


editiones scholasticae

*Heider*

Daniel Heider (Ed.)

Cognitive Psychology  
in Early Jesuit Scholasticism



editiones scholasticae

of Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, Manuel de Góis (one of the so-called commentators of Coimbra) and Antonio Rubio the author shows that cognitive activism, defined as doctrine stressing the causal activity of the sense power and of the soul, is also shared by “the first Jesuits” (whose theories of the co-principles of sensation are here presented in a doctrinal genealogy). In the conclusion, the overall upshot of the chapter is related to the finding of some contemporary scholars, according to which late scholastics (Suárez, the Coimbra commentators) laid substantial emphasis on the efficient causality of the substantial form in general, and specifically of the soul.

## Beyond Psychology – The Philosophical Horizon of the *Coimbra Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’* (1598)

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### 1. Introduction

I wish to focus on the “first Jesuit psychology” by addressing two issues – imagination and self-awareness<sup>1</sup> – as they appear in the *Coimbra Jesuit Commentary on De Anima* (1598) and in a book of the same name (Cologne, 1574) by Francisco Toletus, one of the first generation of Jesuit philosophers. Philosophically and historically speaking, I will claim that the strengthening of the spiritual character of cognition emerging from the Coimbra text is related to its commitment to Neo-Platonism in accordance with the theological profile of the Coimbra Course.

It is true that the *Commentary on ‘De Anima’* by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez was conceived a bit earlier (1571/75)<sup>2</sup> than the Coimbra eponymous title, written by Manuel de Góis in the 1580s.<sup>3</sup> However, contrary to what has been said,<sup>4</sup> there are no

<sup>1</sup> See also Mário Santiago de Carvalho, “Imaginação, pensamento e conhecimento de si no Comentário Jesuíta Conimbricense à psicologia de Aristóteles”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 19 (2010): 25–52.

<sup>2</sup> Salvador Castellote, “Introducción”, in Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De Anima. Comentarios a los libros de Aristóteles ‘Sobre el Alma’*. Introducción y edición crítica por Salvador Castellote. Traducción castellana por Carlos Baciero y Luís Baciero, tomo 1 (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978), XXXVIII, XL.

<sup>3</sup> Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *Psicologia e Ética no Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense* (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2010), 19; Italian translation: *Psicologia e Etica nel ‘Cursus Conimbricensis’* (Roma: Anicia, 2015), 24; see also Carvalho, “Introdução”, in *Comentários do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus Sobre os Três Livros Da Alma de Aristóteles Estagirita*. Tradução do original latino por Maria da Conceição Camps (Lisboa: Edições Sílabo, 2010), 7–157.

<sup>4</sup> Tuomo Aho, “The Status of Psychology as Understood by Sixteenth-Century Scholastics”, in S. Heinämaa, M. Reuter (eds.), *Psychology and Philosophy*.



decisive clues to sustain the view that Suárez influenced the Coimbra theses. It is known that Suárez's text was finally published by Baltasar Álvares (Lyon, 1621), a Portuguese Jesuit, also involved in the Coimbra Course (1592–1606). As observed in Antonio Rubio's *Commentary on 'De Anima'* (1611), for example, what even today is sometimes identified as typical of Suárez's psychology – a rather inaccurate translation for the Latin “scientia de anima” – belonged to common Jesuit patrimony.<sup>5</sup> It is my belief that the person who really influenced the Coimbra Course was Pedro da Fonseca, deeply involved in the Portuguese Jesuit editorial enterprise from its very beginning.

### 1.1 One Lesson of Fonseca's Influence

Without exaggerating one of the most important Fonseca's influences, his Bonaventurian twist, which was meant to complement Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes with the exemplary cause,<sup>6</sup> allow me to illustrate Fonseca's authority by alluding to Góis's interpretation of texts 10 and 16 of *On the Soul* (III. 4, 429b18–20 and 430a7–9).<sup>7</sup> Toletus could not have known

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*Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought* (New York: Springer Science, 2009), 49.

<sup>5</sup> Santiago Orrego, “Antonio Rubio: el intelecto agente y las paradojas de la abstracción”, in Juan Fernando Sellés (ed.), *El Intelecto Agente en la Escolástica Renacentista* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2006), 408; see also Colin F. Fowler, *Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian Doctrine* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 196.

<sup>6</sup> *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae* II, cap. 7, q. 3, a. 1 (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1592), 245 [hereinafter: Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *Physica*]; *Petri Fonsecae Commentariorum in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros V*, cap. 2, explanatio D–E; *ibid.*, cap. 2, q. 2, s. 1 (Coloniae: S. Lazari Zetzneri, 1615), 57–8, 77; Mário Santiago de Carvalho, “As palavras e as coisas. O tema da causalidade em Portugal (séculos XVI e XVIII)”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 19 (2009): 231–36.

<sup>7</sup> *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae* III cap. 5, q. 4, a. 3 (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1598), 342 referring to Aristotle's text as quoted by Góis, 316: “Sensitiva igitur parte calidum discernit aut separabili aut se se habente ad se ipsam, perinde atque se se habet cum extensa fuerit linea flexa.” [hereinafter: Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima*]; Amândio Coxito, *O Problema dos Universais no Curso Filosófico Conimbricense*. Dissertação de Licenciatura apresentada à Faculdade de Letras da

Fonseca's interpretation of those texts – namely, comparing a broken line that finally returns to its straight condition with the problem of knowing the universal nature of a singular sensible.<sup>8</sup> After his own philosophical development, during the time when he was commenting on the *Physics*, Toletus puts forward three conclusions: the intellect (i) can know per se a particular singular (*singulare determinatum*); (ii) it does so through a proper species, (iii) it knows its objects in a manner different from the senses.<sup>9</sup> Alternatively, Góis deals with what he calls “circulus intellectualis” or “actiones intellectus” by adhering to Fonseca's comparison of a kind of inflection (*linea inflexa*) executed by the intellect as a necessary prerequisite to perception of the common nature of singulars.<sup>10</sup> What is perhaps surprising is that Góis identifies such a natural cognitive necessity (*naturalis ordo potentiarum*) with the soul's inflection to the body (*inflexa est anima ad corpus*),<sup>11</sup> dialoguing with numerous interpreters who had described that process as the soul's or the mind's self-awareness, “ad se redit, et in sui ipsius cognitionem incumbit”.<sup>12</sup>

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Universidade de Coimbra (Coimbra: pro manuscripto, 1962); Banha de Andrade, *Contributos para a História da Mentalidade Pedagógica Portuguesa* (Lisboa: INCM, 1982), 99–141; Eckhard Kessler, “Intellective Soul”, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 513.

<sup>8</sup> Fonseca, *In Metaphysica* I, cap. 2, q. 3, s. 5, 186: “... inflexionem referendam esse ad perceptionem rei singularis ... Ratio autem metaphorae hinc sumitur. Quia, cum res singulares cognoscantur a nostro intellectu per species intelligibiles naturarum communium concurrentibus simul phantasmatis rerum singularium, atque in ea re intellectus quodammodo sese demittat ad opem poscendam a phantasia, quae est inferior potentia, merito sese quodammodo dicitur inflectere.”; Coxito, *O problema*, 59.

<sup>9</sup> Francisco de Toledo, *Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in Aristotelis Libros de Anima* III, cap. 4, textus 16, q. 12 (Coloniae: H. Mylli 1615), 138–140, see also, regarding the allusion to *Physics*, 139.

<sup>10</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *Physica* I, cap. 1, q. 4, a. 1, 79; *Physica* I, cap. 1, q. 4, a. 3, 83; Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De anima* III, cap. 4, explanatio I, 316.

<sup>11</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 8, q. 8, a. 2, 401: “... nimirum adeo esse naturalem connexionem intellectus cum phantasia, dum animus est in corpore, ut saltem ordinarie non possit intellectus ullius rei capere notionem, quin ipsum phantasia comitetur, ac circa idem obiectum pro suo captu, et facultate insinat.”

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, III, cap. 5, q. 4, a. 3, 342.



One of the interpreters was named Hugh of Saint Victor (others being, explicitly, Plato, Aristotle, and Philoponus). Indeed, it is impossible not to see the correspondence between Hugh's text about the movements of the mind,<sup>13</sup> and the renewed idea in the Jesuit agenda: to discover the Human soul, or textually put Man,<sup>14</sup> seeks to uncover how the soul is supposed to summarize two worlds (*utrumque mundum summam continet*). Quoting Asclepius, Góis, too, places Man as a mediator, i.e., an horizon (*orizon*), a nexus (*nexus*), a boundary (*confinium*), a summary of all existing things (*totius mundi summa*),<sup>15</sup> topics not at all alien to Renaissance ears that also could

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, III, cap. 5, q. 4, a. 3, 342: "Qua de causa anima, intellectualis sphaera, quae in se ipsam circulum facit, a Philosophis dici consuevit. Eoque spectat illud Hugonis Victorii Didascalon cap. 2: 'Mens nostra in orbis geminos motum glomerat; quia siue per sensus ad sensibilia exeat, siue per intelligentiam ad ea, quae sensus fugiunt, ascendat; ad se ipsam rerum similitudines trahens, regyrat.'"

<sup>14</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *Physica VIII*, cap. 2, q. 1, a. 2, 708. The anthropology of the Coimbra Course was not yet studied, a task to be carried out at least after Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1798); Salvador Castellote Cubells, *Die Anthropologie des Suarez: Beiträge zur spanischen Anthropologie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1962), 196–201; Mabel Lundberg, *Jesuitische Anthropologie und Erziehungslehre in der Frühzeit des Ordens (ca. 1540–ca. 1650)* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966); Ernst Cassirer et al. (eds.), *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives* (Chicago – Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1948)

<sup>15</sup> Collegium Conimbricenses (Góis), *De anima*, Prooemium 2: "Denique communi ratione, ad omnem Philosophiae partem opportuna est haec de animo meditatio; quia cum animus rationis, consiliique particeps (ut Trismegistus in Asclepio ait) sit ueluti Orizon aeternitatis, et temporis, atque intelligibilis, corporeaeque naturae nexus, ac confinium: uel, uti alii dixerunt, totius mundi summa: siquidem natura media extremas repraesentat, superiorem ut imago; inferiorem ut exemplar: fit ut animi doctrina ueluti quoddam rerum diuinarum, et humanarum scientiae compendium existat, nosque ad omnem aliam ueritatis notionem praeparet. Ostendit quodque uberem huiusce contemplationis fructum, id, quod D. Augustinus 2 De ordine c. 8 asserit; nimirum duas esse praecipuas in Philosophia quaestiones: unam de anima, alteram de Deo. Primam, efficere ut nos ipsos nouerimus; alteram, ut originem nostram; illam nobis dulciorem; hanc chariorem esse: illam nos dignos beata uita; hanc beatos reddere." Fonseca (*Metaphysica I*, Prooemium, cap. 6, 32) does not quote the Asclepius but Philo Judaeus's *De Opificio Mundi* and, according to Toletus (*In De Anima I*, cap. 2, t. 25, 21) the authority is Plato who "posuit autem animam rationalem mediam substantiam inter formas omnino abstractas, et formas materiales..." See also Eugenio Garin, *L'umanesimo italiano. Filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento* (Bari: Laterza, 1952), 159.

be read in Toletus.<sup>16</sup> As a matter of fact, after Simplicius, one of the last Neoplatonists, who triggered the study of the soul as "mése ton te hyperphyon einai kai ton physikon",<sup>17</sup> it would be easy to find this topic embraced by Toletus, Suárez, Fonseca,<sup>18</sup> and in the entire first Jesuit psychology.

Another interesting move was that Aristotle was supposed to serve Christian theology. Fonseca had clearly stated that, provided it was corrected and amended (*correcta et emendata*), Aristotelian philosophy (*Aristotelica doctrina*) was of merit with respect to the Christian Republic (*Christiana Republica*).<sup>19</sup> The idea of Creation, in particular, was interpreted in Coimbra as if theology and Aristotelian philosophy were unproblematic. That could not be the case with the way *De generatione animalium II*<sup>20</sup> was then read (we will return to that), with the version of the Augustinian dilemma between time and eternity, or with the identification of philosophy with the quest for God and the soul, even up to the point that the soul's "natura abdita et recondita" was read as an image of the Trinity,<sup>21</sup> defined not only by life, but also by love.<sup>22</sup> In all these cases related to the science of the soul, it would be impossible not to include the theological horizon in its very core. Ultimately, from Pomponazzi's *De immortalitate animae* (1516) to Descartes's *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641) something will occur. From

<sup>16</sup> Toletus, *De Anima II*, cap. 1, q. 2, 46.

<sup>17</sup> Simplicius, *In libros Aristotelis De Anima commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck (Berlin: G. Reimeri, 1882), 3; Simplicius, *On Aristotle On the Soul 1. 1–2. 4*, transl. by J. O. Urmson (London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 17.

<sup>18</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica I*, Prooemium, cap. 6, 32: "Homo nexus Dei mundi et rerum materialium et immaterialium horizon."

<sup>19</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica I*, Prooemium, cap. 5, 30.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *De Generatione animalium II*, 3, 736b26–30: "It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason"; in J. Barnes (ed.), transl. by A. Platt, *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

<sup>21</sup> *In librum de Memoria et Reminiscentia*, c. 3, in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In libros Aristotelis, qui Parua Naturalia appellantur* (Olisipone: S. Lopes, 1593), 6–7.

<sup>22</sup> Collegium Conimbricenses (Góis), *In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, aliquot Conimbricensis Cursus Disputationes in quibus praecipua quaedam Ethicae disciplinae capita continentur*, disp. 7, q. 5, a. 2 (Olisipone: S. Lopes, 1593), 72.



man's singular place, not simply mortal or simply immortal,<sup>23</sup> the very foundation of cognition continues to emerge from an interpretation of Man "in a sense [as] something intermediate between God and nought, i.e., placed in such a manner between the Supreme Being and non-being (...) in so far as a sovereign Being has formed [him]..."<sup>24</sup>

## 2. Encomium of a Science and its Horizons

Jesuit "scientia .de anima", viz. the task of commenting on Aristotle's *De Anima* along with the *Sense and Sensibilia* and the *Short Treatises on Natural History*, had to begin with the Philosopher's initial words of the former title:

Holding as we do that knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul.<sup>25</sup>

After almost two thousand years, these words were interpreted historically as well as ideologically. Inevitably, this renewed "study of the soul" had to be something different from the Aristotelian "historia peri psychés". Without a doubt, this renewed study is more suitable to the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries.

Toletus, who still uses the erudite expression "historia de anima",<sup>26</sup> testifies to the difficulty of the Jesuit endeavour.<sup>27</sup> On his, Góis interprets the above quoted Aristotelian text emphasizing three usual motives:

<sup>23</sup> Pietro Pomponazzi, *De immortalitate animae* c. 1, 41rb: "... mediumque inter mortalia et immortalia", in Pietro Pomponazzi, *Tractatus acutissimi, utilimi et mere peripatetici* (Venetiis: Octaviani Scoti, 1525).

<sup>24</sup> René Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia* IV (AT 7: 54), in René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, transl. by Elisabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003).

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul* 402a 1–5, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, transl. by J. A. Smith, 641.

<sup>26</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* I, cap. 1, textus 1, 8.

<sup>27</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* I, cap. 2, textus 4–10, 10–12.

- i. rigour (*certitudo demonstrandi*) of the doctrine of the soul;
- ii. dignity (*nobilitas*) demonstrative of its subject;
- iii. theoretical (*omnis veritatem cognitio*) as well as practical (*vitam probam instituendam et moderanda*) utility.<sup>28</sup>

If we link motives (iii) and (ii), meaning the recognition of the superiority of reason (*ratio/mens*), Góis is saying that the duty of the natural philosopher, the expert who knows the division of the soul's faculties (*partitio facultatum*), will be of the highest level and ambition. Since the human soul subordinates all its faculties and moderates them (*norma*), eventually human happiness (*humanae vitae felicitas*) will take place.

Toletus, too, seemed to be enthusiastic about the utility of this particular investigation as regards all the other philosophical disciplines, taken either singularly or universally. This is surely why he regarded "contemplation" as the ultimate last cause and "intellective soul" as the intermediate form.<sup>29</sup> It could not be otherwise. The particular kind of knowledge the Jesuits were dealing with, or as it was sometimes put, the "animus meditatio/consideratio", was said to be suitable (*opportuna*) to philosophy as a whole (*omnem philosophiae partem*), viz. "human and divine matters", according to the quoted Platonic-Stoic definition of "philosophy"; but, Fonseca immediately added, provided the definition underwent correction (a gesture we understand in the sense of a deepening of the Christian-Neoplatonic theme of Man as an "imago mundi",<sup>30</sup> which we will immediately address).

The study of the human soul (*animus doctrina*) relies first on "participation", thus reinforcing the *kosmós* – the old motive of the chain of being – as the widest possible perspective on Man/Soul. That notion often appears in expressions like "anima rationis particeps", "animus particeps rationis", not to mention the difficult problem of Aristotle's two definitions of the soul, summarized by the expression "Homo est animal rationis particeps, constans corpore in coelum erecto".<sup>31</sup> It has to be noted

<sup>28</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima*, Prooemium, 1.

<sup>29</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* I, cap. 1, textus 2, 9–10.

<sup>30</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* II, cap. 3, q. 3, s. 2, 521.

<sup>31</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, c. 2, exp. B, 96: "Talis est haec definitio, Homo est animal rationis particeps, constans corpore in coelum erecto;



that the *Coimbra Commentary* expresses participation dwelling on Pseudo-Dionysius much more than Toletus does; note, for example, the use of Pseudo-Dionysius's words such as: man's intermediate nature as an image (*imago*) of what lies above him, and an exemplar (*exemplar*) to what is below him.<sup>32</sup> From the outset, the student of Aristotle's *De Anima* would be taught that Aquinas's doctrine of the subsistent substantial form had to be framed by Plato's *Phaedo* and by Gregory of Nyssa's interpretation of substantiality as an index of God's power connecting all parts of the world.<sup>33</sup>

We have not yet dealt with motive (i), but it is understandable that only Aristotelian philosophy might give the Augustinian unquiet Ego the rigour it had lacked for centuries. Remember that the same movement in the direction of philosophical rigour had been followed by Henry of Ghent, in his case by appealing to Avicenna.<sup>34</sup> Surprisingly, since we are reading an Aristotelian Commentary, two of the three motives, (ii) and (iii), explicitly evoked the Ego's Augustinian existential drive – the human

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*potest enim ex ea confici demonstratio, qua causa materialis per formalem, seu quasi formalem de homine ostendatur, hunc in modum. Omne animal particeps rationis constat corpore in coelum erecto: sed homo est animal particeps rationis: ergo constat corpore in coelum erecto. Propositum uero Aristotelis est talem animae definitionem tradere, ut ex illa et ea, quam superiori capite assignauit, fiat una, quae sit demonstratio positione differens; ita nimirum, ut una ex alia demonstrari possit.*"

<sup>32</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* Prooemium, q. 1, a. 2, 7; *Physica* I c. 1, q. 4, a.1, 84; see also *Ibid.* II, c. 1, q. 6, a. 3, 77: "In quo sane mirabilis rerum ordo et connexio uisitur, dum animus, qui inter substantias intelligentiae participes, infimum locum obtinet, cum eo corpore quod caeteris excellit, coniungitur, sicque iuxta D. Dionysii normam in 7. cap. De diuinis nominibus, summum infimi attingit infimum supremi."; *Ibid.* III, c. 5, q. 6, a. 1, 355: "... iuxta illud D. Dionysii 7<sup>o</sup> capite De diuinis nominibus, Supremum infimi attingit infimum supremi. Est enim phantasia suprema inter sensus, qui in potentiis cognoscentibus obtinent locum infimum, et intellectus humanus est infimus inter facultates intellectrices, quae in eisdem potentiis supremum locum uendicant. Deinde ab extremo ad extremum non itur, nisi per medium; sed inter intellectum, et sensus tam communem, quam externos, qui sunt ueluti extrema, interiecta est phantasia; ergo ut ab illis aliquid sensibile ad intellectum commet, oportet ut prius in phantasia insit, atque adeo non alius sensus, sed phantasia proxime intellectui ministerium praestabit."

<sup>33</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 1, q. 1, a. 4, 39.

<sup>34</sup> Mário S. de Carvalho, "El uso de Aristóteles por Enrique de Gante en el *Quodlibeto IX*", in Francisco Bertelloni, Giannina Burlando (eds.), *La filosofía medieval* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta/Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2002), 179–194.

dilemma between time (*fluxis et caducis bonis*) and eternity (*sempiterna et divina*) – and echoed Socrates's motto, nobody can know himself without knowing the nature (*natura*) and the dignity (*dignitas*) of his soul.

Conscious of not completely following Aristotle's definition of the soul, Toletus leans towards Cajetan's metaphysical approach,<sup>35</sup> whereas Góis, without completely turning his back on metaphysics, confines himself to physics, as Zabarella had done. Like Toletus or Góis, Benet Perera, a Jesuit scholar who taught in Italy, and Suárez<sup>36</sup> addressed this issue as well. With a slight hesitation, Toletus shows a preference for a metaphysical definition of the soul; among other things, he does not ignore the magnitude of the difficulties related with that definition, viz. Man as such (*si quid homo, ut homo sit inquirimus*).<sup>37</sup> Also, he does not ignore the novelty of his proposal (*nova sit*). And, criticizing Averroes's error, Toletus interprets the extrinsic characteristic (*de foris venire*) of the habitual intellect, or the fact that it "comes afterwards" (*posterius aduenit*), in the process of knowledge.<sup>38</sup> This is the first appearance of the already mentioned Aristotelian text of *De generatione animalium*, but it has to be added that the Coimbra qualified

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<sup>35</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* II, cap. 2, t. 26, q. 3, 52: "Mihi etiam placet Caietanus. Quia ex se animam esse talem substantiam, ut sit ex se principium vitae prius, est et causa cur sit actus corporis, sed quamvis illud verum sit, tamen non est talis demonstratio physica, et per causam physicam, sed fere metaphysica per quasdam rationes formales." See also Toletus, *De Anima* I, cap.1, q. 1, 9.

<sup>36</sup> Suárez, *De Anima*, Prooemium, 20, n. 12: "... absolute dicendum esse considerationem animae rationalis pertinere ad Physicam"; *ibid.* 26, n. 16: "Est ergo de consideratione Physicae anima rationalis cum omnibus proprietatibus suis simpliciter, Metaphysicae uero secundum quid ..."; Suárez, *De Anima*, Prooemium, ed. 1621, 2 (reprinted in the appendix of Castellote's translation, t. I): "Sextus de statu animae separatae, illius enim consideratio valde theologica est, multumque naturalem scientiam transcendit." For Perera, see Mário S. de Carvalho, "Between Rome and Coimbra: A Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuit Psychologies (Benet Perera and the Coimbra Course)", *Quaestio* 14 (2014): 91–110.

<sup>37</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* I, cap. 1, q. 6, 14: "Accidentia propria solum conducunt ad cognitionem quid re particularem".

<sup>38</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* II c. 1, t. 11, q. 2, 47: "Cum enim dicitur, intellectus de foris venire, non significatur, quod sit ante corpus ipsa anima, sed loquitur de intellectu secundum habitum, qui perfectus est, cumque tota perfectio intellectus non sit a natura sed magna a parte post et est opus nostrum, ob id dicitur de foris venire", *Ibid.* II, cap. 1, q. 2, 46.



interpretation of this text is a tacit defence of an unequivocal compatibility between physics and a philosophical/theological input; unequivocal, among other things, because, contrary to other contemporary interpretations that did not hide the ambiguity of the Greek expression at the beginning of Aristotle's quotation, Álvares interprets the Latin "restat igitur" that translates "leípetai de" in a conclusive sense, thus removing all the uncertainty of the Greek quotation.<sup>39</sup>

Like Toletus, Góis meant that firstly and in its own (*primo ac per se*), the soul is to be conceived as the origin and the source (*fonti et origini*) of all life manifestations.<sup>40</sup> Notwithstanding, a difference appears. Since Fonseca had argued that physics could achieve the existence of separated substances, a high expectation concerning physics was justified.<sup>41</sup> The definition we have mentioned as a testimony of the doctrine of participation, "Homo est animal rationis particeps, constans corpore in coelum erecto", was rooted in physics. The close relation between the "esse animatum" and the "anima" in the framework of the discussion concerning the two well-known Aristotelian definitions of the soul pertained to physics as well.<sup>42</sup> Lastly, in two more passages, rigour and physics were closely connected, either discussing Paul of Venice's thesis or in justifying the literary transition from the reading of *Meteorology* to

<sup>39</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 1, q. 3, a. 2, 59: "Nec obstat quod secundo De generatione animalium capit. 3<sup>a</sup> asserit mentem exterius ingredi. Non enim his uerbis uitam illius extra materiam, et ante nexum cum corpore; sed diuinam eius originem et creationem, atque independentiam a materia indicauit; ut ipse orationis contextus ostendit, sic enim habet: 'Restat igitur ut mens sola extrinsecus accedat, eaque sola divina sit; nihil enim cum eius actione communicatio corporalis.'" See Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* II 3, 736b 26–30; and also Sascha Salatowsky, *De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (B. R. Grüner: Amsterdam Philadelphia, 2006), 200–1, who refers to Simon Portius's *De humana mente disputatio* (Florentiae: Lorenzo Torrentini, 1551) different reading of the above Aristotelian quotation.

<sup>40</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* Prooemium, 3; Fonseca, *Metaphysica* V, c. 2, q. 6, s. 6, 109; *ibid.* V, c. 4, q. 2, s. 4, 271. Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form. Late Aristotelianism Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 12.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Fonseca, *Metaphysica* II, cap. 3, q. 5, s. 3, 542.

<sup>42</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 2, exp. D, 97: "Progreditur enim ab animato ad animam, constat uero animatum esse posterius natura, quam animam; siquidem animatum dicitur, quod animae particeps est, denominaturque ab anima..." (the italics are mine).

the reading of *De Anima*. According to "the very notion of teaching (*ratio doctrinae*)", Góis insists, the physical or the largest perspective one can have of a subject cannot simply exclude Paul's thesis (*improbabilis tamen non est*) of a reliable complete treatment of the living body (*integram corporis animati commentationem*). And, finally, Góis interprets the transition from *Meteorology* to *De Anima* as an indication that physical science, though not alien to the world, had to, however, aim at something distinct from the world.

Different from Toletus's more literary approach,<sup>43</sup> but in keeping with Fonseca, who could find in Aristotle's *Physics* as well as in Plato's *Timaeus* the claim that the human form exceeded all natural forms by its being,<sup>44</sup> Álvares and Góis insisted that the human form exceeded Heaven. These two Portuguese Jesuits taught that human value (*dignitate vincit*) or excellence, represented by the spiritual dimension of the rational soul,<sup>45</sup> must radically emerge from the "physical" created order.

If life begins with the vegetative dimension,<sup>46</sup> immortality is also a kind of life, although of a different order.<sup>47</sup> Fonseca had attributed the merits of dealing with immortality more to Plato than to Aristotle.<sup>48</sup> Yet, since this subject did amount to asking

<sup>43</sup> Toletus, *De Anima*, qu. prooemiales, q. 3, 5–6; *Ibid.*, I, cap.1, q. 1, 9: "Ad secundum respondeo, quod anima nobilior est coelo, saltem intellectiva. Est enim coelum inanimatum"; see also Des Chene, *Life's Form* ..., 17–19.

<sup>44</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* I, cap. 7, q. 3, s. 8, 369; see also Fonseca, *Metaphysica* V, cap. 2, q. 1, s. 3, 75.

<sup>45</sup> Baltasar Álvares, *Tractatus de Anima Separata*, disp. 2, a. 1 [hereinafter: Collegium Conimbricense (Álvares), *Tractatus*], in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Conimbricae: A. Mariz, 1598), 471; *Ibid.*, disp. 2, a. 2, 474; see also *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In Quatuor libros de Coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae* II, cap. 1, q. 1, a. 2 (Olisipone: S. Lopes, 1593), 136.

<sup>46</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, c. 2, explanatio E–H, 97–98.

<sup>47</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, c. 2, explanatio K, 98: "Videri tamen ait animam intellectuam alterius esse rationis, atque ordinis, et immortalitate a caeteris formis rerum sublunarium distingui. Ex eo sequitur uim intelligendi non haerere in corpore, postea ab eo seiungi, non ita uero caeteras potentias, cum organis addictae affixaeque sint, ut ex superioribus patet; etsi non defuerint, qui eas quoque separati posse a materia affirmarint."; cf. Des Chene, *Life's Form*, 112, regarding the difference between Suárez's and Coimbra approaches to Aristotle's definitions.

<sup>48</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* I, Prooemium, cap. 5, 26: "Si uero quaestio sit de mundi ordine, de animorum immortalitate de bonorum praemio, et poena malorum, atque



whether intellectual souls – the “*animae rationis participes*” precisely – were the true forms of each and every man, Álvares’s positive answer, against Averroes and Antonio Bernardi,<sup>49</sup> juxtaposes the already mentioned Aristotle’s text of the divine (*theíon*) intellect coming from the outside (*thyraten*) with the Christian theology of the Creation of the Human soul (*nous*).<sup>50</sup> Besides the Bible, Góis says Saint Jerome too endorsed God’s direct intervention in the creation of souls (*Deum novas quotidie animas conceptis iam corporibus infundere*), and Saint Thomas referred to the dignity of souls in the same terms (*per creationem esse accipient*). Clearly, there seemed to be no difficulties with the theological problem of the creation of individuals (*in ipsis corporibus singillatim creantur et infunduntur*) and with the philosophical lesson of the soul’s inner and primordial propensity to the body (*animae prius conuenit esse unitam corpori, quam a corpore abiunctam*).<sup>51</sup>

The metaphysical framework of the Coimbra Course differed from that of Toletus. To deal with the science of the separated soul with editorial autonomy, as Álvares did, is something new. Neither Toletus nor Fonseca nor Suárez had detached such a subject in the form of a *Treatise on the Separated Soul*, and this is something more and less than a mere “half-way point in the process of the shifting of the question of the rational soul from natural philosophy to metaphysics”.<sup>52</sup>

The science of the soul was praised quoting *Metaphysics* XII. 7 (1072b20–5), and it is to be noticed that, different from the

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*omnino de universa Dei providentia, quae sunt Christianae religionis praecipua fundamenta, nemo non putabit, si modo prima quasi superficie rem consideret, Platoniam (in Timeao) doctrinam plurimum cum nostra convenire; Aristotelis a nostra valde alienam esse. (...) Asserit nobiscum Plato (in Phaedone et saepe alibi) animos immortales esse; at de ea re Aristoteles ambigue et inconstanter videtur loqui. (...); ibid., cap. 5, 28: “In quaestione vero de animae immortalitate clarius quidem quam Aristoteles, locutus est Plato, etsi uterque immortalem esse docuit.”*

<sup>49</sup> I have dealt several times with Antonio Bernardi, the author of *De eversionis singularis certaminis libri XL* (Basel: Per Henricum Petri, 1562). For his role in the Coimbra Course, see, e.g., Carvalho, *Psicologia e Ética*, passim; see also Marco Forlivesi (ed.), *Antonio Bernardi della Mirandola (1502–1565). Un aristotelico umanista alla corte dei Farnese* (Firenze: Olschki, 2009)

<sup>50</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Álvares), *Tractatus*, disp. 1, a. 2, 445; *ibid.*, disp. 1, a. 5, 461.

<sup>51</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, c. 1, q. 3, a. 2, 55–59.

<sup>52</sup> See Fowler, *Descartes on the Human Soul*, 195.

grammar of participation we have followed thus far, “analogy” and “similitude” will appear below with emphasis entirely placed on immateriality, the immateriality of the intellect and of the higher substances: “Truly, the science of the soul admirably leads us to first philosophy due to a certain analogy and similitude that allow our intellect to reach the intelligible substances, freed from matter, and thus human mind, transformed beyond itself, is called back to the divine nature from which it came.”<sup>53</sup>

In his *Commentary*, Fonseca had considered this investigation on the soul to be purely metaphysical;<sup>54</sup> without, of course, transcending theology,<sup>55</sup> it had to be the highest contemplative science.<sup>56</sup> However, it is to be noted that, cognitively speaking, separation is not the same as abstraction. According to Góis and to Álvares, metaphysics rises directly from the science of the soul, namely from Man’s preternatural dimension, which will have to take into consideration the soul’s condition after being really separated from the body. Álvares’s treatise puts it into practice in a literarily independent manner.

## 2.1 Beyond Psychology

Since it is impossible to characterize the Coimbra Jesuit “psychology” as a middle science – neither “*mathematica*” (Nifo) nor “*animastica*” (Marcantonio Genua) –,<sup>57</sup> and since it is also

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<sup>53</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima*, Prooemium, 1: “*Ad primam vero Philosophiam mirifice confert, quatenus ab intellectu nostro ad substantias intelligibiles, et a materia absolutas per analogiam quamdam, similitudinemque prouehimur, et humana mens se supra se conuertens, a se ipsa ad diuinam naturam, a qua profecta est, reuocatur, et quicquid ipsa perfectionis habet, in Deo omnium perfectionum fonte inuenit, meliori tamen nota, omnique imperfectione sublata.*”

<sup>54</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* IV, cap. 1, q. 1, s. 3, 644: “*... de subiecto communi pure metaphysico, id est, cuius nulla pars subiecta ab alio artifice tractetur, potest illud dici substantia immaterialis, seu separata.*”

<sup>55</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* II, cap. 3, q. 2, s. 5, 517; see also *ibid.*, IV c. 1, q. 1, s. 5, 651.

<sup>56</sup> Fonseca, *Metaphysica* II, cap. 1, expl. L, 381–2.

<sup>57</sup> Paul J. J. M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul”, in Paul J. J. M. Bakker & Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen (eds.), *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The*



impossible to divide it – a prerogative of mathematics – everything we have said can only pertain to a unique science of a peculiar nature. Thus, being a many-faceted science, going beyond psychology can mean, at least, two things: entering into metaphysics or moving farther to physics. Álvares's *Treatise on the Separated Soul* represents the first option. As regards the second, it is important to read Coimbra's *De Anima* in the wider context of the entire Coimbra Course, which, by the way, besides *Dialectics*, does not deal with anything else but natural philosophy: that is precisely 2,462 of its 3,362 pages, or more than 73% of all the published pages. Since we are invoking statistics, note, too, that 50% of the questions of *De Anima* are preoccupied with sensory cognition, with its mechanism (*fabrica*), not to mention that the second of the two published appendices to the same title, the *Tractatio Aliquot Problematum ad quinque Sensus Spectantium*, composed by Cosme de Magalhães, also deals with the senses. Since the intellectual soul is of a natural kind,<sup>58</sup> all the pages dealing with its infusion after the vegetative and sensitive stages, both in male and female foetuses, are more than justified in this context.<sup>59</sup> We can understand the keen interest Góis displayed toward European and Iberian contemporary medicine, in contrast with Toletus's parallel texts. Since cognition is of a physical nature, the importance of the theory of colours and the act of seeing, which is conveyed either by a biological-naturalistic (as happens with the crystalline) or by a physical-mathematical framework, which is in the case of optics, are justified as well. More generally, the nature of sensation, the problem of the sensible species and their relation to the common sensible, the problem of error, and many other issues will be addressed in other chapters of the present volume.<sup>60</sup> In spite of

*Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima* (Aldershot Burlington: Ashgate, 2007), 154–177.

<sup>58</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 1, q. 2, a. 2, 53.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 1, q. 4, a. 2, 62–4; *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In duos libros De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritae* I, cap. 4, q. 2, a. 31 (Conimbricae: A. Mariz, 1597), 159; Maria da Conceição Camps, “A problemática do surgimento da vida humana no Comentário Jesuíta Conimbricense ao ‘De Anima’ de Aristóteles”, *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 19 (2010): 187–198.

<sup>60</sup> On all these issues see Christoph Sander, “Medical Topics in the ‘De Anima’ Commentary of Coimbra (1598) and the Jesuits’ Attitude towards Medicine in Education and Natural Philosophy”, *Early Science and Medicine* 19 (2014): 76–

their patent profusion, all these physical factors aim at a different purpose.

In order to illustrate other differences between Toletus and Góis, let us compare their own chapters on sound perception (chap. 8, texts 77–91).<sup>61</sup> The same fifteen Aristotelian texts are differently read. Whereas Toletus introduces a few short questions on sound and echo, Góis's lecture is more of a philological tendency; since the Portuguese edition reproduces Aristotle's text, Góis divides the fifteen texts into ten clauses, which must be seen as his own systematisation of Aristotle's text. In the move from the physics of sound to its human dimension, Toletus introduces the intentionality of signifying (*cum intentione aliquid significandi*) and ends by appealing to Logic, where such a problem was expected to be discussed; Góis instead immediately sees the close connection between the effective role of the imagination (*cum quadam imaginatione efficitur*) and the production of voice, in the sense of an intentional meaning sound. Toletus discusses one question more than Góis, but a quick inspection shows that not only is the Portuguese much more thorough, but also that he seems to be keen on connecting formation of voice, listening, and several activities of thinking. Among these activities, one would be tempted to give emphasis to the case of education – whose value, in lecturing (*doctrina*), was said to depend upon certitude and upon the nature of what is being taught<sup>62</sup> – mostly because only Coimbra follows

101; Maria da Conceição Camps, *Do Visível ao Invisível – A teoria da visão no Comentário aos três livros ‘Da Alma’ do Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense (1598)*. Dissertação de doutoramento em Filosofia apresentada à Faculdade de Letras do Porto, (Porto: pro manuscripto, 2012); João Madeira, “Francisco Valles Covarrubias: o galenismo renascentista depois de Andreas Vesalius”, *Veritas* 54/3 (2009): 71–89; Michael Edwards, “Suárez in a Late Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology and Authority”, in Benjamin Hill, Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35, note 30; Toletus, *De Anima* II, cap. 7, textus 76, q. 16, 83–5.

<sup>61</sup> See also Fonseca, *Metaphysica* V, cap. 10, q. 1, s. 3, 607.

<sup>62</sup> *Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione*, in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae* I, cap. 1, q. 2, a. 1 (Conimbricae: G. Loureiro, 1606), 301; and *ibid.*, Prooemium, 287. Alluding to Juan Ginés de Sepulveda's position concerning the servitude of the Indians of the New World, Fonseca had recognized the importance of education to improve human condition, see Fonseca, *Metaphysica* V, cap. 15, q. 1, s. 8, 808: “Indos novi orbis ... suapte natura



Julius Scaliger's praise of listening, as if seeing was of a second order.<sup>63</sup>

Toletus	Góis
An sonus sit qualitas praeter motum (q. 19)	Quidnam sonus, quaeve eius causa effectrix sit (q. 1): - statuuntur nonnulli propositiones (a. 1); - propositiones aliae traduntur (a. 2).
An sonus sit in corpore sonante, an in corpore intercepto, scilicet in aere vel aqua (q. 20)	Quodnam soni subiectum sit, quod medium (q. 2): - sonum non recipi in corporibus solidis, quorum conflictu editur, eius medium esse aerem et aquam (a. 1);
An echo sit idem numero cum loco proprio (q. 22)	
An sonus sit realiter in medio usque ad auditum (q. 21)	- quo pacto sonus eiusve species ad auditum traiciantur (a. 2).
De vocis natura, et causis ac significatione (q. 23)	Quo pacto vox formetur, Et quae eius natura sit (q. 3): - de formandae vocis instrumentis et artificio (a. 1). - explicatur vocis definitio ab Aristotele tradita (a. 2). De potentia audiendi (q. 4): quae sit eius praestantia, quae officina (a. 1); qua in parte facultas audiendi constituta sit (a. 2).

Let us briefly explain the above schema, in the section pertaining to the Coimbra Course. Dealing with acoustics – say, physiological and psychological acoustics – the definition of sound as a sensible

*aliam nationum servos esse, sunt enim omnes homines natura pares, etsi conditio ac educatio alios facit ad dominandum, alios ad parendum aptiores.*” On Sepulveda’s position regarding the natives, see Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, *Tratado sobre las Justas causas de la Guerra contra los Indios* (Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996).

<sup>63</sup> Cosme de Magalhães, *Tractatio aliquot Problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium per totidem sectiones distributa*, s. 2, in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Conimbricae: A. Mariz, 1598), 548.

quality is immediately related to listening (q. 1). Any study on hearing or listening, in its basic Aristotelian dimension, would be impossible without referring to the medium and to the transmission of species taking place in it (q. 2); the mechanical process of voice emission (q. 3, a. 1) does not preclude the reference to the intentional activity, thus explaining the move from the necessary treatment of the air inside the ear to the notional being of the listening species (q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2). It is, therefore, apparent that the tension from sound to listening, that is, the difference between sound, voice and speech, refers to the meaning of the soul’s final cause, either originating in the sensitive appetite, in imagination, or in the mind (q. 3, a. 2). Since it is impossible to hear without thinking, after addressing listening as a physical, anatomical and physiological process (q. 4), an occasion to mention the anthropological complex of hearing does emerge, viz. the artistic, the scientific and the educational, not to mention the religious (q. 4, a. 1).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>64</sup> This allows us also the following digression: by adapting Scaliger’s text on sound to music, viz. by recognizing that listening to music is something related to the emotions (*animum commoueat*) aroused by the vital spirits, Góis’s name may be included in the history of the *Affektenlehre*, as interpreted by Händel or Bach but recognized to be rooted in Descartes’s *Passions of the Soul* (1649); see Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 8, q. 4, a. 1, 212: “*Tertio, quia excepta auribus uehementer affectus mouent, praesertim si musicis numeris constant. (...) Cur autem sonus tantopere animum commoueat, hisce uerbis edisserit Scaliger, Exercitationes in Cardanum, 302, n° 2: ‘Propterea quod spiritus, qui in corde agitant, tremulum ac subsultantem recipiunt in pectus aerem, atque cum affini suo unum fiunt et caetera, quae ibidem fusius persequitur.’” See Iulii Caesaris Scaligeri, *Exotericarum Exercitationum Liber XV de Subtilitate ad Hieronymum Cardanum* (Francofurti: A. Wecheli, 1582), 931–932; finally, compare Góis’s text with Peter Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 19–20: “... [I]t was thought that, if a composer wished, say, to write sad music, what he had to do was to write music whose general configuration resembled the configuration of the vital spirits appropriate to the arousal of that emotion. (...) All the composer needed to know was what the basic motions of the vital spirits were, appropriate to the basic emotions, as explained in Descartes’ book, and write music to match those emotions.”*



## 2.2 Imagination and Self-Awareness

Also with Pseudo-Dionysius<sup>65</sup> it is stated that the transition from sensory to intellectual knowledge belongs to the faculty of imagination. As we have read, this is supposed to transform an act into an activity, to hear into the activity of listening, to see into the activity of seeing. Crucial to whatever science,<sup>66</sup> permanence is tantamount to attributing to imagination a certain *poiein, vis*, an *Einbildungskraft*, a kind of power relevant for anyone educated by Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*. This cannot be underestimated, particularly in the case of the category of Jesuit literature such as the one shaped by the New World. I am thinking, for example, of Antonio Ruiz de Montoya's mystical works (1585–1652), where a never seen nature could not be contemplated without the active contribution of the imagination.<sup>67</sup>

Toletus is extremely sensitive to imagination in relation to the transition from sensory to intellectual knowledge.<sup>68</sup> One of the reasons Góis had diverged from Toletus's solution regarding the number of the internal senses – without being as parsimonious as Suárez but more economic than Toletus, Góis was again following Fonseca<sup>69</sup> – has to do with the role and the status of memory, a faculty that, together with the estimative and the cogitative power, belongs to the imagination. Like Toletus, Góis, too, relates the Greek word *phantasia* to light and seeing – Argyropoulos's translation is explicitly invoked here – but whereas Toletus confines himself to the difference between the Latin and the Greek,

<sup>65</sup> See above note 32.

<sup>66</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *Physica Prooemium*, q. 2, a. 2, 18–20.

<sup>67</sup> António Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, José L. Rouillon Arróspide (ed.) (Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP, 1991); Carlos Alberto González, “‘El Sílex del Divino Amor’, de Antonio Ruiz de Montoya: un testimonio místico de un misionero entre los Guaraníes”, *Teología* 75 (2000/1): 29–73.

<sup>68</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 3, tt. 150–8, 122–4.

<sup>69</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 3, q. 1, a. 3, 304; Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 3, q. 6, 126: “*Sensus interiores tantum sunt tres. (...) Unde imaginationem, vel phantasiam non separo ab aestimatione, sed eadem (ut puto) virtus est quae elicit species non sensatas cum ea quae in absentia obiectorum ipsa percipit, speciesque connectit.*”; see also Suárez, *De Anima*, disp. VIII, q. 1, n. 21 (ed. Castellote III, 40); Fonseca, *Metaphysica* V, cap. 28, q. 6, s. 5, 1011; the same problem will be read in Kant, *Anthropologie*, § 24.

the Portuguese Jesuit profits from philology to pinpoint something more of a philosophical nature, viz. that the imagination gives some kind of permanence to the external sensations subjected to instability.<sup>70</sup> Elsewhere, I have remarked that the Greek text which Góis had in his working table supported this interpretation since in it he could read “*apó tou pháous kaí tes staseos*”; note that this last word, precisely translated by “permanens”, is absent in our modern editions.<sup>71</sup> On his part, even if Toletus is not unaware of a permanent imagination – *imaginationes enim manent* – he seems to be much more sensitive to its prophylactic features, namely to the fact that man differs from other animals due to the capacity which the imagination gives to man to act whenever the intellect is subjugated by passions, diseases, sleep, and so on.<sup>72</sup>

Góis relates permanence not only to the active capacity of sensory cognition,<sup>73</sup> but to the new theory (*a recentioribus philosophis*) of the “effective illumination” of the agent intellect.<sup>74</sup> According to such a theory, a kind of external light would raise the sensible images in order to produce the intelligible image in which the common nature is represented as freed from its individual characteristics and perceived only by the possible intellect.<sup>75</sup> Cajetan's “objective thesis” – attributing an assistant role to the

<sup>70</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 3, exp. R, 298; Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 3, t. 162, q. 6, 125. According to Fonseca (*Metaphysica* I, cap. 7, q. 3, s. 8, 374) light (*lux*) was how the Ancients used to refer to the substantial form; see Roberto Grosseteste, *Tratado da luz e outros opúsculos sobre a cor e a luz*. Introdução e notas de Mário Santiago de Carvalho, sobre a edição latina de *De luce e De colore* por Cecília Panti (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2012), 57; 91.

<sup>71</sup> Carvalho, “Imaginação”, 41.

<sup>72</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 3, t. 162, 125: “*Ut ergo homines operari possent, etiam cum ratio non operatur, dedit natura imaginationem.*”

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Alison Simmons, “The Sensory Act: Descartes and the Jesuits on the Efficient Cause of Sensation”, in Stephen F. Brown (ed.), *Meeting of the Minds. The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 63–76.

<sup>74</sup> Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge 1. Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden: Brill), 360–3; Carvalho, *Psicologia*, 90 (Italian transl., 106–7).

<sup>75</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 5, q. 2, a. 1, 328: “*... tanquam externa lux radii sui consortio actiue eleuat phantasmata ad producendam speciem intelligibilem, in qua communis natura repraesentatur exuta differentiiis indiividualibus, manetque a solo intellectu perceptibilis.*”



illuminative intervention of the agent intellect – would have the effect of distancing excessively the physical from the mental, but Capreolus’s or Ferrara’s “radical thesis” – attributing to the sensible images a rather conspicuous role – would dispense the agent intellect almost exclusively in favour of the imagination. Consequently, Góis’s proposal of an “effective illumination” must be read in connection with the “circulus intellectualis” or with the very nature of thinking.<sup>76</sup>

In addition, Góis attacked Avicenna, who could not accept the permanence of the species, and Averroes, who limited the cognitive human role to imagination. He had to point to something else. Once materialized in memory, he says, the permanence of imagination is likely to be grounded in light; needless to say that light (as is colour) is a partial cause in the production of images (*species*).<sup>77</sup> Identified with the spirit (*animus*) and, according to Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, explicitly linked with the three dimensions of cognition, intellectual memory is intertwined with the intentional acts of the soul (*in id tendere/sibi inhaerente feratur*).<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, as the will cannot act without preconceiving its object, the subordinated relation between imagination and intellect needs something in between “de modo repraesentandi”, precisely what Dionysius or the *Liber de Causis* used to express by saying, “omne, quod alicubi recipitur, ad recipientis naturam accommodari debet”.<sup>79</sup> We can say thus, to sum up Góis’s position, that he is pointing to an individual imagination that can only accomplish its role if immersed in the world, but at the same rate whose permanency totally depends on what transcends any worldly order.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In duos libros De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritae* II, cap. 8, q. 4, a. 1 [hereinafter: Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Generatione*] (Conimbricae: A. Mariz, 1597), 457; see also *In librum de Memoria et Reminiscencia* c. 1 [hereinafter: Collegium Conimbricense (Góis): *De Memoria*], in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In libros Aristotelis, qui Parva Naturalia appellantur* (Olisipone: S. Lopes, 1593), 3–6.

<sup>77</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* II, cap. 7, q. 4, a. 2, 177.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, III c. 5, q. 3, a. 3. 335; see also Carvalho, *Psicologia*, 101 (Italian transl., 120).

<sup>79</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 321.

The soul belongs also to the act of self-awareness, which can be described as a process.<sup>80</sup> According to Toletus, but his is a common position, self-awareness is something of an indirect<sup>81</sup> and reflexive nature.<sup>82</sup> A difference, however, appears since Góis deals with two aspects of the intellect, and Toletus distinguishes four: the possible, the habitual (*in habitu*), the agent, and the general (*in genere*).<sup>83</sup> It can be the case that we are facing nothing more than a mere language discrepancy in relation to text 8 (III. 4, 429b6) and, as a matter of fact, both Jesuits acknowledge that what the intellect is fulfilling is an indirect or reflexive self-awareness: “se ipsum intellegere” (Toletus), “ac tum seipso potest cognoscere” (Góis). So, if we are looking for a sharper difference between the two proposals, it is impossible not to look at the three prerogatives of the human soul, or Man’s very nature, according to the Coimbra text, namely: generated from an extrinsic cause, originated in God’s innermost (*ex pectore intimisque praecordis*), and totally immune from matter in its highest spiritual condition.<sup>84</sup> These three prerogatives are closely intertwined with Álvares’s innovative language, with a noticeable Cartesian accent: the soul can know itself (*se*) in the most perfect reflexive activity (*perfectissima reflexio*),<sup>85</sup> he says, and in an objective manner, separately (*se ipsam a quacumque re alia, atque ab obiecto distinguat*), clearly and evidently (*quam certo, quam evidenter obiectum attigerit*).<sup>86</sup>

When separated, the soul can finally reach an evident and complete self-awareness, which is the higher subtlety or sagacity of human knowledge or man’s capacity of penetrating into the nature or the essence of all that exists.<sup>87</sup> This would be impossible

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, III, cap. 8, q. 1, a. 1, 367; *ibid.*, III, cap. 8, q. 8, a. 1, 394.

<sup>81</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 4, q. 11, 136: “Intellectus seipsum intelligit, non quidem per se primo et directe, sed indirecte ex alterius externi cognitione.” For Suárez’s parallel position see Cees Leijenhorst, “Suárez on Self-Awareness”, in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, 137–153.

<sup>82</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* III, cap. 4, q. 11, 136: “Intellectus non eodem actu, quo obiectum cognoscit, se vel suum actum cognoscit, sed alio, qui reflexus dicitur.”

<sup>83</sup> Toletus, *De Anima* III c. 4, t. 1, 129.

<sup>84</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Álvares), *Tractatus* d. 1, a. 5, 461–462.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. 1, a. 3, 448.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. 1, a. 3, 448; disp. 5, a. 1, 515. See also Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Memoria* c. 2, 5; Aho, “The Status ...”, 60, note 44.

<sup>87</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Álvares), *Tractatus*, disp. 1, a. 3, 447–448: “... humana cognitio est subtilius, ut ad intimas etiam rerum quidditates penetrat aut



if Neo-Platonism had not made its entrance into the Aristotelian text to reinforce the spiritual character of cognition, something Góis and Álvares had accomplished by appealing to Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and to the more common Jesuit patrimony of the Thomistic scenario (*anima rationalis est substantia per se subsistens et spirituale*).<sup>88</sup> This awkward, but fruitful syncretism also explains Álvares's reference to a "modern thesis" *ex D. Augustini doctrina*, as if by extending Molina's *scientia media* to the separated souls, liberty, intentionality or creativity were something radically pertaining to human cognition regardless of its historical condition.<sup>89</sup>

### 2.3 Conclusion

Beside the interpretation of what I would call the "metaphysical cogito", probably to be duly related with the Cartesian "epistemological cogito" yet to come, a final word about the Coimbra science of the soul is still possible.

I have tried to give textual evidence of Fonseca's presence in the Coimbra Course which appeared to belong to Neo-Platonism. Moreover, I have claimed that if one wants to get the exact picture of Coimbra science of the soul, it is necessary to read the entire Course. According to Góis, human soul is of spiritual potency, an incorporeal substance, and the *subiectus* that partakes of the condition of Reason itself.<sup>90</sup> However, this is affirmed with a particular stress on physics that contrasts with the sympathy Toletus seemed to display in regards to a metaphysical approach to the study of the soul. This is quite compatible with the keen

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*penetrare contendat, adeo sagax ut quaecunque sunt re ipsa coniuncta discernat, diiudicetque quidnam ad earum pertineat essentiam ..."*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. 1, a. 3, 447; Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Generatione* I, cap. 4, q. 15, a. 1, 103.

<sup>89</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Álvares), *Tractatus* disp. 3, a. 5, 502–503: "Itaque Deus naturali quadam lege in separatos intellectus species immittit, non solum quoties effectus naturales extra suas causas ponuntur, sed etiam quoties, substantiae ipsae intellectrices altera alteri internas cogitationes volunt aperire. (...) Neque insuavior est proposita philosophandi ratio, quod Deum ponat naturali lege concurrentem ad ea, quae libera destinat creatura." See also Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *Physica* II c. 7, q. 3, a. 1, 245.

<sup>90</sup> Collegium Conimbricense (Góis), *De Anima* III, cap. 8, q. 7, a. 2, 396.

interest Góis has shown toward the contemporary European and Iberian medicine, again in contrast with Toletus. Also, much more than Toletus, Góis dwells on the process called "circulus intellectualis" and the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius in Coimbra is undisputed. Surely, it must be noted that the Coimbra commentators also admit a metaphysical approach, a task clearly affirmed by Góis but mostly developed by Álvares. This is quite a novelty because a metaphysical science of the soul transcends Aristotle and introduces an autonomous philosophical task pointing to a kind of "absolute" pneumatologia ("absolute" being here taken as a parallel with the notions of "absolute time" or "absolute space"<sup>91</sup>). A knowledge, let us underline, independent of time and separated from physicality, which are two prerequisites soon to be sought by the so-called Modern cognition. If the study of hearing – a topic with which we dealt only as a case-study – became for Góis an occasion to touch on a possible transition from "psychology" to "anthropology" (a move we could not find in Toletus parallel texts), the differences between these two Jesuits as regards imagination and self-awareness cannot be disputed. Whereas Toletus seemed to be sensitive to the prophylactic nature of imagination, Góis developed its larger philosophical framework. Nevertheless, only Álvares has touched on the relation between separation and self-awareness.

Finally, it is possible to sustain that the "theological" input of the Aristotelian Coimbra study on the soul was framed in an unusual combination of participation (*particeps*), belonging to the physical and ontological realm with evidence (*distincte potest cognoscere*) pertaining to the metaphysical and epistemological activity of the separated soul. Besides the latter more modern metaphysical cogito, the former physical approach cannot be hastily removed from the Western history of the soul. For this reason, the dignity of such a multifaceted science lies in a proposal that our contemporary notion of Psychology is unable to recognize, viz. that it is unadvisable to study the human cognition forsaking what truly constitutes the human, namely theology (Man's dependence on

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<sup>91</sup> Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "The Concept of Time According to The Coimbra Commentaries", in Pasquale Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 353–382.



God), but also ethics (His relations with other men), and cosmology (Man's belonging to the world).<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> I would like to thank Dr. Daniel Heider for his several comments while preparing this chapter; this text is dedicated "in memoriam" Father Josef Dragoš.



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### ABSTRACT

Dealing with the "first Jesuit psychology" (Francisco Toletus, Pedro da Fonseca, Manuel de Góis and Baltasar Álvares), this chapter gives textual evidence of Fonseca's presence in the Coimbra Course; it opposes Góis's physical view of the soul to the metaphysical version of Toletus as well as their own peculiar approaches to the subject; it thoroughly explains the Coimbra perspective on the science of the soul, the process of knowledge, the

relevant role of Pseudo-Dionysius, and (as a case-study) the anthropological horizon of hearing. It also gives an interpretation of what could be called the two main directions of Coimbra psychology, the physical (mainly represented by Góis) and the metaphysical (represented by Álvares). If these differences clearly indicate the importance of theology in the Coimbra philosophical project, it is claimed that whereas Álvares's text can be interpreted in a Cartesian sense, the position primarily represented by Góis forbids any clear identification between "scientia de anima" and what is usually called psychology.