and the cancelation of Congress elections that were scheduled for the next months under claims of corruption and lack of transparency. Once again, pro and anti government protests occurred in several cities, with thousands of people taking the streets to protest. The international community publicly criticized Macedonia's government for stopping investigations. (Petrevska, 2016). Once again, the EU negotiated new elections with the parties, which took place in December 2016. Zoran Saev (center-left Social Democrats) became the new Prime Minister in 2017, after two years of political crisis, with the task of bringing Macedonia back to normality (New York Times, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/macedonia-zoran-zaev-election.html). Despite these situations, there were no ethnic issues in Macedonia. As claimed by the EU itself, such crises were a reflex of the country's corruption and lack of rule of law.

There remains a great deal of mistrust and suspicion between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. The two ethnic groups are geographically, politically, and linguistically segregated, essentially living in parallel communities with very few points of contact or opportunities for interaction. This serves to reinforce myths and stereotypes of the 'other', which then feeds into further cycles of mistrust and division. Illustrating this point is the fact that rates of inter-ethnic marriage are extremely low, at close to nought per cent. Increasing segregation in primary and secondary education is particularly concerning. It is now commonplace for children from different ethnic groups to attend schools in shift systems or, in some cases such as the town of Kumanovo, to be taught in completely separate buildings. (Paintin, 2009, p. 30)

Lastly, the troubled regional context and cases from the former International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia may cause political strain and must be followed up by international actors (Paintin, 2009).

Paintin (2009) concludes her work arguing that Macedonia "does represent a relative success story" and that the case serves as lessons learned in four points: inclusive political settlements are essential to build sustainable peace; structural prevention focused on the long term and aiming at tackling root causes of conflict is key, and had it been done in the 1990s, perhaps the crisis of 2001 would not have happened; high-level preventive diplomacy does work in scenarios of direct prevention when done timely and coordinately; and knowledgeable field presence is "vital for context-specific and timely interventions that influence the real dynamics of the problem", such as the OSCE's. The case study of Macedonia demonstrates that it is possible to prevent conflicts when the international society acts in a coordinated and timely fashion, given the early warning available, the adoption of tools within a specific strategy that is flexible enough to be adapted to changing contexts. Moreover, it illustrates as well the importance of long-term commitment and adequate funding when it comes to prevention.

5. Conclusion

The post-Cold War era saw the rise of complex emergencies, terrorism, environmental issues, poverty and inequality (Lund, 2001), which required a response by the international society to tackle them and their developments. Whereas conflicts are not negative per se, the spiraling inability of States to act as filters of different visions, interests, and projects may result in the extrapolation of debate from the political to the battle field. While conflict management was and is deeply studied, promoted, paid for and developed to assist States who strive with peace, its many complications on the ground, the inability of resolving conflict situations and the loss of confidence of parties in the international community, which was followed by securitization of peacekeeping operations and deepening of hard interventions, gave space to what Kofi Annan (2001) called a "culture of prevention". Such idea, however, is not new (Ackermann, 2003) and, in fact, all international orders reflect an attempt to prevent conflict (Lund, 2008). The Congress of Vienna adopted consultations and established neutral states and demilitarized zones to prevent the revolutionary waves of those times, restoring the pre-French Revolution status quo and to maintain peace by linking the five most powerful states – Austria, England, France, Prussia, and Russia) to an hegemonic logic of multiple dependencies (Kissinger, 1957). In that sense, whenever a state tried to impose itself upon others, a collective hegemony was used to find conciliation between the parties. The rise of Cavour, Napoleon III, and Bismarck changed the logic to a realpolitik one, making it necessary for a new order to maintain peace, which would be designed by Bismarck through a set of secret treaties of neutrality with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, Germany, and Russia, thus isolating France (Hobsbawm, 1994). The German Chancellor's delicate system, which implied betraying an alliance to keep the other, led to several disputes that finally resulted in the First World War. After overcoming such a grave conflict, the international society worked to redesign a global order. Much influenced by France's revanchism, the model chosen was the Versailles Treaty, which imposed a Carthaginian peace to Germany, seen as a great risk to Europe and to the West as a whole and the creation of the League of Nations that failed. This attempt resulted in a German revanchism as an answer to the French one: the Second World War (Carr, 1961). The end of the Second World War saw the rise of two different projects on state

and international society: a liberal, democratic, and capitalist one, promoted by the USA and its European allies, and a socialist, soviet, non-liberal one, promoted by the USSR. Despite these differences, there were attempts to forge a new order before the end of the conflict. In a series of meetings and conferences, leaders established the creation of the United Nations, a new economic system, and peace tools. Despite the relative success of establishing a new order, the antagonisms between the USA and the USSR divided the world into rigid alliances between East and West, which characterize the Cold War period. Albeit a time of war, its order did prevent conflict as well, given bilateral mechanisms and the UN structure: the superpowers did not have a direct confrontation, there was nuclear peace – avoiding major lethal and destruction conflict. The end of the cold conflict maintained the UN structures but changed the context, with the bipolar order giving place to a multipolar one with a broader international agenda, the affirmation of International Law, and a revitalized Security Council. On the other hand, dormant conflicts during the Cold War, the aforementioned complex emergencies, ended up hatching, especially in the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa.

Throughout the aforementioned history timeline, the history of humanitarianism unfolded in parallel, with its modern concept starting in the Battle of Solferin, in 1859, when the civil casualties were so drastic that the Red Cross was founded to protect civilians during times of conflict in a neutral, impartial, and independent manner (Skinner and Lester, 2012). The humanitarian field gained many actors and a vast legislation throughout the time until the Cold War, during which a transformation started happening. States transferred the responsibility to protect civilians to the third sector – which grew immensely –, funding it. This model was deepened with the rise of development in the international agenda, being adopted in the Good Neighbor Policy, the Marshall Plan, among others (Hellener, 2006). Such changes, the dispute in the logic of spheres during the Cold War, and the development of the field, promoted by more money and actors, progressively reframed and expanded the concept of humanitarianism (Vaux, 2006). With the end of the Cold War, the new complex emergencies demanded a response from the international community, and the answer found was the Wilsonian humanitarianism, with humanitarian agents in service of their financers, losing the Dunantist fundamental characteristic of neutrality, important to legitimize humanitarian

action in the field (Vaux, 2006) and promoting a broader set of actions – and therefore intervening – in conflicts. The impact of such changes in the delicate equilibrium maintained for over a century by Dunantist humanitarianism has its apex in the attack at the Hotel Canal, in 2003. The loss of neutrality resulted in a securitization of humanitarian affairs, putting it under the auspices of a military logic. Moreover, during the later years of the Cold War, the apparatus was maximized, with development and humanitarian work being done at the same time, i.e., the former continuum (neutral emergency humanitarian intervention with an emergence character, which was followed by peacekeeping and then development missions) was substituted by the contiguum: wilsonian, liberal humanitarian action done concomitantly with peacekeeping and development work under military auspices (Richmond, 2006).

The failures of the wilsonian humanitarianism to respond to severe crises in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) raised a debate regarding the apparatus that was being developed. To respond to such issues, the UN, led by its then Secretary-General, deepened their advocacy for conflict prevention through a myriad of reports, conferences, and debates, which resulted in the implementation and development of a conflict prevention apparatus as well in an attempt to give life to the UN's "culture of prevention". The academia was a key player and helped with much advancement in the development and analysis of conflict prevention, defining concepts, tools, actors, strategies, and recommendations, despite the complexity of the matter, in order to stop conflicts before they erupt. Lund (2008) has done relevant work in the field, outlining a framework of conflict prevention which divides tools in two groups: direct and structural. The first one encompasses early warning, data analysis, preventive diplomacy, economic measures, and military deployments to stanch conflicts. The latter, in turn, focuses on long-term initiatives that may be promoted by international actors to mitigate and eliminate root causes of conflicts, such as inter-ethnic tensions, through international law, cooperation, development, governance, and trust-building.

Conflict prevention starts with early warning, a tool that consists of a system of data that analyses several indicators that may demonstrate how prone a conflict is to happen in a specific scenario. Starting in the 1970s (Lund, 2008), such systems have seen a remarkable evolution: technology, several local NGOs and diplomatic bodies,

quantitative and qualitative analysis, development of reports, and the creation of agencies specialized in early warning have been key to this. Nowadays there are hundreds of early warning systems. Nonetheless, most actors, such as Ackermann (2003), Lund (2008), and Bellamy (2008) agree that the international society has enough information regarding conflict proneness. In fact, even during the Rwandan genocide many authorities claimed to know about the escalation of tension in the country, for instance. The challenge is to transform this information in deep analysis and recommendations and to make the international society act in time, before tensions worsen. The tools of conflict prevention are also very well established. However the challenge to efficiently prevent conflicts is in determining a strategy based on such tools to address each state's issues at a given time and coordinating the work of several players in the field, which may have different visions and interpretations regarding the conflicts, their root causes, their expertise or interests, resulting in double assignments, competition between agencies and NGOs and mixed recommendations regarding how and when to act. Lastly, political will is also a determinant factor (Lenzi, 1997) for successfully maintaining peace. Conflict prevention depends on the engagement and commitment of actors, which are constrained by many variables: national interests, funding prevention when other conflicts are already happening and their peace missions are underfunded, public opinion, knowledge of and relationship with the unstable state, national constraints, and bureaucracy (Schmeidl, XXXX). Matveeva (2006) also argues that the warning-response dilemma is understudied and those who want to intervene often have no capacity to do so, whereas those who can intervene often are not interested. She concludes that response also depends on the proximity and the degree of the security threat to the West.

Despite all challenges, literature does suggest and point to a best practice of conflict prevention, which includes an efficient and integrated early warning with comprehensive and in-depth analysis, developing strategies of how to act given the moment, capacity, and tools available based on it (Lund, 2008), gathering international society's long-term commitment to the issue in cause (Bellamy, 2008), reforming the UN's institutional capacity to promote coordination between players (Matveeva, 2006), and adapt strategies based on transformations and developments of the situation on the

ground (Paintin, 2009). Meanwhile, authors highlight the importance of deepening the "culture of prevention" advocacy (Annan, 2001) to ensure funding and engagement, enhancing conflict prevention capacity throughout the entire process (Matveeva, 2006), and developing institutional and legal frameworks to support conflict prevention processes (Lund, 2008).

The literature's analysis of best practices for conflict prevention is important to provide insight to the case study of Macedonia, a country that resulted from the disintegration of Yugoslavia in a regional context, during the 1990s, of severe ethnic violence that resulted in international intervention (Paintin, 2009). The country was the only one to become independent by peaceful means and initially managed to have Albanians and Macedonians coexisting peacefully in its territory, despite underlying tension caused by ethnic matters between those two groups (Wanis and Grizold, 2012). The case of Macedonia in the field of conflict prevention is important due to the adoption of basically all tools available for conflict prevention, including innovative ones for the time, ranging from military deployment to confidence building. However, the most important factor of the case study is that the process was developed in a coordinated fashion between actors (Paintin, 2009), with long-term commitment of the parties involved, incentives such as promises of integration in the European Union and NATO, and was flexible enough to be adapted according to the different phases of prevention: in the 1990s, during the crisis of 2001, and afterwards. The agreement established, the OFA, proposed comprehensive reforms to the national apparatus and did prevent conflict despite recent turmoil – which did not regard ethnic tensions, but political ones due to corruption and organized crime, two issues that Macedonia still is to tackle and that have been impeding its access to the EU. Paintin (2009), Bieber (2008), (Brunnbauer, 2002), among other authors agree that Macedonia was a conflict prevention case of relative success.

Efforts regarding conflict prevention are valid ideologically and in practice. Ideologically, it is in line with the UN's Charter and with the liberal logic. In practice, conflict prevention is more cost effective than conflict management in financial, legitimacy, and life terms (Griffin, 2001). In that sense, and to build a framework for conflict prevention, the ICISS report of 2001 was seen with good

eyes by authors such as Bellamy (2008). The r2p, doctrine built based on the report's findings and recommendations, had a strong focus on the prevention pillar. However, many amendments to the initial project, as well as the spaces left by it to ad hoc measures, ended up frustrating initial expectations. The r2p, born just before the context of the War on Terror, has often been instrumentalized by states to further their own political, economic, and strategic interests abroad (Vaux, 2006). In that sense, a tool that could be conflict prevention-oriented is being used to legitimize foreign interventions with the use of force due to difficulties to transform engagement to prevent into consistent policies, the impact of the position of prevention in the War on Terror, and the issue of authority and agency (Bellamy, 2008). The author suggests the adoption of the "no harm policy" and revisiting institutional focus and responsibilities to update the doctrine as a framework for conflict prevention through which strategies, tools, and actors can work.

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